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2 
Summary  
 
Thesis Title: Change in China’s Banking Sector as An Institutional Evolution 
Name: Guy Williams  
 
This thesis explains how China’s banking system has evolved since the establishment of the socialist 
market economy in 1993, when the state began to develop a more standardised and robust system of 
banking regulation and commercialise China’s state-owned banks. China’s large state-owned banks, 
which were technically insolvent in the 1990s, are now some of the biggest commercial banks in the 
world. There has been a remarkable transformation of systems of governance and risk management 
across all types of banking institutions. China has developed a system of financial regulation 
characterised by close supervision and strong regulation of financial institutions to mitigate risk and 
ensure the banking system serves the real economy. This thesis has relied on qualitative research to 
understand this change. Interviews of a number of past and present stakeholders in China’s banking 
system were undertaken, including officials from the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the agency 
responsible for the regulation and supervision of China’s banking system since 2003. The thesis also 
makes use of Chinese language texts which provide the views of Chinese political leaders and banking 
officials with respect to reform of the banking sector.  
 
The principal conclusion of the thesis is that the development of China’s banking system can best be 
understood as an evolution of institutions which reflect historical patterns of political and economic 
organisation in China. This finding is in contrast with the main body of academic literature which 
evaluates the development of China’s banking system according to its degree of conformance with a 
neoliberal economic system. The thesis argues that policy for China’s banking sector was conceived and 
implemented by officials through a politically united, centrally controlled bureaucracy reflective of 
China’s bureaucratic tradition. China’s leaders applied the concept of ‘Chinese studies at the base, 
Western studies for practical use’ (中體西用 zhongti xiyong), when adapting Western ideas and 
technology within China’s traditional political and economic system to modernise the banking sector.  
The deep concern of officials for financial stability caused them to gradually and pragmatically adopt 
international standards of financial regulation and resist policies of financial liberalisation and 
deregulation which were advocated by self-interested Western-educated bankers and government 
officials.    
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Introduction 
 
This thesis explains the evolution of China’s banking system since the establishment of the socialist 
market economy. The evolution of China’s banking system has been a vital component of the economic 
growth ‘miracle’ that has occurred following the introduction of Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening 
policy. The transformation of the banking sector itself has been remarkable. With the introduction of the 
socialist market economy in 1993, China began to formally establish a system of market regulation and 
commercialise its large state-owned banks. These banks struggled to cope with the rapid pace of 
economic development. By the late 1990s China’s banks were widely considered by external observers 
to be technically insolvent (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 47). Today China is home to four of the top five 
banks in the world (measured by Tier 1 capital), with eight further banks placed within the top fifty in 
the world (Palma, Stefania 2016). As of 2015, the average rate of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the 
banking sector is just 1.9% (CBRC 2016, 196). China has now developed a robust regulatory system and a 
sustainable banking system that is resilient to risk. The orthodox view of reform mischaracterises this 
change because it neglects the impact of China’s historical patterns of political and economic 
organisation. China’s officials have incorporated Western ideas and technology to develop the banking 
sector within these historical patterns of political and economic organisation according to the concept 
‘Chinese studies at the base, Western studies for practical use’ (中體西用zhongti xiyong) (Suzuki 2009, 
93; see also Levenson 1964). The first head of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), Liu 
Mingkang, stated that ‘No reform can ignore the actual situation in our country. Only by paying 
attention to China’s national conditions and drawing lessons from advanced countries’ successful 
experiences can reform be successful’ (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009, 122). 
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Table 1: China’s Top 25 Banks by Tier One Capital 
 
 
[TABLE REDACTED FOR REASONS OF COPYRIGHT]    
 
Data adapted from thebankerdatabase.com, ‘Ranking - Top 1000 World Banks by Tier 1 and Assets – 
2017’  
 
 
11 
Part I: The Orthodox View of Reform: 
 
The orthodox view of reform in the academic literature on this subject is derived from neoliberalism and 
evaluates China’s banking sector according to the degree of implementation of free market policies. 
Neoliberalism is an economic philosophy that advocates for free markets and against state intervention 
which has been influential in global economic policy since the 1970s. The neoliberal philosophy 
originates from two main schools of economic thought, neoclassical economics, which provides the 
analytical tools, and the Austrian-Libertarian tradition, which is responsible for the moral and political 
philosophy. The fundamental tenet of neoliberalism is that economic activity should be left to the 
market with limited, if any, intervention by the state. Neoliberal theorists advocate prices determined 
by market forces for efficient allocation of resources, as well as the private ownership of firms and 
protection of property rights of shareholders to provide a profit motive and incentive for investment. 
According to this theory, there should be no restrictions on competition, which drives firms to be more 
efficient. State intervention is considered by neoliberal theorists to cause efficiency losses, for example 
protectionism in the banking sector is characterised as ‘regulatory capture’. Neoliberal policies 
recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and US Treasury Department, 
known as the Washington Consensus, include abolition of policies which restrict market entry and 
competition; liberalisation of interest rates; privatisation; adoption of a competitive exchange rate, and 
the establishment of a system of property rights (Williamson 1989).  
 
This thesis relies on the work of Geoffrey Hodgson to both critique the orthodox view of reform and 
offer an alternative explanation. According to Hodgson, the emergence of neoliberal theory is part of a 
trend in the social sciences towards the search for a general theory, ‘a single theoretical framework’, 
which would provide universal laws and principles which apply to all economic systems (Hodgson 2001, 
3). The search for a ‘general theory’ can be contrasted with an empirical approach which relies on 
gaining knowledge through observed experience. Neoliberals view their economic system as ‘natural’ 
and other systems as ‘unnatural’, and consider the implementation of neoliberal policies as the means 
to achieve the ‘one ideal, pure market system’ (Hodgson 2001, 29,31).  
 
The use of a single theoretical framework or universal laws and principles is prevalent in the literature 
which analyses China’s banking system. The principal work cited in this paper which uses such a 
framework is Red Capitalism. Its authors, Walter and Howie, write that ‘China’s economy is no different 
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from any other’ and consider any China-specific explanations of banking reform as part of what they 
consider to be ‘the Great China Development Myth’ (Walter and Howie 2012, xvii, 3). In this way, Walter 
and Howie neglect historical patterns of political and economic organisation and focus exclusively on 
China’s perceived conformance with a neoliberal model, in their case that of the United States. For 
Walter and Howie, China’s establishment of the socialist market economy marked the commencement 
of reforms that ‘…followed a path of deregulation blazed by the United States’ (Walter and Howie 2012, 
3). 
 
The orthodox view of reform is supported by the academic literature, institutions of global financial 
governance and also by large international financial conglomerates and their governments. In academic 
literature related to the banking sector, the justification for neoliberal policies is supported by cross-
sectional studies such as Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004), which finds that restriction of banks’ activities 
and entry of foreign banks is associated with bank fragility, and that government ownership is linked 
with negative banking outcomes. Studies on China’s banking sector typically recommend the adoption 
of neoliberal policies (see for example Kwong 2011; Mo 1999; Bonin and Huang 2001; Y. Huang, Wang, 
and Lin 2010; Bekier, Huang, and Wilson 2005; Feyzioglu, Porter, and Takáts 2009; Dobson and Kashyap 
2006). Yiping Huang (2001) finds that while China’s economic performance over reform has been 
‘remarkable’, he concludes that the state’s exit from the banking sector and the introduction of 
competition from private and foreign sectors is necessary for the ‘completion of the transition to the 
market economy’ (Y. Huang 2001, 1, 156). The Western developed countries which designed and 
controlled institutions of global financial governance have sought to promote neoliberal policies. As 
recently as July 2015, the World Bank described China’s financial sector in a chapter of its China 
Economic Update, later redacted, as ‘unbalanced, repressed, costly to maintain and potentially unstable’, 
attributes which in its view had led to ‘the poor performance of the financial system’ (Wildau 2015d). 
 
China’s officials have perceived the orthodox view of reform to be an instrument of power for 
developed countries, whose financial conglomerates sought to gain control over China’s best financial 
assets. In his speech at the Second National Financial Work Meeting, then General Secretary Jiang Zemin 
cited the view expressed in Huntington’s book ‘Clash of Civilisations’ that control and operation of the 
international financial system, hard currency and international capital markets were all strategic 
objectives for Western civilisation (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 454). The pressure from foreign financial 
institutions and their governments was particularly acute in the late 1990s after China announced its 
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entry into the WTO. Large financial conglomerates from developed countries, which had emerged in the 
1990s following the deregulation of the global financial services industry, had aggressively pursued M&A 
deals for financial firms in developing countries. China’s financial sector was considered the next major 
objective and international financial conglomerates, with support from their governments, lobbied 
intensely for the deregulation of China’s financial sector to allow acquisition of China’s financial assets 
by foreign firms. Recalling this time, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan commented that 
‘with the geopolitical pressure of the cold war removed, the United States had the historic opportunity 
to knit the international economy more closely together’ (Greenspan 2007, 149). There was deep fear 
and uncertainty among banking executives and regulators in China regarding the future of the banking 
sector. One official in the financial regulatory sector commented at the time that ‘they [the international 
financial conglomerates] will walk all over us’. 
 
The Orthodox View of Reform and the Role of the State: 
 
The orthodox view of reform rejects the idea of an active role for the state to promote economic 
development and transformation. State intervention in China’s banking system is deemed to be the 
result of mere political self-interest rather than seen as a legitimate policy for economic development. 
Walter and Howie state that ‘greed is the driving force behind the protectionist walls of the “state-
owned” economy “inside the system” and money is the language’ (Walter and Howie 2012, 23). State 
intervention exists to serve the needs of the political elite with the ‘true nature’ of the state-owned 
economy considered to be ‘a patronage system centred on the Party’s nomenklatura’ (Walter and 
Howie 2012, 24). In his 2008 book ‘Factions and Finance in China’, Victor Shih of North Western 
University writes that this political self-interest manifests itself through local and central Party factions 
whose ‘dominant presence’ in the financial sector ‘ultimately shape policy-making’ (Shih 2008, 3). 
According to Shih, ‘top leaders desire for power and the uncertain political environment in which they 
operate compel them to pursue factional politics, which creates… the dearth of significant financial 
market reform’ (Shih 2008, 47). According to Nicholas Lardy, his recent book ‘Markets over Mao’ 
‘counters the argument… that the real engine of Chinese economic progress has been the government’s 
adoption of an economic model that eschews reliance on the market’ (Lardy 2014, 2). According to 
Lardy, ‘The key theme… of this book is that in virtually every dimension of China’s economic success 
over the last three decades plus can be attributed to the rise of markets and private businesses’ and that 
‘attempts to produce a model of state capitalism have actually failed’ (Nicholas Lardy on Markets over 
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Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China 2014). These works contend that state intervention is an 
obstacle for reform of China’s banking sector and that a free market system with limited government 
intervention is preferable.    
 
Journal articles on the banking system attempt to find evidence of efficiency losses associated with state 
intervention. These losses of efficiency are considered to be the impact of China’s non-conformance 
with free market policies. Studies attempt to establish a causal relationship between state ownership 
and the relatively weak performance of China’s centrally controlled banks relative to other banks in the 
sector (Shih, Zhang, and Liu 2007; Berger, Hasan, and Zhou 2009; Fu and Heffernan 2009; García-Herrero, 
Gavilá, and Santabárbara 2009; Jia 2009; X. Lin and Zhang 2009). Other studies attempt to demonstrate 
the negative impact of financial repression or lack of competition on the performance of the banking 
system (Fu and Heffernan 2009; García-Herrero, Gavilá, and Santabárbara 2009).  
 
In general, the academic literature perceives state influence over the governance of China’s banks to be 
unfavourable because it has a negative impact on the efficient allocation of capital. State influence has 
been cited as the principal reason for problems of corporate governance within China’s banks (Y. Huang, 
Wang, and Lin 2010; H. Huang 2010). Studies also claim that excessive state influence is the major 
contributing factor behind high rates of NPLs during the 1990s and the high proportion of loans 
allocated to local government financing platforms for low-return infrastructure and utility projects 
following the state’s expansionary monetary policy in 2008 (Mo 1999; Bonin and Huang 2001; Cull and 
Xu 2003; Kwong 2011). According to the literature, the state’s influence prevents capital flowing to the 
most desirable recipients of funds, private firms, which exhibit the highest rates of growth and 
investment (Lardy 2014; Y. Huang, Wang, and Lin 2010). Studies have criticised the banking sector’s 
lending to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which it suggests is politically motivated and not responsive 
enough to commercial principles (Park and Sehrt 2001; Podpiera 2006; Firth et al. 2009; W. Zhou 2009). 
A recent IMF working paper assessing the default risks for Chinese firms found that the cost of debt for 
firms was detached from economic fundamentals and determined by implicit guarantees (Law and 
Roache 2015). 
 
The orthodox view of reform disregards the positive role that the Communist Party has played in the 
governance of the banking sector. Party institutions have been central to the values and ideology of 
officials in the banking sector. They have been responsible for the appointment, monitoring and 
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discipline of officials in the banking sector. Party institutions have also adapted to the evolution of the 
banking sector. These institutions have been utilised to implement policy initiatives and mitigate risk in 
China’s banking sector.   
 
The orthodox view of reform neglects the role of that the Chinese state has played in economic 
development and transformation. China’s banks have made a significant contribution to the country’s 
transition from a planned economy. To reform its SOEs, the state has pulled together plants from the 
communist era to create unified, centrally controlled enterprises which have been commercialised and 
have developed modern structures of corporate governance. To quote ANZ economist Zhou Hao, 
China’s banks have been a ‘mirror of the economy’ as the liabilities of these enterprises have 
represented the bulk of banking assets (Interview with ANZ economist Zhou Hao, 24 April 2015). China’s 
large state-owned banks have taken the leading role in providing capital to SOEs as the state has 
transitioned from grant-based funding to loan-based funding, supporting them as price controls and 
barriers to competition have been removed (Naughton 2007; Laurenceson and Chai 2001). State 
intervention has been fundamental to the development of the banking sector. In contrast with 
neoliberal policy, China has employed protectionist measures in the banking sector to enable the 
transformation of its SOEs such as the regulation of bank interest rates and control of the capital 
account. State intervention into the allocation of credit has been part of a strategy of economic 
transformation. For example, important state infrastructure and industrial projects have retained 
priority over credit, even when these loans are not profitable (Yeung 2009).      
 
The Chinese state has played an important role in determining the pace and sequencing of reform. 
Current General Secretary Xi Jinping recently commented that ‘the market and the government should 
complement and coordinate with each other to promote sustained and sound economic development’ 
(Xi 2014, 128). Officials considered factors such as the suitability of reforms to China’s national 
conditions, the level of difficulty and the potential impact on economic stability when determining the 
reform agenda. In Liu Mingkang’s words ‘the pace of reform had to defer to the quality of reform’ (Liu, 
Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, vii). The rapid pace of economic development after the establishment of the 
socialist market economy made it imperative for the state to develop regulatory institutions to mitigate 
risks that had emerged in the banking sector. Careful sequencing of reform was vital to ensure that the 
most urgent risks to the sustainability of China’s banking system were addressed. Officials were also 
mindful of time constraints and limited resources available in implementing banking reforms. The timing 
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of reforms was subject to China’s national conditions. The socialist market economy was established 
only after the planned economy was strengthened to contain cycles of currency and price inflation and 
create the conditions necessary for further reform. Similarly, shareholding reform proceeded by virtue 
of favourable conditions including rising levels of domestic economic growth, strong world markets and 
deep foreign exchange reserves. These conditions had not been present a few years earlier in the 
aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, when the state was forced to bail out the banks without 
instituting any major reform of bank governance. Officials chose to implement reforms which were 
easier first. Reforms which empowered centrally controlled financial institutions preceded more difficult 
political reforms such as the centralisation of bank appointments and the widening of People’s Bank of 
China (PBoC) branch areas. In determining the listing order of state-owned banks, officials prioritised 
those banks with relatively favourable levels of capital adequacy and NPLs. Bank of China’s international 
experience as China’s foreign exchange bank, along with the successful listing of its Hong Kong 
subsidiary, was also taken into consideration. 
 
The Orthodox View of Reform and the Regulation of Markets: 
 
The emphasis of the orthodox view of reform on policies of financial deregulation and liberalisation 
causes it to neglect the role of the state in constructing a system of market regulation which will ensure 
the stability of the financial sector. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has been a 
notable advocate of the orthodox view during the period of research. In a speech titled ‘The Evolution of 
Banking in a Market Economy’, given less than three months before the Asian financial crisis, Greenspan 
extolled the benefits of self-regulation of markets and suggested ‘…market-stabilizing private regulatory 
forces should gradually displace many cumbersome, increasingly ineffective government structures’ 
(Greenspan 1997). Such a view neglects the inherent instability of markets. The increased incidence and 
severity of financial crises since neoliberal ideas have gained popularity around the mid-1960s caused 
Charles Kindleberger to label it ‘…the most tumultuous in international monetary history’ due to the 
increase in cross-border capital flows (Kindleberger and Aliber 2005, 277). Minsky argued that the 
capitalist financial system was inherently unstable because in good times firms would underestimate the 
risk of external finance and overestimate future profits (Minsky 1980, 1992). He stated that ‘over 
periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable 
system to financial relations that make for an unstable system’ (Minsky 1992, 8). 
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The academic literature has overlooked the development of market institutions which has allowed the 
Chinese state to harness the power of the market safely and effectively. For example, Shih (2007, 1238) 
characterises the period between 1998 and 2003 as one of ‘reform stagnation’ in China’s banking sector 
because, in his view, market reforms following the establishment of the socialist market economy were 
blocked by the interests of the central political elite. Shih defines reform as policies which increases the 
efficiency of resource allocation and cites the Washington Consensus policies as examples. According to 
Shih, reform stagnated because China failed to liberalise interest rates and legalise private banking, 
actions which he considers to be ‘some of the most important reform measures’ (Shih 2007, 1241). The 
period covered by Shih’s article was one of significant institutional development, provoked by the Asian 
financial crisis, as policymakers reduced systemic risk and solidified the foundations of the socialist 
market economy. His article neglects fundamental market-building reforms that occurred in areas such 
as loan-making and risk management. Similarly, Walter and Howie call the year 2005 the ‘end of reform’ 
because, although substantial, the reform which followed was not part of the journey towards a free 
market system (Walter and Howie 2012, 15). This thesis argues that Walter and Howie overlook the 
reforms undertaken by CBRC to strengthen regulation and improve the governance of state-owned 
banks after listing, reforms which greatly improved the resilience of the banking sector. Studies which 
focus on bank regulation tend to focus on institutional form ahead of regulatory development, criticising 
the lack of independence of PBoC and CBRC, suggesting they are not able to maintain a ‘market system’ 
as other state organs will intervene when the interests of state-owned banks are compromised (see for 
example H. Huang 2010).  
 
Part II: Reform as an Evolution of Institutions: 
 
Contrary to the orthodox view, the development of China’s banking system is best described as an 
evolution of institutions which reflect historical patterns of political and economic organisation in China. 
China’s leaders applied the concept of ‘Chinese studies at the base, Western studies for practical use’ 
(中體西用zhongti xiyong), in gradually adapting Western ideas and technology within China’s traditional 
political and economic system to modernise the banking sector. China’s officials have determined how 
reform would be implemented. The focus on free market policies in literature holds little explanatory 
value in describing banking reform given that the Chinese state has not implemented such policies. 
China did not attempt the ‘big bang’ approach to market reforms that was observed in Russia and 
certain Eastern European states. China’s policymakers, according to the principles of Deng Xiaoping’s 
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Reform and Opening policy, have implemented gradual, experimental reform as if ‘groping for stones to 
cross the river’. Deng’s ideas have remained highly influential from the establishment of the socialist 
market economy until today. In 2012, at a visit of Shenzhen’s Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to mark the 
20 year anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour, General Secretary Xi Jinping declared his resolve 
to continue with reform according to the theories and practices of ‘Reform and Opening Up’ which he 
considered ‘the only route that must be taken to adhere to and develop socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’ (Xinhua News Agency 2012). Xi vowed that there would be ‘no stop in reform, and no 
stop in opening up’ (Xinhua News Agency 2012).   
 
It is argued that historical patterns of political and economic organisation persist in institutions, causing 
institutions to be path dependent and subject to an evolutionary process of development. According to 
Hodgson, institutions, defined as ‘systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social 
interactions’, are socially constructed and embedded in the country’s history, culture and politics 
(Hodgson 2006, 18). Therefore characterising change in China’s banking system as part of a convergence 
towards ‘one ideal, pure market system’ in the literature is problematic because China’s market system 
is unique and comprised of its own, historically-specific institutions of governance (Hodgson 2001, 31). 
In this way institutional analysis rejects the idea of a ‘natural economic system’ and emphasises the role 
of institutions in market regulation or governance of financial institutions. Instead of being considered 
as part of a ‘natural economic system’, neoliberal policies can be viewed as a consequence of a 
particular institutional arrangement. In his work ‘The Great Transformation’, Karl Polanyi stated that 
since the 19th century, ‘the road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase 
in continuous, centrally organized and controlled interventionism’ (Polanyi 2001, 146).   
 
Institutional analysis has previously been applied in other case studies to demonstrate how historical 
patterns of political and economic organisation have been highly influential in processes of economic 
development. In his work on the Danish economy, Ove Kaj Pedersen identifies institutional features 
which explain the evolution of an economic model which has produced an advanced economy 
characterised by high levels of investment in education and skills, high taxation and a strong welfare 
state. Pedersen suggests that Denmark’s ‘long history of lost wars and territories’, which instilled ‘into 
the public mind a sense of national vulnerability’, was instrumental in the establishment of a common 
national identity (Pedersen 2006a, 245). He also finds that the existence of a small, centralised ruling 
elite has allowed Denmark to drive national development strategies in the public interest. Pedersen 
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finds that these features, along with ‘a political culture marked by institutionalized class cooperation’, 
has defined how Denmark has incorporated neoliberal ideas within its economic system to create what 
he terms a ‘negotiated economy’ (Pedersen 2006a, 245; see also Pedersen and Kjaer 2001).  With 
respect to the evolution of Denmark’s economy, Pedersen too rejects the notion that it should be 
evaluated according to its degree of conformance with a neoliberal economic system, favouring instead 
an institutional approach. He states:  ‘The important lesson of the Danish case… is that the differences 
between economies are not based on their being more or less liberal, but on the political, economic, 
organizational, and other mechanisms by which they are coordinated’ (Pedersen 2006b, 466). 
 
The research question is as follows: 
 
What factors explain the evolution of China’s banking system since the establishment of the socialist 
market economy? 
 
Why History Matters: 
a) The overarching goal of reform is rooted in China’s pride in its ancient civilisation  
 
Through the policies of ‘Reform and Opening’, Deng Xiaoping wished to see China to rise again, to catch 
up to developed Western nations and claim the benefits of modernity for the Chinese people. China has 
a proud history as one of the world’s oldest civilisations and had the most vibrant and prosperous 
economy in the world prior to the industrial revolution. As Western countries experienced the industrial 
revolution, China’s economy experienced a decline which was associated with a loss of sovereignty and 
oppression by foreign powers. These experiences have underlined to Chinese policymakers the 
importance of economic sovereignty for any programme of modernisation. In a speech made to mark 
the 30th anniversary of Reform and Opening, Hu Jintao declared that China ‘should always put the 
nation's sovereignty and security above anything else’ and that the state was ‘determined to deal with 
Chinese affairs according to China's realities by relying on the strength of the Chinese people’ (Hu Jintao 
2008). Deng’s reform vision was highly influenced by time he had spent in advanced nations with 
modern economic systems such as France, the USA and Japan (Vogel 2013). Through ‘Reform and 
Opening’, China opened itself to the ideas, technology and capital of Western countries. These would be 
incorporated within a Chinese system according to the concept ‘Chinese studies at the base, Western 
studies for practical use’ (中體西用zhongti xiyong).  
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In March 2006, current General Secretary Xi Jinping explained the influence of history on China’s reform 
and opening policy. He said: ‘To understand our dedication to revitalize the country, one has to 
appreciate the pride that Chinese people take in our glorious ancient civilization. This is the historical 
driving force inspiring people today to build the nation. The Chinese people made great contributions to 
world civilization and enjoyed long-term prosperity. Then we suffered over a century of national 
weakness, oppression and humiliation. So we have a deep self-motivation to build our country. Our 
commitment and determination is rooted in our historic and national pride’ (Kuhn 2010, 4). According to 
economic historian Angus Maddison, prior to the 19th century China was the most powerful country in 
both Europe and Asia. China’s GDP in 1820 was 30% higher than Western Europe and its Western 
offshoots combined (Maddison 2006, 119). China contributed valuable technology advancements to the 
world which supported important industries such as shipping, textiles and mining. Merchants were 
engaged in peaceful trade of exports such as porcelain, tea, silk and textiles, predominantly through 
South East Asia. Prosperous areas such as the Jiangnan region in Eastern China experienced high levels 
of urbanisation.    
 
China’s century of national humiliation was characterised by military defeats resulting in the loss of 
territory and the imposition of disadvantageous terms of commercial trade through unequal treaties. 
China’s economy experienced a decline from the 1840s until the birth of new China in 1949. China’s 
defeat at the hands of the British and the French during the Opium Wars in the 1840s forced China to 
open its borders to traders from the United Kingdom, US, Japan and twelve other European nations. 
Treaties were imposed on China which guaranteed traders jurisdiction over ports and access to Chinese 
markets at low tariff rates. Foreigners established a large international settlement in Shanghai. Japan 
imposed its military might over China, taking over control of Korea in the late 19th century and 
Manchuria in the 1930s, and occupying China for eight years during the Second World War. China’s GDP 
per capita fell 25% between 1820 and 1950 (Maddison 2006, 119).  
 
The modernisation of China’s banking system has been a source of great pride for China’s leaders. 
According to a book edited by former head of Bank of China and CBRC Liu Mingkang which details the 
history of Chinese banking sector reform since reform and opening, reforms have rendered the banking 
system ‘incomparable’ to its past forms (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 3–4). Before reform, China’s 
banking system was far behind that of Western European nations where financial institutions 
resembling modern banks had been developed and refined since approximately the end of the 16th 
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century. The development of systems and mechanisms to regulate the market economy is considered by 
Liu to be an ‘historical breakthrough’ (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 2). Liu considers that these 
achievements have only been possible because the state has had full responsibility for the development 
and implementation of strategies for the banking sector.  
 
Due to China’s history of oppression by foreign powers, officials were wary of adopting Western ideas 
and technology in a manner which would undermine China’s economic sovereignty or be unsuitable to 
China’s national conditions. Officials incorporated ideas which would enable China to meet reform goals 
and resisted those which were unsuitable or even harmful. China rejected the Western, neoliberal 
model which promoted a dangerous and insufficiently regulated global financial system. China’s officials, 
though perhaps possessed with less sophisticated understanding of modern banking systems, were able 
to resist pressure from self-interested large financial conglomerates (often supported by their 
governments) who advocated for deregulation and the break-up and privatisation of large state-owned 
banks in order to pursue a strategy of M&A in China’s banking sector. This pressure was particularly 
intense after China signalled its intention to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and open up its 
financial sector to foreign firms, at a time when China’s large state-owned banks were considered by 
external observers to be technically insolvent. Minority investment in China’s banks by foreign financial 
institutions was restricted in order to limit the influence of Western ideas on the character of China’s 
banking system while still allowing for the benefits of foreign knowledge and competition.   
 
Why History Matters: 
b) The bureaucratic system embedded within the banking sector is reflective of China’s bureaucratic 
tradition   
 
China possesses a unique bureaucratic system which has been historically characterised by a politically 
united, centrally controlled bureaucracy led by scholar-officials. According to the structure of traditional 
Chinese society, social class was defined by one’s profession with scholar-officials being of a higher 
social class than that belonging to peasants, artisans and merchants. The influence of officials extended 
to all aspects of society. China developed and refined its system of bureaucracy over 2000 years, 
particularly after the unification of China (Dawson 1964, 310). In the Han dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD), 
Confucianism became the state doctrine. Confucian thought emphasised the idea that rulers govern and 
maintain legitimacy through virtuous example and serving the interests of society. At this time the rival 
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legalist school remained influential and through it valuable bureaucratic concepts relating to personnel 
administration and organisation were introduced. A meritocratic system of examination for the entry of 
scholar-officials into civil service was developed. Over time detailed rules were developed to refine the 
roles and responsibilities of officials and their place in the bureaucratic structure. Institutions such as the 
censorate were established to monitor the behaviour officials. Over the 16 centuries or so which 
followed, institutions for ‘investigation, criticism, advice and complaint’ of officials were developed 
(Dawson 1964, 319).  
 
The party system of governance that is deeply embedded in the banking sector has descended from 
China’s bureaucratic tradition. The Communist Party exerts centralised control through a system of 
party committees, led by the Central Committee which is comprised of China’s most powerful political 
leaders. The general direction of state policy for the economy is determined at the level of the Politburo, 
a small group of party leaders elected by the Central Committee. It is the role of government organs 
such as the State Council, PBoC and CBRC to executive the vision of party leaders. Within the banking 
system, each bank has a party committee. Party committees are a vehicle for transmitting the values 
and ideology of the party to officials. They also serve as a means to monitor and discipline officials, with 
the Central Discipline Inspection Commission charged with the most serious cases of official misconduct. 
The Central Organisational Department (COD), which is the party organisation responsible for personnel 
administration, has taken the leading role in the appointment of senior officials in the banking sector. In 
the early 1990s it was estimated to control appointments of 5,000 party and government posts, 
including those of its centrally controlled SOEs (McGregor 2012, 81,89). Within the banking sector, the 
COD controls the appointments of the executive board members of its centrally controlled banking 
institutions, namely the ‘Big Four’ state-owned banks, Bank of Communications (BoCom), the three 
policy banks, and the banks of CITIC Group and Everbright Group. Even the appointment of CEO for 
China Minsheng Bank, known as China’s first private bank, passes through the COD (McGregor 2012). As 
in the past, the appointment system facilitates the assessment of officials in different roles which 
provides the party with valuable information on which officials are suitable for higher office (Zhang 
2012).  
 
China’s top bankers identify themselves as officials with a political career within the bureaucratic system 
rather than as career bankers. As one CBRC official stated, the ultimate goal of these officials remains 
higher political office and the chance to contribute to the country. When asked of their motivations, the 
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official in question quoted the Confucian phrase ‘a good scholar can become an official’ (Interview with 
CBRC official, 20 March 2015). The career of officials in the banking sector is defined by progression 
within the bureaucratic system. It is extremely common for officials in China’s large state-owned banks 
to move to and from roles in financial regulatory agencies which report to the State Council (L. Chen 
2013). For example current head of CBRC Guo Shuqing was chairman of China Construction Bank from 
2005-2011. During his career, Guo also assumed the roles of Chairman of CSRC and SAFE and was 
governor of Shandong Province prior to moving to CBRC. Officials in the banking sector have an interest 
in serving the needs of society. Many of the CBRC officials interviewed cited pride in contributing to the 
development of the banking sector as a major reason for choosing this career path (Interviews with 
CBRC officials, 10 October 2014 – 19 March 2015).    
 
The party system of governance within the banking sector was centralised after the establishment of the 
socialist market economy. This followed a period of decentralisation of economic decision-making 
within China’s bureaucratic system during the early period of reform and opening following the success 
of agricultural reforms in 1978. Agricultural reforms led to the eventual devolution of production 
decisions from the commune to the household. Industrial reforms, which followed in 1984, transferred 
control of large industrial plants or enterprises from central industrial ministries to local governments. 
Relations of production changed as households and industrial enterprises formed contractual relations 
with the state over production. According to Liu Mingkang, the development of specialised banks 
proceeded according to the spirit of the contract responsibility system employed in industrial reforms 
(Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 43). At this time banks did not function as unified enterprises. Branches 
had their own legal person status which afforded them considerable autonomy. The devolution of 
power to provincial regions rendered local governments with significant influence over the financial 
sector. Local party officials held the power to appoint local heads of branches of both the central bank 
as well as the specialised banks. They pushed central bank and specialised bank officials to lend money 
to local enterprises. This was not limited to loan-making and included inter-bank and central bank loans.  
 
Centralising reforms of party governance were undertaken to align the incentives of party officials with 
reform goals relating to financial regulation, credit allocation and monetary policy. After the 
establishment of the socialist market economy, the party emphasised the duty of officials to maintain 
financial order and respect national financial regulation. The bureaucratic system was forced to adapt to 
the unification and commercialisation of centrally controlled financial enterprises. The PRC Commercial 
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Bank Law, enacted in 1995, had provided a legal basis for greater autonomy of banks and a single-tier 
legal person structure was established within the banks. Reform of the personnel system completed in 
2003 shifted authority for local appointments of centrally controlled state-owned banks to the COD in 
Beijing. The role of party organs in controlling appointments and monitoring and disciplining officials has 
remained a fundamental part of the governance of China’s large state-owned banks. It has adapted to 
the governance changes caused by shareholding reform and the establishment of a basic framework of 
corporate governance with a board of directors and board of supervisors.  
 
The cohesive nature of the bureaucratic system, particularly since centralising reforms, has proved an 
effective foil to the excesses of the market. The party system aligns the incentives of officials in banks 
and regulatory agencies with those of the party core. In this way it has limited the ability of agents in the 
financial sector to lobby for deregulation or acquisition of Chinese banks by foreign entities. In the 
banking sector, the desire of officials to serve the interests of society has been expressed through the 
idea that banks should serve the real economy. This can be seen in the regulation of financial derivatives, 
for example, which have been limited by the CBRC to ‘practical, transparent, and straight-forward 
innovations that serve the fundamental demands of the real economic sectors’ (CBRC 2011a, 41). While 
market capitalisation of Chinese banks has surged, the compensation of executives in the financial 
sector in China remains a tiny fraction of that of their counterparts in the West. China’s bureaucratic 
control of the financial sector has allowed it to rein in the market and use it as a means to achieve public 
policy goals.  
 
Why History Matters: 
c) The emphasis of officials on stability, which has defined the approach towards regulation of the 
banking system, can be linked to historical Chinese political thought 
 
Historically, stability has been a fundamental concern of China’s bureaucracy. Successive dynasties 
struggled to protect the population from fundamental problems of food production, famine and 
management of water supplies (see for example Will 1990; Chi 1970). The fall of a dynasty not only 
brought a loss of power to its rulers but also created significant political turmoil. The question of how to 
rule over Chinese civilisation with stability has been a central goal of scholars of Chinese political 
thought, such as Confucius, which remain influential today. The weight of this history magnifies the 
sense of responsibility felt by China’s leaders towards the political system and heightens the fear of 
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system disintegration. More recently, China has suffered through periods of instability during both the 
Republican and Communist eras. Many of the leaders at the 14th Party Congress in 1978 were 
themselves victims of ideological attacks during the Cultural Revolution and other movements and 
experienced first-hand the devastating impact of political instability on economic progress. Hu Jintao 
said of the state’s attitude towards reform that ‘we are deeply aware that development is the 
fundamental principle and stability is the fundamental goal. Without stability, we will get nowhere and 
may even fritter away our past achievements’ (Hu Jintao 2008). 
 
The concern for stability is reflected in policy implementation for the banking sector during Reform and 
Opening. It was magnified by the challenge of economic transition from a planned economy with a 
banking system that had been severely weakened during the Cultural Revolution. As a supplier of credit 
to other industries, instability in the banking system had the potential to slow down or derail China’s 
economic reform program. Consequently, reform of the banking sector has proceeded ‘half a step’ 
behind the reform of other SOEs according to one CBRC official (Interview with CBRC official, 10 March 
2015). China’s officials have viewed markets as inherently unstable and requiring close supervision and 
regulation. Stability has been prioritised ahead of market discipline and market efficiency. The banking 
sector has supported struggling SOEs during economic transition in order to maintain social stability. 
According to one official, loans made to SOEs to maintain social stability were termed ‘dumpling loans’, 
as they would ensure workers had money to buy dumplings at Chinese New Year (Interview with 
government official, 10 October 2014). The most significant failure in the banking sector, that of the 
Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation in 1998, was permitted by officials to 
mitigate systemic risk, reduce moral hazard and increase the accountability of China’s financial 
institutions. 
 
Since the establishment of the socialist market economy, officials have been concerned with how to 
regulate the banking system in order to maintain financial stability. In the early stages of its 
development, the priority was to empower the regulatory system so that it could bring order to the 
banking sector. The advent of the Asian financial crisis alerted officials to the danger of NPLs to the 
stability of the financial system and prompted reforms to create a more resilient financial system, many 
of which were based on international regulatory standards. China has repeatedly voiced its concern 
regarding the inability of global financial regulatory institutions to ensure financial stability, most 
notably after the global financial crisis. Shortly after the crisis Central Bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan 
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wrote that ‘the frequency and increasing intensity of financial crises following the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system suggests the costs of such a system to the world may have exceeded its benefits’ 
(X. Zhou 2009). This scepticism has been the major factor for China’s relatively slow integration into the 
global financial system, particularly with respect to its unwillingness to allow free movement of capital 
and the gradual liberalisation of interest rates. Prior to the global financial crisis, the CBRC improved 
supervision of the banking system and governance mechanisms of the large state-owned banks, thereby 
lowering credit risk and allowing banks to build up capital buffers. After the crisis, the CBRC focused on 
close supervision and interaction with banks to reduce risks which emerged as a result of the crisis in 
areas such as local government debt and shadow banking.     
 
Why History Matters: 
d) The ideological excesses of Mao’s era and their impact on economic development and stability 
unquestionably influenced Deng Xiaoping’s desire for a pragmatic approach to reform from 1978   
 
The pragmatic approach to reform observed after the establishment of the socialist market economy 
can be linked to the spirit of ‘Reform and Opening’ policies. According to Hu Jintao, the Third Plenary 
Session of the 11th Central Committee in 1978, which marked the beginning of Reform and Opening, 
‘redefined the Party’s ideological line’. The party, following Deng Xiaoping’s vision, resolved to ‘proceed 
from actual situations, integrate theory with practice, seek truth from facts, and test and develop truth 
through practice’ (Hu Jintao 2008). This represented a significant departure from the ideological 
excesses of Mao’s era and indeed Deng’s pragmatic stance allowed him to navigate through dangerous 
ideological waters as reform proceeded.  
 
While the overall goals for reform in the banking sector were clearly expressed, policymakers did not 
have a fixed view for how to achieve goals of maintaining financial stability, supporting economic 
modernisation, transforming SOEs and developing infrastructure. Prior to the establishment of the 
socialist market economy, the implementation of Reform and Opening policies did not imply the 
inevitable transition to the market economy. Prior to 1993 there was no commitment to the 
development of a system of market regulation. Rather, policymakers aimed to develop a more scientific 
and informed planned economy. Policymakers elected to establish the socialist market economy based 
on the observation that market-based incentives had driven economic growth and improvements in 
living standards. The state does not have blind faith in the market and views it as a ‘double-edged sword’ 
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which can create financial instability. Wang Dashu, Professor of Public Finance at Peking University and 
former senior researcher at the Research and Development Centre of the State Council, insisted that 
China’s rapid rate of change, diverse developmental challenges and the imperfect nature of markets 
have necessitated a strong role for the state (Interview with Wang Dashu, 25 March 2015).  
 
This has led to a pragmatic approach to the regulation of China’s banking sector after 1993, as illustrated 
by Zhou Xiaochuan’s comments relating to reform in the financial sector: 
  
‘The characteristic of reform in China is to uphold the attitude of ‘trial and error’, sufficiently respect the 
practice and treat practice as the only test of truth….The approach of progressive reform may make 
some policies and regulations rather strongly explorative and avoiding to duplicate the statutes of 
mature markets will probably result in many provisional regulations, but the reality has proved that the 
overall consequences of Chinese practices are quite positive’ (C. Lin 2003, 7–8).  
 
As Zhou suggests, reforms in the banking sector were highly exploratory and evolved according to 
practical results. Successful trials of policy initiatives within particular banks or regions prior to a 
nationwide roll-out were a feature of China’s banking reforms. Important regulations issued by the PBoC 
and the CBRC were labelled ‘provisional’ and subject to further revision after implementation. The CBRC 
has tended to issue comprehensive rules only when a particular area of regulation reaches the end of an 
exploratory rule-setting process, whereupon previous rules are annulled.   
 
The ‘primary task’ of each type of financial institution has been to ‘keep serving the real economy’ (CBRC 
2014, 18). There is no one model of financial institution for the banking sector. Each type of financial 
institution serves a particular purpose based on its characteristics. Accordingly, officials have generally 
implemented pragmatic reform programs by type of financial institution. China’s ‘Big Four’ state-owned 
banks, which were carved out of the monobank system to serve large SOEs, were initially specialised 
banks serving a particular area of the economy. The introduction of shareholding banks helped cultivate 
a competitive environment for the specialised banks. The urban credit cooperative (UCC) model was 
established when reform began in order to provide capital to collective enterprises and individual 
businesses. After UCCs were converted into city commercial banks, exceptions were made to allow 
banks that had demonstrated superior performance to expand beyond provincial boundaries, according 
to ‘the principle of rewarding good performance’ (China Economic Review 2006; CBRC 2007, 42). This 
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policy was adjusted when regulators decided that it was necessary to encourage greater specialisation 
of city commercial banks rather than allow further expansion of a model based on the interest rate 
spread. In the rural financial sector, the state made significant efforts to re-establish collective financial 
organisations which had become state-run within the commune system in order to serve rural 
communities. Although the scale of agricultural development eventually exceeded that of the village 
unit, the State Council rejected a proposal to merge rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) into a large 
agricultural bank as it believed the co-operative model would provide a more balanced supply of funding 
to rural areas. Instead the State Council elected to group RCCs into county-level companies, thereby 
allowing them to retain their intrinsic nature. Eventual reform of RCCs into commercial banks and rural 
co-operative banks proceeded according to risk management capability, with some RCCs remaining 
unchanged (Interview with CBRC official, 12 March 2015).  
 
Foreign banks have been utilised by Chinese policymakers to help develop the domestic banking sector. 
Foreign banks were utilised as a conduit for foreign and overseas Chinese investors to invest in the SEZs 
in southern China in the 1980s. The threat of foreign competition created by the announcement of 
China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 drove improvement in the domestic banking sector. Since WTO 
restrictions were lifted, foreign banks have provided competition in high value areas and assisted 
Chinese companies with overseas expansion in accordance with the ‘going out 走出去’ policy. Foreign 
banks, acting as minority investors, assisted the preparation of China’s banks for listing on foreign stock 
exchanges and their engagement in the sector provided vital assurance to overseas investors. Policy 
banks have carried the burden of policy lending within specific, priority areas of industry, thereby 
facilitating the commercial transition of the large state-owned banks. China Export-Import Bank, for 
example, was charged with the task of expanding exports of capital goods, particularly in the electronics 
sector. The China Development Bank was responsible for domestic infrastructure projects but as SOEs 
expanded internationally, its mandate expanded significantly. Asset management companies, which 
were established to dispose of NPLs, leveraged this capability and expanded operations to the disposal 
of bad assets across the entire financial sector. The trust sector has been at the forefront of market-
orientated innovation within China’s banking sector. In the early reform period, trust companies acted 
as a ‘window overseas’ for China by sourcing foreign capital and technology through measures such as 
the issuance of international bonds and financial leasing. For example in 1980, the China International 
Trust Investment Corporation used financial leasing to import the first Boeing 747 airplane into China. 
Today the trust sector is part of a shadow banking system which helps provide credit to marginalised 
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sectors of the economy. In recent years, the trust sector has been an important conduit for commercial 
banks in the development of China’s wealth management sector. The high risks and consequent 
instability of the trust sector have caused it to be restructured several times of the course of reform, 
notably during the Asian financial crisis. The CBRC has elected to standardise the activities of trust 
companies, establish firewalls and increase transparency in response to growing risk in the shadow 
banking sector.    
 
China has employed a pragmatic approach to its segregation of financial sectors. By international 
standards China’s regulation of cross-sector activities is strict in order to reduce financial contagion. 
Commercial banks have been prohibited from engaging in trust, security or insurance business according 
to the 1995 PRC Commercial Bank Law (Loechel and Li 2009). In 2009 CBRC head Liu Mingkang stated, 
‘we don’t discuss universal banking’. However parent companies of shareholding banks CITIC Group, 
China Everbright Group and China Merchants Group have been permitted to retain their status as 
financial conglomerates despite the passing of this law. Subsequently, large state-owned banks have 
entered the insurance and securities sectors through Hong Kong subsidiaries and in 2004 these 
exceptions were formally recognised through an amendment to the Commercial Bank Law. In 2011, the 
CBRC reported that pilot programs had been launched for commercial banks investing in other financial 
sectors according to a best practice operating model and strict performance requirements (CBRC 2011a). 
 
Why History Matters: 
e) It was necessary for the state to actively foster market behaviour and develop market institutions as 
part of the transition from a planned economy 
 
The process of fostering market behaviour began before the establishment of the socialist market 
economy. Deng Xiaoping had the vision of making banks ‘real banks’ that would allocate capital to 
projects which supported economic development rather than merely appropriate funds (Du, Hua 杜华 
2007, 9). The profit motive was introduced to the banking sector through experimental institutional 
arrangements such as the contract responsibility system. To establish the profit motive, banks and their 
sub-branches were granted significant autonomy within a highly decentralised system. The results of 
this policy experiment provided the basis for the commercialisation of specialised banks and the 
establishment of institutions of monitoring and governance to replace the loss of administrative control. 
The monitoring institutions covering financial regulation, auditing, a legal framework of rules, and 
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accounting that were introduced have been refined and updated over the period of research. The 
governance structure of large state-owned banks was unified and strengthened so that banks were 
more empowered to act according to commercial principles and resist the demands of local 
governments. Unified governance facilitated the establishment of systems to control market risk, 
including systems of asset and liability management and loan classification. The CBRC has breathed life 
into the two-tier board structure established through shareholding reform. The CBRC issued a series of 
guidelines which defined the responsibilities of management and the board with respect to decision-
making processes, the development of mechanisms for risk management and internal control, and the 
introduction of incentives to stimulate commercial-orientated lending.    
 
The introduction of competition also served to foster market behaviour. The shareholding banks were 
introduced to drive improvement in specialised banks by creating a competitive dynamic in the banking 
sector and promoting commercial concepts. Shareholding banks were not restricted by industry and had 
more flexible human resource structures and more commercially-orientated branch networks. China’s 
entry to the WTO created the threat of impending competition from foreign banks, which proved an 
important stimulus for bank improvement and regulatory development. Chinese policymakers carefully 
designed WTO regulations to ensure the sustainability of the domestic banking sector. Foreign banks 
proved an important source of competition in high value areas. The recent establishment of private 
banks, announced in 2014, represents another initiative to strengthen the role of the market in resource 
allocation through the introduction of competition.       
 
Part III Fieldwork: 
 
Study of the institutional evolution China’s banking sector lends itself to qualitative research which 
sheds light on the thought processes of policymakers and the nature of banking reform. Two primary 
sources of data, qualitative interviews and documentary data, were gathered. The principal subjects of 
the qualitative interviews were officials from the CBRC, the primary agency charged with regulation and 
supervision of China’s banking system since 2003. Interviews were held with employees of CBRC’s head 
office, which is located in central Beijing. The interviews were conducted on two occasions, the first in 
Beijing in October and November of 2014 and the second in Beijing and Shanghai during February and 
March of 2015. Ten semi-structured interviews of CBRC personnel were conducted at the national 
headquarters of the CBRC in Beijing. Interviewees were asked their opinions on the overall process of 
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reform of the banking sector since Reform and Opening began. Questions covered major reform events 
and the future direction of reform. Interviewees were also asked questions relating to their roles and 
responsibilities at the CBRC as well as their previous work history. One goal of the interviews was to 
understand the philosophy of the organisation and its staff towards regulation, and what has influenced 
this philosophy. Thirteen other interviews were conducted with a variety of persons with experience of 
China’s banking reform. The other principal source of information for the dissertation was documentary 
data. Documents referred to include CBRC annual reports, bank annual reports, official government 
reports and publications of international organisations.  
 
The major challenges of the research involved obtaining and managing access to organisations. There is 
a high degree of sensitivity around the public disclosure of sensitive information by regulators or 
banking institutions which limits the degree of access of outsiders to these organisations. The researcher 
was fortunate to conduct ten interviews at CBRC, though voice recording of these interviewees was not 
permitted. Many of the interviews were conducted in Chinese language which also proved to be a 
challenge. Many sources of documentary data were also written in Chinese language. These sources 
proved important in obtaining the view of Chinese policymakers. In general, the research had a high 
degree of difficulty as the research covers a long and complex period of institutional change. 
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Chapter 2: The Search for a Modern Banking System (800-1990) 
 
The modernisation of China’s banking system under Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening policy 
reflected historical patterns of political and economic organisation in China. It should, therefore, not be 
viewed as an institutional convergence with Western developed nations, as indicated by Walter and 
Howie, who claim Deng’s rise to power ‘freed China to take part in the great financial liberalization that 
swept the world over the past quarter-century’ (Walter and Howie 2012, 3). Instead, to quote Hodgson, 
Reform and Opening policies can be seen as ‘path dependent’ and ‘historically specific’ (Hodgson 2001, 
3,4). The historical development of China’s indigenous banking system is characterised by a pattern of 
strong bureaucratic control to regulate market activity, and this pattern has persisted in the evolution of 
banking sector during the current Reform and Opening period. China had already begun to establish a 
relatively sophisticated indigenous banking system prior to Western intervention in 1840. The 
subsequent process of incorporation of Western ideas and technology in China’s banking sector can be 
best understood as occurring according to the concept ‘Chinese studies at the base, Western studies for 
practical use’ (中體西用 zhongti xiyong) (Suzuki 2009, 93; see also Levenson 1964). China’s leaders 
strongly associated the decline of China’s economy which began in the 19th century with foreign 
intervention and the consequent loss of economic sovereignty. Ever since, officials have sought to 
restore pride in China’s civilisation, a goal which has been predicated on the establishment or 
maintenance of sovereignty over the financial system. Deng’s reform vision was shaped by this historical 
circumstance, acknowledging in 1978 after visiting Western, industrialised countries that ‘the basic point 
is: we must acknowledge that we are backward… and that we need to change’ (Vogel 2013, 218). 
Furthermore, the emphasis of China’s officials on stability was reinforced by the devastating impact of 
episodes of political instability on China’s economy and banking system. The gradual, pragmatic reform 
approach to reform adopted by Deng reflected this emphasis on stability, along with the desire to 
remove the harmful ideological excesses of the Maoist period from economic policy. The legacy of the 
planned economy caused Reform and Opening to be a policy of economic transition. To regulate new 
forms of economic activity, the state began to establish new forms of institutions to monitor and govern 
banks and firms and in doing so borrowed from many ideas from Western experience.  
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China’s Indigenous Banking System: 
 
In traditional Chinese society, China’s officials sought to regulate the indigenous financial institutions 
which had emerged to serve its vibrant economy in order to promote social stability and ensure the 
welfare of the people. As early as the beginning of the ninth century, the domestic tea trade stimulated 
the development of an early remittance system for merchants known as ‘feiqian’ or ‘flying money’. 
During the Song dynasty (960-1279), a joint body of sixteen merchant families in Sichuan province 
established a more sophisticated remittance system using certificates known as ‘jiaozi’, which were 
popular amongst traders in silk and grain (J. Hu 1988). Ultimately the ‘dishonest conduct’ of the 
merchant families, along with failed endeavours in commercial activities, led to a payments crisis at the 
jiaozi money changing shops (J. Hu 1988, 401). The county government intervened, closing down the 
jiaozi shops and ensuring that merchants were able to receive cash payment for their jiaozi, albeit at a 
20-30% loss (J. Hu 1988, 401). The jiaozi shops were reopened under the authority of the local 
government of Yi County in Sichuan, which implemented strict regulations regarding the use of jiaozi. 
The local government unified the value of jiaozi, set a quota for their issuance, developed requirements 
for the holding of cash reserves and set a circulation period of three years (J. Hu 1988).      
 
The evolution of China’s indigenous banking system from the eighteenth century can be viewed as part 
of the emergence of economic patterns of organisation which have been termed ‘embryonic capitalism’ 
(Xu and Wu 2000). China’s economy had experienced sustained phases of economic development in the 
late Ming and Qing dynasties which were marked by dynamic changes to patterns of economic 
organisation including the development of China’s banking system. Also associated with this phase of 
‘embryonic capitalism’ were the commercialisation of agriculture, the effective private ownership of 
land, and the increasing use of wage labour (Xu and Wu 2000). The Shanxi banks and the qianzhuang 
developed relatively sophisticated systems of remittance and credit in response to the growing demand 
for trade-related financial services (Mann Jones 1972). Shanxi banks provided merchants with 
remittances services by draft, letter and cheque. This service allowed merchants to spare the expense 
and risk of travelling with hard currency.  Shanxi banks expanded rapidly, particularly in the north of 
China. By the end of the 19th century, there were 32 Shanxi banks with 475 branches, with operations in 
all provinces and frontier regions of China (Cheng 2003, 12). The incorporation of Shanxi banks into 
China’s bureaucratic system as a financial intermediary in transactions between the central and 
provincial government caused them to function as a ‘quasi-government institution’ (Mann Jones 1972, 
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48). The qianzhuang were smaller-scale banks which provided services to merchants in the central and 
southern coastal areas of China. Qianzhuang were typically established by wealthy merchant families. 
They issued notes and operated as a clearinghouse for merchant transactions. The regulation of 
qianzhuang was achieved largely through banking guilds controlled by merchants, which maintained 
regional stability of the financial system through control of interest and exchange rates and managing 
the liquidation of smaller banks (Mann Jones 1972). Susan Mann Jones (1972, 51) finds support in the 
literature for the argument that qianzhuang descended from the money changing shops of the Song 
dynasty. According to Rawski (1989), China’s indigenous financial system ‘paralleled that of pre-
industrial Europe in its complexity and sophistication’ (Peng 2007, 126).  
 
Foreign Intervention and a Failed Attempt to Establish a Modern Banking System: 
 
Foreign intervention, which commenced with the advent of the first Opium war in 1839, undermined 
the ability of the Chinese state to continue to develop the indigenous banking sector. According to the 
unequal treaties imposed by the British (and subsequently other countries) on China, the state was 
unable to subject foreign financial institutions to control or regulation. By the end of the century, nine 
foreign banks had established a total of forty-five branches in China’s treaty ports (Cheng 2003, 18). 
China’s indigenous banks suffered a decline and the financial power of foreign banks quickly rivalled 
then exceeded that of the Shanxi banks and the qianzhuang. According to Eastman (1988, 165), ‘thirty-
two foreign banks in China and Hong Kong in the early 1930s financed some 90 percent of China’s 
foreign trade’. Foreign bankers’ lack of understanding of domestic trade caused them to work through 
Chinese agents.   Foreign banks extended credit to the Chinese government, private enterprises and the 
qianzhuang, while wealthy officials took advantage of their perceived security to make deposits. The 
Qing government had become dependent on foreign banks for capital, not least to pay war indemnities 
after suffering defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1884. From 1884, HSBC had custody of the 
Imperial Maritime Customs and also managed the salt tax. These were major sources of government 
revenue (Kynaston and Roberts 2015). Prior to the establishment of China’s central bank, HSBC ‘acted as 
financial agent, depository, adviser and underwriter for the Chinese government’ (Kynaston and Roberts 
2015, 7).  Currency issued by foreign banks was preferred to Chinese notes as it held its value better 
(Eastman 1988).  
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Chinese officials attempted to develop a modern banking system in the face of this foreign intervention 
and loss of sovereignty over the banking sector. The state established the Imperial Bank of China, in 
1897, and sixteen more banks were established before the collapse of the Qing dynasty.  Most were 
either led by officials or were official-merchant joint ventures, including Daqing Bank (which later 
evolved into the Bank of China) and Bank of Communications (Cheng 2003, 44).  In the Republican era, 
Chiang Kai-shek advocated state control of private capital and prioritised state ownership of strategic 
sectors of the economy.  According to Chiang, while ‘China’s destiny formerly… was controlled by 
foreign imperialists’, ‘her destiny hereafter… rests in the hands of our [China’s] entire citizenry’ (Chiang 
1947). The banking system expanded even more rapidly during the Republican era, in part aided by the 
preoccupation of foreign powers with the First World War. By 1925 there were more than 150 modern 
Chinese banks, most established through private interests (Cheng 2003, 42). The rapid development of 
the modern Chinese banking system resulted in the declining influence of foreign banks. Chiang’s victory 
over regional warlords in 1927 facilitated the development of national institutions of financial 
governance. That year the state established a central bank and bureau of financial supervision and 
issued regulation on the registration and operation of banks. The state reclaimed control over the 
collection of customs and salt revenues (Kynaston and Roberts 2015). As Chiang’s vision suggested, 
Chinese banks in the Republican era had a strong relationship with the state. Banks extended anywhere 
between 40% and 70% of loans to government bodies (Eastman 1988, 165). General Manager of Bank of 
China, Zhang Jia’ao, confirmed that ‘in times of emergency the government can obtain money from the 
Bank…’ (Peng 2007, 74). Peng writes that ‘…BOC had no choice but to support state enterprises’ (Peng 
2007, 81). Ironically, Zhang was ultimately removed from his post for not supporting the issuance of 
government treasury bills in the early 1930s (Peng 2007).  
 
The Second World War and the Chinese Civil War had a devastating impact on economic and financial 
stability which ultimately derailed efforts to establish a modern banking sector.  In what became known 
as the Banking Coup of 1935, the government gained control of around 70% of China’s financial assets, 
including those of Bank of China and Bank of Communications, in response to insufficient support by 
private banks for government economic policy (Eastman 1988; Peng 2007).  This did not end efforts to 
modernise the sector and professional bankers retained significant influence (Cheng 2003). However the 
Japanese invasion compelled the Nationalist government to appropriate the nation’s financial assets to 
help finance the war effort, ending any attempt to establish a diversified banking system. China’s 
economic and financial systems were highly dysfunctional over this period. Japan occupied China’s most 
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economically developed areas including its major ports and industrial areas, which not only deprived the 
state of important products and services but also caused a dramatic reduction in tax revenue. The 
puppet regime established by the Japanese also began to issue currency, creating a fractured and highly 
unstable monetary system. Both the Japanese puppet regime and the nationalists elected to print 
money for the purpose of creating seigniorage revenue. Their currencies experienced hyperinflation 
(Yan 2015; Hewitt 2007). The civil war between the Nationalist government and the communist forces 
continued for four years following the surrender of the Japanese. The victory of the communists 
provided a new opportunity for the stable development of China’s banking system.  
 
Banking within the Planned Economy System: 
 
‘The semi-colonial and semi-feudal China of the past, which for over a hundred years had suffered from 
foreign aggression and bullying, was turned into a new and independent socialist China in which the 
people were the masters’. 
 
Jiang Zemin, speaking of the achievements of Mao and his comrades at the 14th Party Congress (CCP 
2011) 
 
Following the founding of new China in 1949, the Communist Party moved to establish clear sovereignty 
and centralised control over the financial system.  A new national-level central and commercial bank, 
the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), was founded through the merger of banks established in areas 
controlled by the Communists. The state took measures to unify and stabilise the new currency, the 
Renminbi, by withdrawing other currencies and reducing inflation. The Bank of China and Bank of 
Communications were taken over by the government. The state moved quickly to revoke the special 
privileges of foreign banks acquired during the Republican era. All but four of the foreign banks exited 
China and those that remained operated in a very limited capacity. Upon the implementation of the first 
five year plan in 1953, which served to introduce a centrally planned economy based on the Soviet 
model, the banking system was gradually restructured into a unified and vertically managed system. The 
PBoC, which reported to the State Council, was at the core of this system. The Bank of China, which 
handled foreign exchange and international settlements, was made subordinate to the PBoC. Also 
subordinate to the PBoC was the Joint-State Private Bank, a merger of over sixty formerly private banks. 
Other financial institutions include the People’s Construction Bank of China, which was subordinate to 
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the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and was responsible for capital investment, and credit cooperatives, 
which served as banks for communes in the countryside. Within this system, banks were under 
complete state control and were used by the state to supervise the economic activities of its SOEs 
(Donnithorne 1967).   
  
The nature of economic relations did not require the banking sector to develop the institutions for loan 
selection, monitoring and enforcement which were present in Western-style banking institutions. Banks 
did not perform the duties of a financial intermediary by aggregating savings and allocating capital for 
investment. Instead ‘savings’ were predominantly generated by and ‘reinvested’ in SOEs, whose 
provision of a wide range of services to state sector employees and their families reduced the need for 
private savings. Under this model, the PBoC allocated capital according to the annual budget set by the 
MOF and provided working capital for SOEs. Aside from the relatively few holdings which passed 
through the RCCs, there was little development of financial assets. Transactions between government 
entities and SOEs were made through deposit transfers at the central bank and there were strict 
requirements on state organs and communes to deposit excess currency (Gurley 1976). 
 
While the PBoC did monitor the performance of firms, this was achieved primarily through its role in 
executing the plan and was unlike the monitoring function of autonomous actors performed in a 
capitalist economy. The PBoC was intimately involved with the development and execution of the credit 
plan which corresponded with the plans for agriculture and industry. The central bank monitored the 
use of capital and consequent output by firms who were provided production targets by the state. Bank 
branches were established near industrial sites such as factories or mines. One major problem was the 
excessive use and misappropriation of working capital. Banks monitored for the use of working capital 
for fixed asset investment, which was a violation of the plan. From 1959, the state required enterprises 
to pay interest on working capital loans. The state experimented with other policies to resolve the issue, 
including channelling funds directly through the MOF and charging the PBoC with supplying above-quota 
working capital (Donnithorne 1967).  As firms held little cash, there existed an incentive to demand 
greater raw materials than required and hoard these for use in later production cycles or to barter for 
other goods. Central bank official works would examine firm bank balances and even visit production 
sites to detect hoarding. Without the aid of market price signals, much energy was devoted by state 
planning agencies to gathering accurate and timely information about the ever-changing supply and 
demand of materials (Gurley 1976). The decision of the state to decentralise important functions of the 
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Agricultural Bank of China, a financial institution which had previously been abolished, likely reflected 
the desire to allow local officials to respond to the needs of producers in a timely fashion (Donnithorne 
1967).  
 
Along with the rest of the economy, China’s banking system suffered a severe institutional decline as a 
consequence of the large-scale instability and loss which occurred during the Great Leap Forward 
campaign (1958-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). During the Great Leap Forward, the 
state implemented economic policies which were designed to achieve rapid industrialisation but instead 
resulted in mass starvation as harvest sizes fell. The banking sector was given license to extend credit 
beyond the plan to achieve the state’s policy goal, though contradictorily the supervisory powers of 
banks were ‘whittled away’ as party committees took over (Donnithorne 1967, 429). The banking sector 
did not possess the institutional capability to evaluate loans effectively and as a consequence it 
experienced heavily losses. The turmoil created by the ideologically-driven Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976) severely damaged the banking system as all functional departments aside from the operations 
and political departments within PBoC’s head office were removed. By 1969, the PBoC had been 
formally absorbed by the MOF, for whom it provided accounting and payment functions. As an 
institution, the PBoC had become so weak that its head office was unable to implement financial policies 
and systems at branch level and lacked a consistent administrative form at district and county levels (Liu, 
Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 5).  
 
Reform and Opening: Banks to become ‘real banks’ 
 
Deng Xiaoping’s desire to modernise China’s economy was the inspiration behind the economic reform 
policy ‘Reform and Opening’, which was announced at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central 
Committee in 1978. Deng wanted banks to play an active role in liberating productive forces in the 
economy. In October 1979, at a meeting convened by Deng to explain his economic philosophy to 
provincial and city party secretaries, he signalled that banks would now play an active role in allocating 
capital rather than merely administering the plan: ‘Banks must become the lever for the development of 
the economy and technological innovation, banks must become real banks’ (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 
2009a, 5). During this speech, Deng bemoaned the failure of the financial system under the plan to 
allocate capital to profitable projects. To achieve more effective allocation of capital, Deng envisaged an 
institutional strengthening of the banking system to increase the accountability of capital use by the 
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state: ‘Any government entity that wants goods and materials will need to obtain a bank loan and will 
pay interest on that loan’ (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 9). 
 
While it was clear that the shift in economic policy heralded a far more prominent role for banks in the 
economy, China’s policymakers did not have a predetermined view for how to transform the banking 
sector and achieve modernisation of the economy. In the words of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese people 
had endured unnecessary hardship as a consequence of the ‘excessive egalitarianism and ultra-left 
tendencies’, seen most prominently during the Cultural Revolution (Nolan 2004, 8). Deng advocated a 
new, pragmatic approach to economic reform based on empirical evidence, for which he borrowed the 
Chinese idiom ‘seeking truth from facts’. The implementation of reform in the banking sector would be a 
highly exploratory process subject to much trial and error, as if ‘groping for stones to cross the river’. 
 
Diversification of the Banking Sector: 
 
The first step towards Deng’s vision of the banking system began with the development of a diversified 
banking sector that grew from the foundations of the planned economy. The bureaucratic structure 
remained relatively constant, with the State Council and PBoC responsible for implementing the vision 
of party leaders and developing concrete proposals on reform. A new agency, the State Council’s 
Research and Development Centre, was established in 1980 to act as a ‘think tank’ and provide policy 
recommendations. Between 1979 and 1984, the state carved out four large state-owned banks from the 
PBoC. These were known as specialised banks as the business of each bank was divided by industry. 
Competition between banks was limited to deposits and new business in the emerging real estate, trust 
and securities sectors. According to a CBRC official, specialisation was the principal reason for the 
establishment of the Big Four, as the state sought to address the needs of particular sectors with a 
specific financial institution, rather than any intention to develop competition between banks (Interview 
with CBRC official, 10 March 2015). This was a model the state had previously experimented with prior 
to 1978, establishing and disestablishing both the Agricultural Bank of China and the People’s 
Construction Bank of China on more than one occasion. Indeed, Liu Mingkang stated that the decision to 
re-establish these banks was ‘carried out according to the industrial management concepts of the 
planned economy’ (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 9).  
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The establishment of specialised banks was both a reaction to the new demands on the banking system 
after the introduction of economic incentives and a reflection of China’s desire to transform SOEs, adopt 
foreign capital and technology, and develop infrastructure. The introduction of incentives represented 
the first major step of economic transition, with Deng hoping to resolve the ‘excessive egalitarianism’ of 
the planned economy which he felt provided no incentive for managers to run enterprises at a profit. 
The rural and urban reforms which developed incentives also caused the quantity of capital flowing 
through the banking system to dramatically increase. At the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, 
when China’s leaders created incentives for farmers to lift production by raising the prices substantially 
for production outside of quotas set out in the plan, it was also decided to establish the first specialised 
bank, the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). The ABC would support the expected development of 
household-based production and rural enterprises. Reforms of SOEs, which were announced at the 
subsequent 3rd Plenum in 1984, endorsed the widespread implementation of the contract responsibility 
system (CRS). To enhance incentives, the state compelled enterprises to enter into individual profit-
sharing and tax agreements and allowed production above the quota to be sold at market prices. That 
same year the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was established to support the economic 
transformation of urban enterprises. It took over the industrial and commercial business of PBoC.  
China’s opening up led to the rapid development of international trade and a consequent rise in 
international settlements, causing the State Council to endorse a PBoC report which recommended the 
Bank of China (BoC) split off from the PBoC in 1979. BoC would become a bank which specialised in the 
management of the country’s foreign exchange and foreign trade businesses. Its relationships with the 
outside world would help facilitate the introduction of foreign capital and technology. China 
Construction Bank (CCB), which in its previous forms had been under the supervision of the MOF, 
became subordinate to the State Council in 1983. It had a mandate to finance construction and 
investment in fixed assets in order to develop the country’s infrastructure.  
 
The PBoC was established as an independent central bank in 1984 as officials struggled to control the 
allocation of credit and currency in an increasingly monetised economy. The PBoC was given many of 
the supervisory powers of a regulator in a market economy, though this was problematic while the PBoC 
retained functions of an operating bank. The PBoC was assigned the responsibility for supervision and 
audit of all financial institutions, including non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs). The PBoC had the 
authority to act as the gatekeeper for the entry and exit of financial institutions in the financial sector. 
The PBoC reported directly to the State Council and held a ministry-level status within the state’s 
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bureaucratic hierarchy. Detailed PBoC policy-making was primarily conducted by a council comprised of 
the PBoC governor and vice-governor, the vice ministers of the MOF, the State Planning Commission, 
and the System Reform Commission as well as the presidents of the specialised banks, though 
conditional upon the State Council’s approval (World Bank 1990a, 5).   
 
Strong bureaucratic control over credit allocation continued after the establishment of a pluralised 
banking system. Loan selection was primarily determined by officials at each administrative level of 
government. Credit was directed according to the state’s mandatory investment plan, which was 
comprised of projects approved by the State Planning Commission. While interest rates were set by the 
PBoC, state priority projects received loans at a discounted rate as well as priority access to raw 
materials. Typically the credit plan would specify the bank responsible for financing each project. 
Mandatory provincial plans were a subset of the credit plan and the projects chosen were determined 
by planning agencies, local government and SOEs.  In 1990, the World Bank estimated that the central 
government and local governments each controlled approximately 40% of fixed asset investment, with 
the surplus comprised essentially of household investment in residential construction (World Bank 
1990a, 31). The majority of loans were invested in the industrial and commercial sectors. At this time, 
the relative strength of planning institutions within the China’s bureaucratic structure hindered the 
ability of PBoC to develop regulatory capability. PBoC deputy secretary general Ren Junyin described the 
institution’s relationship with the State Planning Commission as ‘not very smooth’ (O’Neill 1987a). 
 
The Role of New Financial Institutions in the Development of the Banking Sector: 
 
Shareholding Banks: 
 
Party leaders had become aware that the structure of the banking system had to change in order to 
achieve Deng’s vision of making banks ‘real banks’. In order to develop banks that were truly 
commercial in nature, it was imperative to cultivate a more competitive environment for specialised 
banks. Chinese economists had written papers supporting the establishment of shareholding banks and 
this was formally proposed to the State Council by the State Council Research and Development Centre 
(Interview with Wang Dashu, former senior researcher at the Research and Development Centre of the 
State Council, 25 March 2015). Between 1987 and 1988, six shareholding banks were established with a 
further three entering the sector in 1993 following Deng’s Southern Tour. Regional commercial banks 
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were also established around China, particularly in areas such as Shanghai and Guangzhou. The initial 
capital needed to establish these banks also came from the state, but from diverse sources. 
Shareholding banks were either controlled through centrally controlled state-owned enterprise groups, 
which was the case with CITIC Bank, Everbright Bank and Merchants Bank, local government investment, 
for example Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, large-scale SOEs (Huaxia was a subsidiary of Capital 
Steel) or local financial companies as was the case with Fujian Industrial Bank. The activities of 
shareholding banks were not restricted by industry. According to Liu Mingkang, the arrival of 
shareholding banks ‘introduced a mechanism of competition which promoted the improvement of the 
overall financial sector and its service level’ (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 18).  
 
The decision to establish shareholding banks demonstrated a willingness by China’s central officials to 
release some control of the banking system in an attempt to promote its development. On one hand, 
the decision to develop shareholding banks was a bold decision from the central government. It 
represented perhaps the most significant step away from the monobank system since reforms began. 
The shareholding bank model was distinct from that of specialised banks and had the ability to challenge 
their monopoly over sectors of the economy. Shareholding banks were of a smaller scale and typically 
had a regional focus under the jurisdiction of local governments. On the other hand, the decision was a 
pragmatic one by the state which was designed to accelerate the commercialisation of the banking 
sector without having to fundamentally alter the course of reform. While planning decisions were 
generally made at a more decentralised level than at specialised banks, the lending activities of 
shareholding banks remained under the plan and this reform did not fundamentally alter the 
mechanism by which credit was allocated.  
 
The establishment of shareholding banks ‘gradually changed the old supportive banking organisational 
model to become a real enterprise organisational model’ (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 22). While 
shareholding banks were state-owned and had their roots in the planned economy, as newly established 
financial enterprises they did not have the same level of obligation to provide SOEs with financial 
support. This comparative lack of ‘institutional inertia’ allowed them to be relatively dynamic and act 
more according to commercial principles.  While the corporate governance framework of shareholding 
banks, comprised of a board of directors, board of supervisors and the general meeting of shareholders, 
was bloated and ineffective, there was at least a clear ownership structure in place through which to 
monitor managerial performance. While the branch networks of specialised banks conformed to state 
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administrative areas, shareholding banks chose to establish branch networks concentrated in thriving 
coastal regions such Guangdong and the Yangzte River Delta. From their establishment, shareholding 
banks instituted flexible employment policies, composed of labour contracts and a salary system with 
performance objectives upon which promotion and demotion decisions were based, a time when 
specialised banks were just beginning to dismantle a system of guaranteed employment and wages. 
Along with performance incentives, management were also incentivised to reduce risk. Shareholding 
banks pioneered the early development of systems of risk management and asset liability management.  
Furthermore unlike specialised banks the governance systems of shareholding banks, with the exception 
of Bank of Communications (BoCom) and Guangdong Development Bank, were organised according to a 
one-tier legal person system which greatly assisted in the uniform management of enterprises.  
 
Competition proved an effective instrument for progress for specialised banks, though this was achieved 
more through the bureaucratic system than by means of a credible competitive threat. Officials in senior 
positions in the Big Four state-owned banks did not want to ‘lose face’ when comparisons were made to 
the performance of shareholding banks. At the time of their establishment, the scale of shareholding 
banks caused them to be at a significant disadvantage to specialised banks. Indeed even by 1996, 11 
shareholding banks had a total of 85,505 staff and 3,748 branches, less than any of the specialised banks 
(Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 22). Nevertheless, officials in specialised banks were influenced by 
exposure to this new model of banking enterprise, which provided a clear path forwards in terms of 
system change.  
 
Trust and Investment Companies: 
 
China’s trust sector was established to raise capital for the purchase of new technology and equipment 
from foreign countries to facilitate the modernisation of China’s industry. Trust companies raised funds 
by attracting domestic savings, executing short-term financing and issuing overseas bonds. The NBFI 
sector in China began in 1979 with the establishment of the first trust company, CITIC, which was 
founded by Vice Premier Rong Yiren. In 1980 CITIC used financial leasing to import the first Boeing 747 
airplane into China and two years later issued a 12-year bond in Tokyo for 10b Yen, which was China’s 
first bond issued on international markets (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 10). Initially trust companies 
were highly integrated into the bureaucratic structure. Officials at each level of government established 
trust companies to deliver investment services required after the introduction of profit sharing 
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arrangements under the contract responsibility system. This led an explosion of new firms, with 620 
trust companies opened by 1982 (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 11). In order to establish greater order 
in the sector, there was a reorganisation of trust companies. That same year, operations of trust 
companies were restricted to the PBoC or a PBoC-approved specialised bank. Following this reform, 
control of the trust sector shifted from government entities to branches of the specialised banks. 
Provincial branches and some city branches of specialised banks established their own trust companies. 
454 of the 745 trust companies at the end of 1988 were affiliated with three of the specialised banks, 
which were the predominant source of funds (World Bank 1990a, 13). 
 
The trust sector was a vehicle for policymakers to understand the risks associated with more market-
orientated institutions. At a time when credit was tightly controlled under the plan due to vigorous 
demand, trusts were able to lend a greater proportion of capital to lenders which were outside of the 
plan and could make loans to enterprises at higher rates with fewer restrictions on loan size and 
clientele.  The greater profits available through arbitrage activities such as selling goods or lending 
outside the plan incentivised banks and their trust companies to allocate more capital outside the 
planning system. Between 1986 and 1988 the total assets of trust companies doubled each year (World 
Bank 1990a, 13). Given the perverse incentives, it was no surprise that reports suggested that only half 
of trust financing and investment activities accorded with government regulations (Pei 1998, 330).The 
growing leakage from the plan to what was largely unregulated banking activity became a priority issue 
for the state in 1988 due to the weak state of regulatory institutions (Interview with Wang Dashu, 
former senior researcher at the Research and Development Centre of the State Council, 25 March 2015). 
Regulation of the sector had failed to ensure that trust and investment corporations (TICs) and other 
NBFIs were institutionally adequate or sufficiently capitalised. It was also alleged that trust companies 
had exceeded their business scope by undertaking the traditional lending and deposit activities of 
commercial banks (World Bank 1990a, 13). Along with TICs, other finance, leasing and credit firms were 
accused of being ‘not well managed and not adequately controlled’ because they offer illegally high 
interest rates and ‘divert capital into unauthorised projects and disobey orders from Peking on how 
funds should be used’ (Reuters News 1988a).  
 
Problems in the trust sector created a resolve within the party to improve systems of regulation in order 
to contain market risk. In a speech made in August 1989, then Premier Li Peng decried the reckless 
nature of trusts which had caused the leakage of capital, inappropriately structured investment and 
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created the conditions for ‘all kinds of corruption’ to occur. However Li pragmatically compared the 
problems of corruption of China’s most market-orientated institutions with that of central government 
officials. He suggested that in both fields, corruption occurred only in a minority of cases and the key 
issue was governance of markets, given the ‘lax systems and weak management’, rather than a problem 
of the market system itself (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 95).  
 
Foreign Banks: 
 
China opened its doors to foreign banks in order to attract foreign capital, technology and ideas. Strict 
limitations were placed on the operation of foreign banks to maintain sovereignty over the banking 
system and ensure that new ideas could be adopted in a manner suitable to China’s political and 
economic institutions. Foreign banks were not permitted to undertake RMB business, which would put 
them in direct competition with domestic banks. Instead regulators encouraged foreign banks to advise 
foreign firms and facilitate foreign currency investment into SEZs and certain coastal cities. From 1979 
informal permission was given to foreign banks to establish representative offices in China. 181 
representative offices had been opened by 1987, by which time 22 foreign banks had opened branch 
offices in the Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Xiamen SEZs as well as Shanghai. Significant funds had been raised 
through these branches. For example, to raise funds for the development of energy, transport and raw 
materials industries, China ‘floated 20 bond issues through foreign financial institutions, for a total of 
340bn Japanese yen and 400m US dollars in Japan, Singapore and Europe’ (BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-
Pacific 1987).  
 
Bureaucratic Control and Decentralising Reforms: 
 
The party system was at the core of the governance of the banking system, reflecting the historical 
influence of China’s bureaucracy over patterns of economic organisation. Party agencies were 
responsible for the appointment, monitoring and discipline of officials. Through its system of party 
committees, the party maintained a strong presence in banking institutions. The decentralisation of 
China’s SOEs which followed Zhao Ziyang’s reform of the urban sector in 1984 shifted the control of 
many large industrial plants and enterprises from central industrial ministries to local party committees. 
This policy of decentralisation allowed local party officials in provincial regions to gain greater influence 
over banks and regulators and diminished the power of officials in central ministries. Local officials 
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utilised this enhanced power to advance the economic interests of their home province or region. The 
key mechanism utilised by local governments to exert influence was their ability to control 
appointments of local banking and regulatory officials through the bureaucratic system. The local party 
committee was responsible for the appointment of the top banking officials at regional level, with 
minimal input from the bank’s head office. Control over the appointment of officials was used to push 
lending to local enterprises. This was made possible by a policy, instituted in 1985, which decentralised 
the management of specialised bank credit through the allocation of funds at PBoC branch level. 
Branches also took advantage of the indicative nature of specialised bank plans and the flexibility 
around loans for working capital (Holz 1992, 46).  Local authorities, who wanted funds for projects, were 
often able to gain access to such funds despite the directives from central party officials, who sought 
monetary stability and a more sustainable model of economic development. Li Guixian, governor of 
PBoC between 1988 and 1993, acknowledged while in office that every bank branch ‘had to consciously 
accept the leadership of the local CCP committee’ (Holz 1992, 35). 
 
The governance structure of banks and regulators was highly responsive to decentralising reforms and 
the increased influence of local party officials. City and provincial bank branches were accorded their 
own legal-status. Control and supervision of specialised bank branches was conducted at the provincial 
level, demonstrated by the tiny proportion of staff located at banks’ head offices. For example, ABC had 
only 200 staff at its head office from a total number of 350,000 employees at 30,000 branches (World 
Bank 1990a, 6). The appointment powers of local governments had a similar impact on central bank 
branches and prior to 1988 the PBoC did not have full authority to appoint the managers of its own 
branch offices (Yang 2004, 83). The activities of local PBoC branches generally deferred to the interests 
of planning bureaus and local government officials. Local regulators were required to coordinate 
activities with local Finance and Planning Bureaus and follow the general practices of the relevant local 
administration. The lack of bureaucratic power limited the ability of the head office of PBoC to exert 
control over its own sub-branches and ensure their compliance with credit and monetary targets.  
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Table 2: Supervisory and Internal Auditing Tasks Carried Out by PBoC’s Organisational Units 
 
[TABLE REDACTED FOR REASONS OF COPYRIGHT]    
 
Source:  The World Bank 1990a, 93.  
 
This World Bank table shows the decentralised nature of PBoC banking supervision. Supervisory 
activities were conducted using a bottom-up approach which treats branches as separate entities 
instead of scrutinising bank activities at an enterprise level. Banking inspections were essentially 
performed at a branch level rather than at the level of the enterprise, causing the majority of 
supervisory resources to be located at the lower-level branches. While the central bank had a total staff 
of over 130,000 staff in 1988, its headquarters along with the Beijing and Shanghai branches each had 
no more than 30 staff each, despite supervisory responsibilities over specialised banks in some of the 
most thriving economic regions in China (World Bank 1990a, 4,92).  
 
Policymakers actively encouraged the trend of decentralisation within the banking sector to increase 
incentives, a policy which was an extension of the thinking behind agricultural and urban reforms. 
Between 1985 and 1988 the contract responsibility system, along with similar decentralising reforms, 
was trialled in the banking sector. In 1987 ICBC formally established ‘the city’ as the basic operating unit 
and 22% of all ICBC branches implemented trials of the contract responsibility system. At ABC, trials 
which gave county branches authority for their accounting practices were implemented at 4,600 
branches in 1985. In 1987, wide-ranging reforms of its operating mechanism led to greater autonomy at 
the unit of the city (or county) through trials of a ‘targeted management responsibility system’. ABC was 
the first and only bank to achieve full implementation of the CRS in 1988, under which it delivered a tax 
quota that was pre-negotiated with the government in return for the right to retain a proportion of 
profits above the quota. CCB linked the financial performance of county bank branches with retained 
earnings and staff numbers and trialled a responsibility system based on fees. In addition to trials of CRS 
and the targeted management responsibility system within parts of its branch network, it also 
broadened the scope the contract system to include areas of finance, loan-making and human resources 
(Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 16–17). Even the central bank had instituted systems through which 
branches retained earnings and were responsible for tax payments. 
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While these reforms increased incentives, the fractured nature of governance created significant 
problems at branch level. Staff would engage in unsustainable business practices aimed at maximising 
short-term profits and which created harmful competition between branches. The problem most severe 
at lower-level branches where a lack of governance caused corrupt practices to develop as well as the 
violation of financial rules and processes (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 17).  
 
Along with problems of governance, the increased autonomy of branches made it difficult for the state 
to ensure sufficient credit reached heavy industry and other price-controlled sectors where profitability 
was low. Banks became more reluctant to lend to projects with small returns such as those related to 
heavy industry and infrastructure in favour of the rapidly expanding light industrial sector. Chinese 
authorities labelled this phenomenon a ‘twisted structure of credit’ (World Bank 1990a, 33). As this 
liberalisation of credit expanded, the state actually increased efforts to direct capital to these industries 
through administrative guidance and implementing credit ceilings on non-priority sectors.  
 
Establishing Institutions of Market Governance: 
 
During the 1980s, the state began to gradually establish institutions which could provide monitoring and 
governance functions to ensure financial stability as administrative control was reduced. The use of 
regulation, while secondary to the planning system, was endorsed at the 3rd Plenum of the 12th Party 
Congress in 1984, while Party leaders approved an economic system which integrated planning and 
regulation functions at the 3rd Plenum of the 13th Party Congress in 1988.  
 
The development of monitoring and governance institutions was highly dependent on the adoption of 
ideas from the modern banking systems of developed countries. These ideas were incorporated within 
China’s existing political and economic institutions in a manner which was suitable to China’s national 
conditions. During the 1980s, China consciously began a strategy of learning from the outside. The PBoC 
developed a strong relationship with leading foreign regulators and banks and regularly sent delegations 
overseas to interact with and learn from bankers and regulators (Interview with Wang Dashu, former 
senior researcher at the Research and Development Centre of the State Council, 25 March 2015). Chen 
Yuan, son of influential Communist leader Chen Yun and Chairman of China Development Bank from 
1998 to 2013, recalled a 2-week training program taken while at PBoC in 1988:  ‘My classroom was 
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Washington and New York. I visited the Fed, the Treasury, investment banks and commercial banks. 
They were my teachers. I learned supervision, risk management, payment services, and financial 
products’ (Kuhn 2010, 272). Bank employees also underwent periods of secondment with 
correspondent banks abroad. The training received in modern management practices was hugely 
influential in the development of modern banking concepts in Chinese banks.   
 
Monitoring and governance functions were needed to control market risk and promote the 
development of commercial behaviour within Chinese banks. Simply granting greater autonomy to 
specialised banks was not sufficient to cause them to act in a commercially sustainable fashion. As part 
of the state apparatus, specialised banks had an obligation to direct capital to priority projects and 
support SOEs over economic transition. In keeping with this support, banks would not withhold capital 
from SOEs who failed to return loans. This effectively provided SOEs with a soft budget constraint. SOEs 
were unconcerned of the prospect of bankruptcy and endeavoured to obtain as much capital as possible 
from banks. In many ways their actions resembled the competition for raw materials during the planned 
economy. Additionally, given the fractured nature of governance, meeting loan targets to regional SOEs 
was a stronger consideration for banks than profitability.  
 
The state needed to establish new institutions to govern and regulate banks in order to change this 
culture. Making these new institutions effective, particularly given their early stage of development, was 
a challenge for the state. This problem was compounded by the fragmented governance structure 
present in the banking sector, which limited the ability of the state to implement reforms consistently 
across financial institutions. Furthermore throughout the 1980s the state was simply unable to obtain 
good information through which to effectively monitor the performance of banks and the SOEs to whom 
they were supplying capital.  
 
Financial Regulation: 
 
The initial establishment of a regulatory framework in the banking sector was a highly explorative 
process. Policymakers took a pragmatic approach in designing a system of regulation which would 
control market risk and facilitate the development of a sustainable banking model. In October 1984, 
Premier Zhao Ziyang established a working group with the aim of empowering the central bank to drive 
the establishment of a regulatory framework for the banking system. The working group was comprised 
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of officials from the PBoC, the MOF, the State Commission for Reform of the Economic System and the 
Economic Research Centre of the Council. 
 
The PBoC developed the initial regulatory framework for the banking sector through what one CBRC 
official described as a ‘series of trials’ (Interview with CBRC official, 10 March 2015). These occurred 
within particular geographic areas and where successful were followed by the issuance of provisional, 
nationwide regulation. The state selected a group of cities (jinrong gaige shidian chengshi) which would 
undertake the initial trials of reform measures in the financial sector. Regulatory trials were coordinated 
centrally and conferences were held which brought together the relevant stakeholders of reform 
including representatives of the PBoC, specialised banks and local government. By the time of the fourth 
conference, held in Dalian in September 1987, the number of trial cities had reached 27 (Holz 1992, 10). 
In January 1986, the State Council issued the Provisional Regulations on the Administration of Banks in 
the PRC, which was the first comprehensive and unified set of regulations for the banking system. The 
regulations defined the role of the PBoC as financial regulator, responsible for drafting and 
implementing regulations, and set out rules for the approval of the establishment and merger of 
financial organisations and the supervision and audit of operations of financial institutions. It also 
defined the basic operational scope of financial institutions. In the second half of the 1980s a series of 
provisional regulations followed for the various types of financial institutions including trust companies 
(1986), UCCs (1998), and RCCs (1990) (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a).  
 
At this early stage of regulatory development, central bank officials struggled to ensure the effective 
implementation of regulation. The PBoC did not yet have the capability to utilise the information it 
gathered in off-site supervisory reports and on-site examinations effectively as part of the bank 
supervisory process. Furthermore the PBoC’s strong focus on credit and monetary policy led it to use 
information collected to analyse bank liquidity, where applicable, or simply for statistical purposes. The 
ad hoc nature of regulatory development, which aimed to develop regulatory coverage for each type of 
financial institution, gave rise to a fragmented coverage of the banking system and regulatory 
distortions.  Additionally, the primary focus of legal development emphasised ‘the social and 
developmental role of banks’, prioritising compliance with the national credit plan ahead of important 
regulatory objectives such as the safety and soundness of financial institutions (World Bank 1990a, 90). 
It became obvious that a comprehensive banking law was needed to resolve these issues. China passed 
its first bankruptcy law in 1986, which legally protected the property rights of creditors in the advent of 
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default, but the mechanisms to enforce this law had not been developed. In practice it was difficult for 
banks to successfully claim the assets of borrowers in the event of a default as assets were owned by 
the state and SOEs had a social responsibility to workers and their families. Following the passing of the 
law a PBoC official pointed out that ‘relations between a firm and its local government are too close. The 
government does not want its own firms to go bankrupt. Bankruptcy will be very hard to implement’ 
(O’Neill 1988). 
 
The ineffective nature of the regulatory framework created a lack of order in the financial sector. The 
entry and exit of financial institutions to the banking sector was not monitored effectively while there 
was often little distinction between the activities of different types of financial institutions despite large 
variations in their regulatory environments. A World Bank report produced in 1990 suggested there was 
‘almost a complete overlap’ of function between the various types of financial institutions (World Bank 
1990a, 15). Specialised banks were able to engage in trust business through trust subsidiaries and TICS 
and finance companies were involved with commercial lending. The lack of compliance with existing 
regulations compounded the problem. There were state organs which had covert financial firms and 
enterprises with illegal enterprise banks. Even the central bank was involved in commercial lending. 
While explicitly forbidden by the authorities, some illegal private banks also emerged. The New York 
Times reported in 1988 that 27 private banks had been established in the city of Wenzhou alone. These 
banks offered higher interest rates on deposits and loans than the state regulations allowed. While local 
PBoC officials were aware of this phenomenon, there was no crackdown by authorities, perhaps due to 
the small scale of activities and limited regulatory resources (Gargan 1988).     
  
The development of financial regulatory capability was stimulated by efforts to deal with the serious 
problems of governance in the NBFI sector. The PBoC presided over the clean-up of the NBFI sector 
between 1989 and 1991. The number of financial companies, which had reached over 1000 in 1988, was 
reduced considerably. The PBoC gave approval for 285 to remain a going concern, closing 792 in 1990 
(Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 32). Similarly, the number of trust companies fell from 745 in 1988 to 386 
in 1992. The clean-up tested the auditing capabilities of the PBoC, who conducted investigations into the 
financial circumstances and operating standards of 15 national-scale trust companies, along with  a 
large-scale investigation of credit use by financial companies. The PBoC conducted audits of loan limits, 
loan direction and loan effectiveness and addressed issues problems of unreasonable competition for 
deposits caused by NBFIs offering excessive interest rates. The clean-up also reinforced the importance 
 
 
53 
of PBoC’s role as a gatekeeper to entry and exit into the financial sector. In August 1988, the State 
Council reiterated that no department could establish a financial institution without first gaining PBoC 
approval. The clean-up facilitated the development of a concrete policy for the merge and closure of 
financial companies. It also began a process of separation between specialised banks and trust 
companies which foreshadowed the formal separation of sectors which was announced in 1994 
(Interview with Wang Dashu, former senior researcher at the Research and Development Centre of the 
State Council, 25 March 2015). Importantly, it was an exercise which stimulated a comprehensive 
examination of the existing regulations and standardised documents of the PBoC, many of which were 
discarded. This process allowed the drafting of a comprehensive banking law to begin. 
 
Risk Management: 
 
In the 1980s, China’s banking system had only a very rudimentary system of risk management.  Banks 
did not have a strong awareness of concepts of risk management and seldom considered credit risk 
when making loans. Policies relating to management of credit risk were relatively undeveloped at 
Chinese banks. Internal bank documents tended to focus on the response to non-repayment of loans 
rather than the events preceding it. Documentation detailed written procedures for loan rescheduling, 
visits to borrowers to prevent default of loans, loan collection and the taking possession of collateral. 
Due to the absence of policies relating to allocation of loans, there was a lack of consistency within 
specialised banks with regards to policies for loan structure and pricing, loan to collateral ratios, 
borrower information and concentration of credit within borrowers, sectors and geographic areas. 
Specialised banks lacked a clear system of lending authority and consequently it was difficult to establish 
accountability for lending decisions. Staff lacked the required training in credit analysis or accounting to 
evaluate loans effectively. Furthermore there was no separation of loan-making and loan assessment 
which would have added much-needed accountability to the loan-making process.  
 
It was not normal practice for banks to write-off loans, even when it was felt that it was no longer 
possible to make any further recovery. This general practice is evidenced by the requirement of State 
Council approval for write-offs above 100,000 RMB (World Bank 1990a, 94). There was no adequate 
general loan loss provision and no provision for specific loans where a loss in the value of assets had 
been identified. As of 1988, the MOF had an upper limit on loan provisions of 0.01% or 0.02% in effect, 
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depending on the sector where the loan was made. Early loan classification systems were highly limited. 
There was little information available on NPLs as banks did not attempt to classify loans by quality.  
 
Asset and liability management, which would provide a mechanism by which to control capital 
utilisation and address areas of the potential liquidity and interest rate risk, was not practised by 
Chinese banks in the 1980s. Furthermore, Chinese banks did not yet have a system of key financial 
indicators by which to monitor and assess the performance and risk of branch operations. Consequently, 
banks were not aware of their performance relative to competitors, nor did they possess a clear 
understanding of their own risk profile.  
 
Auditing: 
 
Western forms of auditing had not existed in the planned economy era and consequently the priority in 
the 1980s was to establish a basic framework for auditing practices. There was a lack of trained and 
experience staff at all levels of audit, principally because there were few qualified accountants.  
 
Following the PBoC’s National Disciplinary Inspection Audit Work Meeting in 1985, it was decided to 
establish a new, independent structure of audit within the PBoC. This event signified the beginning of its 
on-site examination system. By the end of 1985 there were audit departments in all provincial-level 
branches and branches in 258 of the 284 city-level branches (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 31). In July 
1985 the PBoC issued the PBoC Audit Work Provisional Regulations, which was the first attempt to 
define the regulatory principles for audit of the different types of financial organisations. Later the PBoC 
issued detailed instructions on working procedures including rules and the standardisation of practices 
relating to the incentive system, and procedures for communication with specialised banks. While by 
the end of 1986 there were only 2,500 auditors, this marked an increase of over 1000 from the year 
before (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 31). The capability of PBoC audit gradually improved and by 1992 a 
unified system of off-site assessments and risk monitoring audits was developed. By this time, loan 
quality and financial policy audits had also been conducted for each type of financial organisation.  The 
PBoC issued detailed rules for the resolution of violations discovered by audit and for audit reporting 
methods in 1989 and 1992 respectively (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 31).  
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The lack of capability of internal audit within specialised banks compelled the PBoC audit system to bear 
the responsibility of basic tasks such as the verification of transactions within specialised banks. Unlike 
the PBoC, banks had not established a parallel structure for internal audit and auditors reported directly 
to branch managers. This impaired auditor independence. Compounding this problem was the bottom-
up audit structure in which higher branch levels relied on lower levels for self-audit. Staff shortages 
were chronic. As of 1988, PCBC employed approximately 1,000 auditors at provincial level to audit 
around 10,000 offices (World Bank 1990a, 64). The inconsistent implementation of CRS-style reforms 
created variable practices across specialised banks. For example, county-level branches formed an 
accounting unit for ABC but not for PCBC (World Bank 1990a, 62). Specialised bank branches had not yet 
implemented standardised reporting methods and or a unified system for the verification of financial 
reporting. There was a divergence in audit frequency across branches.  
 
China’s accounting firms found it difficult to provide the state with meaningful and accurate information 
regarding bank performance and the level of NPLs. The MOF did not permit international firms to 
operate in China and Chinese accountancy firms typically had their origins in the state finance bureaus. 
The lack of political independence of Chinese accounting firms caused them to serve merely as a ‘rubber 
stamp’ for the state (Interview with PWC Partner David Wu, 3 April 2015). An awareness of international 
accounting practices had been built up over the 1980s, with the MOF having translated annual volumes 
of International Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards. However China’s 
own accounting standards were also lenient. They did not yet comply with the ‘generally accepted 
accounting principles’ (GAAP) and fundamental practices such as the write-down asset losses and bad 
debts, making loan loss provisions or valuation of assets at ‘lower of cost or market’ had not been 
established (World Bank 1990a, 61). Accounting firms also remained more concerned about verifying if 
capital was spent according to the plan than with enterprise performance (Interview with former PWC 
China accountant Paul Gillis, 30 March 2015).   
 
The National Audit Office was established in 1983. Staff numbers increased from 28,600 in 1985 to 
63,000 in 1989 as a nationwide branch network was established (Yang 2004, 280). In the 1980s its 
mission, to undertake audits of SOEs and provided a check on other levels of audit, was compromised by 
its low administrative ranking relative to the departments it audited.  
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Human Capital:  
 
The development of the necessary human capital to implement new institutions of governance was also 
a priority within the banking sector. For obvious reasons, the generation of China’s officials which were 
in office at the beginning of Reform and Opening were simply not familiar with the operational concepts 
of a more active and commercial banking system. In 1989, Premier Li Peng contrasted workers in China’s 
banking system with their counterparts from the 1950s, commenting that while the complexity of 
banking operations had increased, the level of skills and training of workers had regressed. The urgency 
of the problem was such that he even suggested an extension of the retirement age to allow bankers 
from the Republican era to remain at their posts (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 95).    
 
Many of the entry-level staff came from occupational schools which were operated and staffed by the 
specialised banks. Students enrolled in these schools for what was normally the last three years of 
middle school. The Shanghai Municipal NanHu Bank Vocational School, which commenced operations in 
1982, was associated with ICBC. Its teachers were allocated from ICBC’s jinrongzhigongdaxue 金融职工
大学.  While the school taught specialist banking classes, its graduates typically began work at the 
counter. There were a fixed number of students which entered the school each year. Each of these 
students was promised a job with ICBC upon graduation (Interview with Chen Chengyou, former 
president of Nanhu Bank Occupational School, 25 April 2015).   
 
The World Bank deemed training in the banking sector to be sufficiently comprehensive as to ‘meet the 
needs of current banking practices’. The ICBC operated a total of 100 educational institutions at the end 
of the 1980s (World Bank 1990a, 79). In additional to occupational schools, specialised banks also had 
an affiliation with training institutes. Mrs Chen Chengyou, President of Nanhu Bank Occupational School 
from 1982 to 2000, estimated that over 90% of her students enrolled in tertiary education while working 
in the banking sector as a recognised qualification was a prerequisite for further career development 
(Interview with Chen Chengyou, 25 April 2015). The sector itself was constantly evolving and adopting 
new concepts and practices of modern banking. 
 
The system of guaranteed employment at specialised banks began to be dismantled during the second 
half of the 1980s in line with practices already employed at shareholding banks. Specialised banks 
introduced trials of recruitment systems of cadres that were more competitive in nature as well as fixed-
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term appointments and employee contracts. There were early attempts to develop performance 
incentives.  
 
Increasing burden on banks: 
 
During this initial period of regulatory development, the banking sector found itself taking an increasing 
share of the burden of SOE transition. The shift to loan-based funding was accelerated by decentralising 
fiscal reforms which pushed the central government to use the banking system to finance important 
national infrastructure projects.  The share of bank financing in fixed investment projects rose from 12.7% 
in 1981 to 20.3% in 1988, while budgetary financing fell from 28.1% to 9% over the same period (World 
Bank 1990a, 32). This had a direct effect on the profitability of SOEs. Fiscal subsidies decreased from 
50.7b RMB in 1985 to RMB 33.7b in 1996 in a growing economy as SOEs were forced to rely more on 
bank loans (Lardy 1998, 37). Price reform throughout the decade both increased input costs for state 
firms and removed a barrier from competition. Over this period the number of loss-making SOEs 
continued to expand with one third of medium or large-scale firms reporting a loss by 1995 (Lardy 1998, 
39). The challenges faced by SOEs affected profitability and consequently the ability of SOEs to repay 
loans. This decline in profitability caused almost a corresponding increase in NPLs and a decline in the 
financial health of China’s banks. In 1987 Dai Xianglong, who was vice president of ABC at that time, 
estimated that bad loans made by ABC totalled over 40 billion RMB with approximately 15% of its 
business customers having financial and management issues that made them unsuitable customers 
(O’Neill 1987b). The total number of bad loans was estimated by a PBoC official to be 57 billion RMB 
(O’Neill 1988). Bank capital declined from 9.8% of assets in 1985 to 7.75% in 1989 (World Bank 1990a, 
65). 
 
Conclusion: 
 
The evolution of China’s banking system under Reform and Opening should not be viewed simply as 
institutional convergence with the banking systems of Western developed nations. While there were 
elements of convergence in the initial establishment and development of China’s regulatory framework, 
there is strong evidence of a persistence of historical patterns of political and economic organisation. 
The purpose of the Reform of Opening policy, to modernise China’s economy, stemmed from a desire to 
restore pride in Chinese civilisation after the humiliation of military defeat and the subsequent loss of 
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economic sovereignty which had undermined China’s efforts to build a modern banking system. As a 
consequence, officials regarded the sovereignty over the financial system as imperative. While China 
opened its doors to attract foreign capital, technology and ideas, it placed strict limitations on the 
operations of foreign banks and did not permit international auditing firms to operate in China. The 
strong role of the Chinese state in the banking sector under Reform and Opening is in contrast to the 
policies of financial liberalisation and deregulation employed by countries such as the United States or 
United Kingdom. The fundamental role of the party system in the appointment, monitoring and 
discipline of officials in the banking sector reflects a pattern of strong bureaucratic control seen in the 
development of China’s indigenous banking system, the modern banking system of the Republican era 
and the administrative banks of the planned economy. The state actively managed the gradual 
transition of China’s banking sector from the planned economy. The state developed a pluralised 
banking sector and released some control of the financial system to promote the development of an 
enterprise organisational model. Specialised banks, carved out from the financial sector of the planned 
economy, retained a dominant position in the sector with around 75% of assets at the end of the 1980s 
(World Bank 1990a, 6). As in the past, stability was a central concern for China’s officials. While credit 
was still allocated predominantly through the planning system, the state developed institutions to 
provide monitoring and governance functions in order to control market risk and promote the 
development of commercial behaviour in Chinese banks. Officials incorporated ideas from the modern 
banking systems of developed countries. Early systems of financial regulation and audit were 
established in a pragmatic and exploratory fashion which reflected both a desire for stability and a 
deliberate departure from the ideological excesses of the Maoist period. Prior to the establishment of 
the socialist market economy, China’s regulatory framework was at an early stage of development. As a 
consequence, officials struggled to ensure that regulation was effective. There were many challenges 
including the lack of bureaucratic power of the PBoC, the decentralised nature of banks and regulatory 
institutions, the focus on meeting objectives of the plan, the lack of a comprehensive banking law, the 
inability of auditors to provide high quality information regarding bank performance to the state, and a 
general lack of understanding of concepts of risk management and market regulation. The lack of 
financial order which resulted created a resolve within senior party officials such as Premier Li Peng to 
improve systems of regulation to better contain market risk.    
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Chapter 3: Building a Banking Regulatory System for the Socialist Market Economy (1990-96) 
 
At the establishment of the socialist market economy, China’s policymakers implemented reforms which 
created a platform for the development of a more standardised and rigorous system of banking 
regulation that was aimed at ensuring financial stability and mitigating market risk. While China 
incorporated Western ideas and technology subsequent to the establishment of the socialist market 
economy, it did so selectively and avoided conformance with a model of financial liberalisation and 
deregulation employed by many Western developed countries. It is argued that Walter and Howie’s 
statement that ‘in the 1990s, China’s domestic reforms followed a path of deregulation blazed by the 
United States’ fundamentally mischaracterises the reform process (Walter and Howie 2012, 3). This 
chapter demonstrates that banking reforms were path dependent and subject to an evolutionary 
process of development. General Secretary Jiang Zemin stated that ‘China’s socialist market economy 
must incorporate our national conditions’ (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 150). The decision to establish a socialist 
market economy, announced at the 3rd Plenum of the 14th Party Congress in November 1993, reflected 
the success of early market reforms in facilitating modernisation of the economy. By 1995, China’s gross 
national product was more than four times higher than in 1980 and the country’s already substantial 
investment in infrastructure continued to grow. Living standards had improved markedly and the 
population of the poor had decreased by 20 million since the end of the 1980s (State Council 2006).  
General Secretary Jiang Zemin maintained Deng’s pragmatic approach to reform, saying (with regards to 
the socialist market economy): ‘…the criterion for judging the success or failure… is whether it helps 
develop the productive forces of socialist society, strengthen the overall capacity of the country and 
improve the people's living standards’ (CCP 2011). Regulatory reforms in the banking sector were a 
direct response to the inability of the state to maintain macroeconomic stability and mitigate market 
risk during periods of rapid economic development. The Commercial Bank Law and Central Bank Law 
became guiding documents for exploratory reforms in the banking sector. Reforms to strengthen the 
governance of state-owned banks reflected their growing importance in determining capital allocation 
as SOEs became increasingly autonomous. Jiang Zemin affirmed the country’s desire to maintain 
economic sovereignty and build a stronger country: ‘Modern Chinese history and the realities of the 
present-day world show that so long as a country is economically backward, it will be in a passive 
position, subject to manipulation by others’ (CCP 2011). 
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Inability to Ensure Economic Stability: 
 
As China’s economy grew in the late 1980s, it became evident that the state did not possess the tools to 
provide stability to the economy at the macro-level. The central bank, which lacked both unified 
governance and political strength, was not sufficiently strong to effectuate macro-economic control of 
the economy, particularly given the high degree of influence of local government over credit allocation. 
According to Holz, 'the lack of an endogenous mechanism restraining the volume of credit and cash in 
circulation turned out to the a major factor in the cycle of monetary over-investment characteristic of 
the PBC' (Holz 1992, 149). There was excess demand for credit, which was hotly contested by local 
authorities within the planning system and also through the rapidly expanding interbank market which 
more than quadrupled in size between 1991 and 1993 (Pei 1998, 331). A CBRC official, at the time an 
employee of ABC, estimated that approximately 60-70% of decision-making by PBoC and bank local 
branches in 1993 reflected local government wishes, with the remaining 30-40% reflecting the wishes of 
their respective head offices (Interview with CBRC official, 10 March 2015). The President of the 
People’s Construction Bank, Zhou Daojiang, revealed the lack of control over credit, saying ‘when local 
governments and enterprises have money, they invest as they like, and you can hardly do anything 
about them’ (Thomson 1987).  The pattern of over-investment, predominantly in fixed assets, caused 
China to suffer from a shortage of capital. Total investment in fixed assets between 1991 and 1995 grew 
at an annual rate of 22.9%, far in excess of the 4.1% growth rate recorded in the previous period (State 
Council 2006). The state budget fell into deficit and cash in circulation ballooned as the state resorted to 
printing money to fund projects. PBoC Deputy Secretary General Ren Junyin revealed the gravity of the 
situation, saying that ‘…the money in our country each year is not enough to cover our priority projects. 
Because capital is short, everyone comes to the banks…’ [for funding] (O’Neill 1987a).  
 
The deficiencies in macroeconomic control led to cycles of inflation which in turn had a serious impact 
on economic stability. These were exacerbated by the constant increase in wages and salaries along with 
reform of the dual track price system, which had begun in some commodities. During the first cycle of 
inflation, inflation rates reached just under 20% in 1988 and rumours of further price increases caused 
‘panic buying’ of all types of consumer goods and a rapid depletion of bank savings (World Bank 1990b; 
Holz 1992, 129). Retail sales across the country in the first half of 1988 were 25% higher than in the 
corresponding period of the previous year (Reuters News 1988c). In Harbin the problem was particularly 
serious. 12.5 million RMB was withdrawn from banks between July 25 and July 27, constituting the 
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worst bank-run in new China’s history. Sales at the city’s biggest department store were 200 times 
above average in July 1988. By July 28 there were no televisions,  tape recorders, refrigerators, washing 
machines, rice cookers and carpets left in the city (Reuters News 1988b). During the second cycle of 
inflation, deepening reform of the price system compounded issues of monetary expansion. In 1992, the 
price of grain rose around 50% in most provinces as a large pilot program for free grain markets began. 
According to an article in China News Digest (27 December 1993), the continuation of such price rises in 
the following year precipitated social unrest and rioting in rural areas as farmers vented their frustration, 
prompting Jiang Zemin to express the need to ‘take forceful measures to maintain social and political 
stability’ (as cited in Blecher 2009, 82).  
 
The government was unable to direct credit to the parts of the economy which needed it most. 
Problems in rural areas were exacerbated by the inability of specialised banks, particularly ABC, to 
provide the necessary funds for state purchase of agricultural goods. Specialised banks simply did not 
have enough reserves at the time of harvest and the PBoC was reluctant to expand the money supply 
any further to assist. According to a PBoC official interviewed by the Farmers Daily newspaper, the PBoC 
was only prepared to loan ABC a total of 1.5 billion RMB in 1989 despite 26 billion RMB being needed to 
meet payments in full, causing half the farmers selling grain and oilseeds to be paid in IOU notes 
(Reuters News 1989). Premier Li Peng himself pointed out the contradictory nature of an economy in 
which fixed asset investment and consumption rates continued to rise but farmers could not receive the 
economic support promised by the state (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 93). Instead of supporting farmers, the 
banking sector was directing capital to speculative areas of the economy such as coastal real estate and 
the stock market. Deng Xiaoping’s message of continued economic reform during the Southern tour 
bolstered the spirits of such investors. The number of real estate developers rose from 3,000 at the 
beginning of 1992 to 20,000 just 18 months later, with the investment bubble particularly severe in 
parts of Hainan, Guangdong and Guangxi. Incredibly, the GDP of Hainan grew by a whopping 41.5% in 
1992 (Zarathustra 2011). Such speculation was alarming for the state, whose investigations determined 
that speculative investments totalled more than 100 billion RMB, diverted primarily from the interbank 
market at high interest rates (Pei 1998, 337). A CBRC official stated that speculation in real estate was a 
major contributing factor behind the failure of Hainan Development Bank which was liquidated in 1998 
after the housing market cooled down (Interview with CBRC official, 11 March 2015).  
  
  
 
 
62 
Implementation of ‘Control and Rectification’ Policy:  
 
In the face of this lack of macroeconomic control, the state attempted to bring stability by tightening the 
reins on the planning system. Indeed in the years prior to the 1993 reforms, China actually strengthened 
the planned economy model of allocating credit. The state broadened the credit plan in 1989 so as to 
include NBFIs and slow the growing leakage of funds from the planning system. Investment funds were 
funnelled to trust companies, which were less restricted in their investment activities. While outside the 
plan, trust companies had also been able to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities available due to 
the dual pricing system and the restrictions on interest rates in the traditional banking sector.    
 
At the same time, the state implemented a dramatic program of austerity through a tight control of 
credit and government investment within the parameters of the plan. The PBoC also raised both its 
lending rate to banks and the required reserve ratio. There was a stricter administration of the credit 
plan with priority given to essential goods and projects. Regulations banned loans that were outside the 
plan or related to non-manufacturing construction projects or speculative activities, as well as loans 
made to companies that were unprofitable or held large inventories (Financial Times 1989). The 
austerity policy was particularly devastating for small private and collective enterprises, many of whom 
were forced into bankruptcy as a result (Xinhua News Agency 1989). The policy was known as 
‘zhilizhengdun’ or ‘control and rectification’, with its principal goal being the stabilisation of prices, a 
strong agricultural harvest and a reduction in the imbalance between supply and demand (Du, Hua 杜华 
2007, 92).   
 
The state’s decision to tighten control over the banking sector using tools of the planned economy was 
not an indication that the state wished to revert back to a planned system. On the contrary, the decision 
to slow down the economy was made in order to bring about the necessary economic conditions for 
further reform to take place. Premier Li Peng explained that ‘the motive for the current ‘control and 
rectification’ measures remains the improved implementation of ‘reform and opening’ policies’ (Du, Hua 
杜华 2007, 92). Stability was an overriding principle that superseded any push for market reform. The 
‘control and rectification’ policy achieved a certain degree of success. Speaking to PBoC officials, Vice 
Premier Yao Yilin praised their ‘great achievements’ in achieving price stabilisation (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 
97). Indeed by 1990, inflation levels had dropped to only 3% (World Bank 1990b, 37).  
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However ultimately economic stability could not be delivered within China’s transitional economy 
merely by using the old tools of the plan, and would instead require the development of a new set of 
tools to regulate the economic activity of enterprises and financial institutions that were becoming 
progressively more autonomous. Stricter control of the plan naturally impacted more on SOEs who 
relied directly on the plan for funding than on other enterprises, even though this was not the intention 
of the policy. In the first quarter of 1989, while SOE production fell substantially, there was a large 
increase in production from town and village enterprises and collective enterprises. Similarly, levels of 
consumption and infrastructure construction continued to rise (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 93). The adverse, 
unintended effects of tightening left the state no choice but to provide emergency funds for SOEs 
(Xinhua News Agency 1989).  Measures under ‘control and rectification’ could only control provision of 
capital within the plan and in particular capital for centrally controlled projects. At local levels, local 
governments held the last say on the allocation of capital. The state’s success in achieving greater 
control over credit and prices was short-lived. Following Deng’s Southern tour, investment euphoria 
returned and inflation levels rose even further than before, reaching almost 25% (World Bank 2016a).  
 
The ‘control and rectification’ policy also had other unintended effects on the economy. Within the 
environment of tight credit, a phenomenon of debt chains between enterprises known as ‘triangular 
debt’ appeared. It is estimated that between 1991 and 1992 triangular debt amounted to as much as 
one third of total bank loans (Guan 2013). While the high levels of debt created a liquidity issue among 
enterprises, the PBoC’s attempts to resolve the issue through capital injections were unsuccessful. This 
is because both parties to the debt were often unwilling to see the debt paid. Debtors wished to delay 
payment to remain afloat, while creditors were also unwilling to receive payment if it would have to be 
used to repay bank loans. Both parties preferred to wait for government support to solve their financial 
issues. This issue required a complex solution which was achieved by the PBoC at the end of 1992 
through clearing the debts of large-scale, fixed asset investment projects which were situated at the 
start of the debt chain (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 33). 
 
Lack of Financial Order: 
 
The lack of economic stability was both created and compounded by a lack of order in the financial 
sector which reflected the lack of a robust system of regulation. This problem became known in the 
industry as the ‘the three disorders’ - disordered financing, disordered establishment and approval of 
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financial organisations and disordered financial operations (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康  2009a, 39). 
Disordered financing referred to the use of the interbank market by banks to bypass the credit plan, as 
well as the leakage of funds from specialised banks to their trust companies at each level, along with the 
consequent allocation of funds within the trust sector, all of which were highly unregulated despite 
attempts to bring them under the plan. Entry of financial institutions was not regulated effectively and 
many state organs and enterprises, as well as private firms, had established illegal financial institutions. 
The fractured governance structure of the PBoC did not allow it to implement a consistent policy on 
entry of financial institutions. A survey of the establishment of 648 TICs, conducted between 1995 and 
1996, found that 249 were granted approval by PBoC branches which did not have the requisite 
authority (Pei 1998, 330). The final issue, the disorder of financial operations, referred to the trend of 
rising NPLs and reduced capital adequacy within banks. Policies to develop economic incentives through 
the decentralisation of banks had inhibited the development of strong governance mechanisms which 
could prevent violations of financial rules and processes and instances of corrupt practices (Liu, 
Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 17). The fractured governance structure of banks also limited the ability of 
policymakers to drive improvements in credit risk management. Implementation of a consistent asset 
and liability management policy, for example, would require the development of unified financial 
enterprises with a singular governance structure. A further cause of operational disorder was 
imperfections in bank supervision. The problem of triangular debt, for instance, had been due in large 
part to a lack of robust bank supervision and audit procedures which allowed enterprises to open 
settlement accounts and receive loans from multiple banks.      
 
Reform Measures: 
 
The establishment of the socialist market economy in 1993 represented an evolutionary step in (and not 
a departure from) China’s historical patterns of political and economic organisation. China’s leaders 
envisioned the development of a market system which would reflect the historical priority for economic 
and financial stability. Party institutions of governance would adapt to this market system and officials 
would remain deeply embedded within the banking sector. Deng Xiaoping emphasised that the end goal 
of reform, the revitalisation of China’s economy, was more important than the means used to achieve it: 
‘...Capitalism and socialism have no direct bearing on the planned economy and the market economy ... 
Planned economy and market economy are both economic measures. Socialism's real nature is to 
liberate productive forces, and the ultimate goal of socialism is to achieve common prosperity...’ (Ash 
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1992, 456). Deng re-emphasised the importance of continuing Reform and Opening policies for the 
purpose of economic modernisation: ‘... If we do not uphold socialism, do not carry out reform and 
opening, do not develop the economy, and do not try to improve the people's livelihood, then there will 
only be the road to ruin. This basic line should be valid for 100 years and must not be shaken...’ (Ash 
1992, 456). The decision to establish an improved system of market regulation had been foreshadowed 
by the increasing acknowledgement of the state of the role of regulation alongside planning processes 
at the 3rd Plenums of 1984 and 1988. 
 
China’s policymakers did not have a fixed view on how to develop a market system and reform 
measures in the banking sector were a pragmatic response to the problems facing China’s banking 
sector. In early 1993, the basic principles of reform were developed through consensus at a meeting of 
China’s leading finance professionals and academics. These experts agreed that a stronger, more 
independent central bank was needed to effectuate effective macro-economic control and develop a 
more standardised and rigorous system of financial regulation. It was hoped that these measures would 
‘ensure a stable financial order and the healthy development of financial operations’ (Liu, Mingkang 刘
明康 2009a, 40). These experts concluded that, despite remarkable progress in the banking sector, 
Deng’s vision to make banks ‘real banks’ or autonomous entities capable of efficient allocation of capital  
had not yet been realised. To achieve this, it was recommended that the governance of China’s state-
owned banks be unified and strengthened so that banks could act as autonomous, commercial financial 
enterprises capable of managing market risk. The unification and empowerment of the PBoC and state-
owned banks would provide a platform for the development of institutions to provide monitoring and 
governance functions necessary in the socialist market economy (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a). It would 
also counter the excessive influence of local government on banks branches which had been partly to 
blame for economic overheating and the consequent macroeconomic instability.    
 
At the National Financial Work Meeting, Zhu revealed the blueprint for the transformation of specialised 
banks to state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). This commercialisation process was necessary to 
empower banks to bear the responsibility of allocating capital efficiently and managing market risk as 
SOEs gradually became more independent from central industrial ministries and the planning system as 
a result of economic reforms announced at the 3rd Plenum of the 14th Party Congress. According to these 
reforms, SOEs would develop horizontal linkages between firms or plants to build large enterprise 
groups and then be subjected to a process of corporatisation by means of shareholding reforms and 
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listings to develop modern enterprises. Fifty five large business groups had been selected in 1991 to take 
part in the first group of trials (Sutherland 2001, 69). Corporatisation of firms signalled a transition from 
the profit sharing arrangements with the state through the contract responsibility system in favour of 
more autonomous governance. SOCBs had the responsibility of providing capital to SOEs during this 
transition. To facilitate the commercialisation of SOCBs, the central bank established policy banks to 
reduce the policy burden. SOCBs would now operate autonomously and bear the responsibility for 
profits and losses as well the burden of market risk. These reforms effectively released banks from the 
constraints of their specialised industries. One CBRC official, who began his career at ABC in 1993, noted 
the focus of the bank at that time on entering the cities (Interview with CBRC official, 10 March 2015). 
To mitigate market risk, SOCBs would institute systems of asset and liability management. It was also 
decided that banks would abide by the 1988 Basel Capital Accords with respect to policies of risk-
weighting assets and loan assessment to address the issue of credit risk. 
 
On Christmas Day 1993, the State Council issued ‘The Decision Regarding Reform of the Financial 
System’. The state pursued two main strategies in order to strengthen the central bank and the newly 
autonomous SOCBs. The first strategy was to establish laws and regulation which would legitimise their 
enhanced role within the banking system by clearly and transparently defining their roles and 
responsibilities. The Law of the PRC on the PBoC, passed in March 1995, empowered the central bank as 
regulator of the financial sector. With regards to banking supervision, it gave the central bank the 
authority to establish and implement regulation, determine the entry, exit and operational scope of 
financial organisations, and supervise, inspect and audit financial organisations (“Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China” n.d.). The PRC Commercial Bank Law, also passed in 
1995, defined the rules for establishment or termination of commercial banks, as well as their 
organisational form and management structure (along with the PRC Company Law) and the scope of 
business operations. The Commercial Bank Law asserted the autonomy of SOCBs, who would ‘make 
their own decisions regarding their business operations, take responsibility for their own risks, [and] 
assume sole responsibility for their profits and losses…’ and ‘conduct business operations without 
interference from any unit or individual’. The Commercial Bank Law also guaranteed protection of the 
law in recovering the principal and interest of loans when due. The law had a clear emphasis on the 
development of systems of risk management and its first clause identified the goal of improving asset 
quality as a key objective (“Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks” n.d.). Despite 
their increased autonomy, SOCBs would continue to support reform goals of economic modernisation, 
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infrastructure development, the transformation of SOEs and improvements in social welfare. According 
to the law, banks would ‘conduct their business of lending in accordance with the needs of the national 
economic and social development and under the guidance of the industrial policies of the State’ (“Law 
of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks” n.d.). In order to minimise the risks of financial 
contagion, the Commercial Bank Law formally segregated the banking sector from other financial 
sectors. As a consequence, commercial banks would no longer be permitted to engage in security, 
insurance and trust activities. The second strategy was to unify these institutions to strengthen 
governance. PBoC business operations were placed under centralised management and branches 
became agents of head office rather than stand-alone branches. Decentralising, CRS-inspired profit 
retaining and tax payment systems employed at PBoC branches were abolished. China’s SOCBs were 
gradually transformed into unified financial enterprises. The organisational concept of a one-tier legal 
person commercial bank, predicated on the ultimate control of capital management at head office level, 
was developed and strengthened. SOCBs developed systems of centralised capital management and 
restructured important operating functions such as accounting under a vertical organisational structure. 
This unification, which was implemented in large part between 1994 and 1995, made it possible to drive 
systemic improvements through the SOCBs.  
 
These banking reforms created greater opportunities for China to selectively adopt Western ideas and 
technology to suit China’s reform program. Since reform and opening, China had been very open to 
learning from other countries. According to a former PBoC official, committees had been established 
within the financial sector and beyond to facilitate relationships with foreign experts including 
academics and banking professionals (Interview with current Ministry of Commerce official, 29 March 
2015). China’s officials had established regular dialogue with financial experts and executives from Wall 
Street in order to gain knowledge about how the financial systems of developed countries were 
operated and regulated (see for example The Toronto Star 1986). Senior executives from international 
banks such as Goldman Sachs and Bank of America had consulted with the state on the management of 
risk by financial institutions. With the establishment of the socialist market economy, China paid greater 
importance to international standards of financial regulation, as evidenced by its adoption of the 1988 
Basel Accord. The state was able to refer to examples of international best practices to understand how 
best to regulate the banking system.  
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Officials chose to adapt Western ideas to develop a system of close regulation and supervision of China’s 
banks. This was in sharp contrast with the process of deregulation and liberalisation which was occurring 
in the West at this time. According to Johnson and Kwak, it was in this decade that ‘Wall Street 
translated its growing economic power into political power and when the ideology of financial 
innovation and deregulation became conventional wisdom in Washington on both sides of the political 
aisle’ (Johnson and Kwak 2010, 89). Johnson and Kwak further argue that ‘the 1990s witnessed the final 
dismantling of the regulatory system constructed in the 1930s’ in the U.S. as ‘leading policymakers from 
Alan Greenspan on down chose to rely on “self-regulation” of financial markets’ (Johnson and Kwak 
2010, 89). Ideas from the West strongly influenced the financial policy of developing countries and 
China’s officials were extremely nervous about the increased risk to global stability created by the 
deregulation of financial systems. Jiang Zemin’s explicit reference to the crises which occurred in Mexico 
(1994), Russia (1998), Turkey (2000) and Argentina (2001) in his speech at the National Financial Work 
Meeting in 2002 demonstrates that officials paid close attention to the growing dangers of the global 
financial system, even beyond the Asian region (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 455). China’s officials selectively 
adopted Western ideas which would enhance the stability of China’s banking system.  The new systems 
of asset and liability management employed by China’s banks utilised a number of simple ratios to 
ensure that the timing, quantity and structure of assets and liabilities corresponded in order to improve 
asset safety and liquidity (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 44). CBRC head Liu Mingkang would later 
comment that regulators were reliant on ‘a set of simple, useful and effective ratios, limits and targets, 
modeling those used by some developed markets in the past and were later abandoned by themselves 
during the frenzy [of] innovation and deregulation’ (Liu, Mingkang 2010a). Jiang Zemin affirmed that 
while ‘there are a great deal of areas that are undoubtedly worth studying’, it remained that ‘drawing 
lessons from foreign experience must start from the actual situation in our country’ (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 
150,151). 
 
Policymakers also sought to adapt Western technology to China’s banking system. One senior banker, 
employed by what is known today as the Bank of Beijing, recalls that offices made the transition from 
written work to computer systems in 1994-95 (Interview with Yao Libao, Head of Personal Loan Service 
Centre, Guangdong Development Bank, 9 October 2014). The construction of the electronic interbank 
system was achieved in 1995 with technical assistance from the World Bank and covered 250 large or 
medium-sized cities (“Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 1996” 1996). Prior to its launch, Jiang 
Zemin spoke vividly about the impact of financial satellite communication networks on Western banking 
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systems, and how it would enable the use of ATMs and credit cards (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 167). Jiang also 
emphasised its impact on financial stability, such as how it would enhance the supervisory power of the 
PBoC and reduce corruption (Du, Hua 杜华  2007, 168). Western technology would become 
progressively more integrated within China’s financial system. ATM networks in China would ultimately 
become highly reliant on Intel processors and Microsoft software, while the computer systems of 
China’s tier 1 state-owned banks would depend on technology belonging to IBM and HP (Nolan 2013, 
115,118).  
 
Bureaucratic Control and Market Regulation: 
 
Market regulation required the full support of the officials in China’s bureaucratic system in order to 
become effective.  Newly established regulatory agencies such as the central bank did not have the 
political power that resided within planning ministries and local governments. As a consequence early 
systems of market regulation had lacked legitimacy. While Premiers Zhao Ziyang and Li Peng supported 
the development of market regulation, neither Chen Muhua nor Li Guixian (Governors of the PBoC from 
1985-1998 and 1988-1993) had been members of the Politburo, let alone the Standing Committee. The 
new importance vested in the banking regulatory system caused China’s leaders to appoint Vice Premier 
Zhu Rongji as head of the central bank in July 1993.  According to Zhu, the ‘chief problem’ was the lack 
of commitment by officials to the institutions which governed the banking sector. Officials ‘were not 
handling affairs strictly according to the directives of the Central Committee and State Council or the 
banking regulatory framework’ (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 179). Zhu emphasised that establishing financial 
order required Party officials at all levels to take on board policies of the banking sector, to ‘stick to the 
Party’s path at all times and not waver’ (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 183). Zhu put his political weight fully 
behind new regulations, promising that banks must take them seriously or risk investigation. Zhu had a 
brash style and officials feared him, not only because of the potential consequences for their political 
careers, but also because he was not afraid to publicly humiliate those with whom he was unsatisfied.  
 
Along with Zhu Rongji, many of the officials posted to the PBoC would have an important influence over 
the development of the banking sector in the years ahead. These were career bureaucrats who were 
rotated between bureaucratic posts at the central bank, CBRC, commercial banks and to political 
positions beyond the sector according to the needs of the party leadership. These officials had a strong 
understanding of their responsibilities as leaders in the banking sector.  Most officials had been sent 
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down to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution and experienced the consequences of political 
and economy instability first hand. Each felt a heavy weight of responsibility to ensure the stable 
development of the banking sector and contribute to the revitalisation of Chinese civilisation. Zhu’s vice 
governors at the PBoC were Wang Qishan, Dai Xianglong, Zhou Xiaochuan and Chen Yuan. Wang Qishan, 
who worked at the Shaanxi museum prior to studying history at Northwest University in Xi’an, would 
later become a key figure in mitigating the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and now presides 
over Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. Dai Xianglong became head of the central bank after Zhu 
Rongji’s departure in 1995, though Zhu maintained a strong interest in the sector as vice premier. 
Current PBoC head Zhou Xiaochuan was appointed head of the central bank in 2002. Chen Yuan was 
chairman of the China Development Bank between 1998 and 2013. These officials, subject to the 
leadership of the party centre, had a strong influence over the direction of reform. China’s officials did 
not have a sophisticated understanding of modern banking systems but were open to learning from the 
West while avoiding the dangers of a deregulated financial system. They gradually became more familiar 
with concepts of market regulation as reform progressed. Zhu Rongji and Chen Yuan had received their 
education in economics, while Dai Xianglong was trained in financial accounting. Neither of Zhu’s 
predecessors as premier (Zhao Ziyang and Li Peng) or as head of the PBoC (Chen Muhua and Li Guixian) 
had any formal training in economics.      
 
The immediate focus for officials was to bring order to the financial sector.  Financial order was a key 
policy objective for senior party leaders in the Central Committee and Zhu Rongji had been advised that 
‘if we do not resolve to turn around the current financial chaos, and repress inflation, it could lead to 
large fluctuations in the economy and we could lose an excellent opportunity to develop’ (Du, Hua 杜华 
2007, 179–80). It was significant that at his closing speech at the National Financial Work Meeting in July 
1993, Zhu’s announcement of three new provisional regulations designed to return order to the banking 
sector preceded any discussion of market-based reforms. The regulations attempted to address the lack 
of order by putting a stop to illegal short-term loans, preventing deposit wars and prohibiting banks 
from funnelling money out of the planning system. PBoC lending was centralised and interbank markets 
were suspended below the level of head office (Du, Hua 杜华 2007). Zhu’s measures to increase control 
on credit ultimately reduced inflation levels from a peak of 24% in 1994 to 8% in 1996 while economic 
growth rates remained relatively stable (World Bank 2016a). According to the Almanac of China’s 
Finance and Banking, restoring price stability was a top priority of party leaders (“Almanac of China’s 
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Finance and Banking 1996” 1996, 4). Zhu’s ability to restore financial order and control inflation likely 
contributed to his eventual promotion to the position of Premier in 1998.   
 
‘Groping for Stones’ – Subsequent Institutional Development in the Banking Sector: 
 
The Commercial Bank Law and the PBoC Law became guiding documents for the pursuit of a highly 
exploratory process of regulatory development whose ultimate goal was the stable development of the 
banking sector.  
 
The unification and empowerment of the central bank allowed it to actively develop systems of internal 
control. The resources invested in audit of financial institutions increased considerably between 1993 
and 1997. In 1997 the PBoC invested over 1,000,000 working days in the audit of 28,310 financial 
organisations (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 64). Over this time audits became more varied and 
specialised as audit capability increased. The increase in the volume of PBoC’s audit load compelled the 
development of related financial regulations, systems of communication and policies to correct and 
punish violations. In 1997 a series of audit rules were published relating to PBoC methods of conducting 
supervisory audits as well as principles of internal control within financial organisations (Liu, Mingkang 
刘明康 2009a, 64). The National Audit Office, strengthened by the 1994 Audit Law, provided a valuable 
check on PBoC activities. In 1994, when the NAO discovered a significantly higher number of short-term 
loans in its audit than claimed by the PBoC, Zhu Rongji ordered the PBoC to dispatch five work teams to 
branches to resolve the issue (Yang 2004, 281).   
 
The PBoC developed strict regulations relating to the establishment and operation of financial 
institutions. It was charged with enforcing the segregation of financial sectors as according to the 
Commercial Bank Law. The PBoC managed the split of SOCBs from TICs and the removal of security 
trading operations from NBFIs. It developed detailed regulations which defined the limits of commercial 
bank activities. Segregation of financial sectors was successfully achieved by 1997. The greater 
empowerment of the PBoC as a gatekeeper to the financial sector led to the discovery of a number of 
financial institutions that had been established illegally or whose operations violated financial 
regulations. The State Council published a cautionary example relating to the Economic Reform 
Committee of Lanxi City, Zhejiang Province who allowed the established of three local financial 
institutions without PBoC approval in 1994 and 1995. Financial operations of these institutions were not 
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conducted prudently or according to regulation. Loan and deposit rates of these organisations were 90% 
and 50% higher respectively than PBoC limits. The risky nature of loans created an extraordinary total of 
23m RMB of NPLs and a bank run by depositors ensued. What made this case more serious was that the 
local government attempted to solve this problem without PBoC assistance, resorting to use funds from 
the local SOCB branch and UCCs to cover their tracks. The local government also planned to hide NPLs 
within the UCCs. To demonstrate the seriousness of this issue the relevant Lanxi City local government 
entities, along with the local PBoC branch, were investigated to determine criminal responsibility (State 
Council 国务院 1996). In June 1995, the NPC Standing Committee issued a law for the purpose of 
defining criminal punishments for the violation of financial order, which came into effect immediately. 
The law provided significant weight to the efforts of PBoC head office in establishing financial order. This 
is evident in one notice issued by the PBoC relating to the emergence of illegal private money houses 
where the illegal nature of this activity is emphasised with a clear reference to the relevant clause of the 
Commercial Bank Law (PBoC 人民银行 1996).  
 
The unification and strengthening of SOCB governance provided a platform for the development of 
systems of risk management. The implementation of systems of asset and liability management 
introduced the concept of managing assets and liabilities to reduce credit and liquidity risk. It also 
pushed the utilisation of performance indicators which could identify risk such as ratios relating to 
capital adequacy or loan structure. In 1994, the PBoC issued a notice requiring the gradual 
implementation of asset and liability management for commercial banks. The issuance of this notice 
came at the end of several years of exploratory trials, led by ICBC. ICBC commenced trials in 1988 in 
selected branches in Guangdong, Shandong and Ningbo and gradually expanded these trials, achieving 
full implementation in some provinces by 1992. In 1993, PBoC permitted ICBC to attempt full 
implementation of asset and liability management. The learnings accumulated during this process 
provided a basis for the implementation of systems of asset and liability management at other SOCBs 
(Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 44). The implementation of the 1988 Basel Accord provided a stimulus for 
the evaluation of assets according to their risk profile, the increase of capital adequacy according to 
international standards and the improvement of systems of loan assessment. The banking system 
employed a basic four-tier system of loan classification which had been instituted by the MOF in 1988. 
Within this constraint, SOCBs experimented with new forms of credit risk management and developed 
initial procedures for the assessment, monitoring and evaluation of loans (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a).  
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Gradual and pragmatic reforms of other financial institutions were implemented in order to ensure 
financial safety, serve the real economy and develop mechanisms of competition. Three policy banks, 
China Development Bank, The Export-Import Bank of China and the Agricultural Development Bank of 
China were established to facilitate the transition of specialised banks to SOCBs and, importantly, to 
provide the state with the institutional capability to finance important state projects which had been 
lacking, notably in the construction and agricultural sectors. Shareholding banks continued to show the 
way for the Big Four with achievements in areas such as asset and liability management drawing acclaim 
from international bankers (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 48). Despite the strict segregation of financial 
sectors CITIC, Everbright and China Merchants Groups were allowed to retain their status as financial 
conglomerates. In the RCC sector, the PBoC took over supervisory activities from ABC to drive regulatory 
improvement. The RCC model needed to change as the scale of agricultural development now well 
exceeded the level of the village. According to a CBRC official, the concept of a large-scale RCC bank was 
mooted, but ultimately it was considered to be unsuitable for the developmental needs of rural 
communities (Interview with CBRC official, 12 March 2015). Ultimately it was announced by the State 
Council in 1997 that RCCs would be grouped at the county level in an effort to retain the organisational 
characteristics which could allow greater participation in finance at the local level. In order to subject 
UCCs to a higher degree of risk management, it was decided they would be transformed into city 
commercial banks. The activity of foreign banks was allowed to evolve outside of the SEZs. The 
restriction of foreign bank activity within SEZs was removed by the PBoC in 1996. Between 1993 and 
1997 the total number of foreign financial institutions and total assets had both tripled (Y. Huang, Wang, 
and Lin 2010, 35). Tentative trials of foreign banks conducting RMB business were held in Shanghai.   
 
Build-up of Risk in the Banking Sector: 
 
The level of risk in the banking sector increased after the establishment of the socialist market economy 
because the development of institutions to mitigate market risk lagged behind the expansion of market-
led economic activity. Prior to the Asian financial crisis, China’s economy grew rapidly and SOCBs, 
reformed into autonomous and commercialised enterprises, had significantly greater responsibility for 
allocating capital. However the process of commercialisation of SOCBs between 1994 and 1997 was 
described by policymakers as ‘not thorough’ (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 47). Former Vice Chairman of 
PBoC’s auditing department, Wang Jun, cited ‘the widespread lack of credit culture within SOCBs’ as one 
of the principal concerns (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 71). To compound matters, the development of 
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systems of financial regulation was at an early stage. These systems were not yet able to control the 
level of market risk in the banking sector effectively. This resulted in the poor performance of the 
banking sector and a build-up of credit risk in the years leading up to the Asian financial crisis. In 1993, 
early PBoC audits of 175 financial enterprises determined that these enterprises did not have sufficient 
capital and that loan quality was poor (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 65). Not only had none of the Big 
Four banks reached the Basel I standard of 8% minimum capital ratio, levels of capital adequacy were 
actually in decline. NPLs of the Big Four increased from 20.4% to 32.2% between 1994 and 1998 
according to the relatively lenient four-tier system of loan classification (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 
77,78). Profits at the Big Four banks had fallen alarmingly from 34.3 billion RMB in 1992 to just 5.1 
billion RMB in 1996 (Pei 1998, 333). The lack of strong governance and weak regulatory supervision in 
the banking sector also provided an environment for other financial institutions such as TICs and 
shareholding banks to engage in risky behaviour. According to insiders at Guangdong Development Bank, 
the total value NPLs at the bank had risen to close to 100 million RMB by the end of the 1990s 
(Www.people.com.cn 2006). There was rapid growth in speculative investment, particularly in the stock 
market and real estate market. The heavy international borrowing of international trust and investment 
corporations (ITICs) and Chinese companies with a presence in Hong Kong, often for the purpose of such 
speculative investment, would later pose a threat to China’s economic stability during the Asian financial 
crisis.        
 
Table 3: Declining Capital Adequacy Ratios of the Four Specialised Banks, 1990-1996 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
ICBC 
Adjusted 
Core 
 
5.48 
4.5 
 
5.35 
4.3 
 
5.13 
3.8 
 
6.57 
4.07 
 
5.7 
3.33 
 
- 
2.98 
 
- 
2.55 
ABC 
Adjusted 
Core 
 
7.49 
5.2 
 
6.41 
4.5 
 
5.5 
3.8 
 
4.1 
2.74 
 
6.95 
3.5 
 
- 
3.31 
 
- 
2.72 
BOC 
Adjusted 
Core 
 
6.72 
4.3 
 
6.69 
4.1 
 
6.31 
3.7 
 
5.35 
3.44 
 
7.37 
4.13 
 
- 
4.77 
 
- 
4.69 
CCB 
Adjusted 
Core 
 
8.72 
5.9 
 
7.4 
4.9 
 
6.32 
4.4 
 
4.79 
3.21 
 
4.31 
2.81 
 
- 
2.32 
 
- 
2.13 
 
Source: Pei 1998, 335. 
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The combination of more autonomous banks and the weak nature of early regulation created the 
conditions for a high level of operational risk. According to the 1996 Chinese Banking Almanac, ‘the 
number of serious crimes was on the rise’ (“Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 1996” 1996, 11). 
The Almanac reported that a range of financial crimes had been discovered in which there had been 
clear violations of financial rules. As operations of banks became more autonomous, crimes had become 
harder to detect. Foreign exchange operations had become a notable target for such fraud. Often 
violations would be left unreported in banks’ accounts. Violations of financial procedures by banks often 
resulted in the use of funds for speculative areas of the economy such as the stock market and the real 
estate sector. Instances of large-scale fraud generally only came to light from the late 1990s as bank 
systems of internal control improved.  
 
SOCB workers had not yet been able to comprehend and adapt new concepts required for the 
development of a strong credit culture. Managers at SOCBs lacked familiarity with modern management 
concepts and as a result SOCBs continued to function in the mould of an administrative department. 
SOCB staff were also unfamiliar with new concepts of risk management designed for commercial banks. 
The state of organisational reforms within SOCBs reflected the notion that the development of 
commercial concepts was at an early stage. While in recent years SOCBs had ‘broken the iron rice bowl’, 
systems of human resources were relatively undeveloped. Banks had signalled their intention to 
restructure branch networks to reflect commercial principles but large-scale restructuring and 
consolidation of branch networks had yet to occur.  
 
There had not been the fundamental shift in the economic relations between SOCBs and SOEs needed 
for banks to manage credit risk effectively. This was due to the early stage of SOE enterprise reform, 
which contributed to the build-up of risk in SOCBs. Corporatisation of SOEs through shareholding reform 
and listing had been conducted in an experimental fashion in selected industries and was not fully 
endorsed by the state as a reform measure until 1997. The process of corporatisation was complicated 
by ongoing bureaucratic intervention and welfare responsibilities (Ma 2010). While the Commercial 
Bank Law had required the mandatory establishment of a board of supervisors to monitor bank 
performance, more substantial governance reforms in SOCBs would occur subsequent to that of other 
SOEs due to the high priority given to stability in the banking sector. SOEs did not treat relations with 
SOCBs as that between two commercial entities. An official who worked at ABC during that time 
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remarked that there was undoubtedly a culture of non-repayment among SOEs that persisted regardless 
of their commercial circumstances (Interview with CBRC official, 10 March 2015). In many ways the 
borrowing behaviour of SOEs still reflected a ‘selfish departmentalism’, with some companies aiming to 
obtain financial resources without giving real consideration to their financial circumstances or ability to 
repay loans (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 46). SOCBs continued to support SOEs during this phase of 
economic transition. Declining SOE profitability, which had fallen from 25% at outset of reform to just 
6.5% by 1996, had a negative impact on bank balance sheets (Lardy 1998, 47,48).  
 
Reforms in the banking sector which aimed to develop a robust system of market regulation and 
improve the capacity of banks to manage risk were at an early stage.  The gradual roll-out of a 
standardised set of reform measures for credit risk occurred in the years following the announcement of 
the socialist market economy. SOCBs had to first trial and then become familiar with new systems. One 
important reform, the separation of loan-making and loan assessment within the decision-making 
hierarchy of SOCBs, was not rolled out in a standardised form across SOCBs until 1997. Such systems 
often still lacked legitimacy. PBoC vice governor Dai Xianglong remarked that while the standardised 
implementation of asset and liability management constituted a ‘good start’, there were ‘many leading 
comrades who did not place enough importance on this work’. Dai also noted that bank workers needed 
time to learn how to this new system correctly (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 48). New systems of 
regulation introduced were still in their infancy and needed further strengthening and improvement. 
The four-tier loan classification system that was fundamental to the assessment of credit risk in the 
banking sector was overly simple.  It focused only on whether the loan was overdue and did not 
consider loan quality or risk, or the relationship between the repayment of the loan’s principal and its 
interest. A former employee of one of the Big Four banks remarked that systems of internal control 
were poor around this time (Interview with CBRC official, 10 March 2015). A new accounting law had 
been established according to international standards, but it did not include the requirement for banks 
to hold loan loss provisions due to the poor financial circumstances of China’s banks.  International 
auditors had recently begun operations in China by means of joint-venture partnerships. Audits of 
China’s non-financial SOEs by international accounting firms were vital to the success of their 
international IPOs, which began in Hong Kong after 1993. The first international audit in the banking 
sector did not occur until prior to the 2002 listing of Bank of China (Hong Kong), a subsidiary of the Bank 
of China.   
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While newly established laws had unified and strengthened the central bank and centrally controlled 
commercial banks, the fragmented nature of party governance undermined these reforms. As one CBRC 
official pointed out, the influence of local governments and ministries continued to cause SOCBs to 
continue to allocate loans to SOEs that were not commercially viable (Interview with CBRC official, 17 
March 2015). While from 1994 PBoC had the authority to vet appointments of SOCBs branches at vice 
governor level or above, appointment powers for the local branches of SOCBs remained in the hands of 
local party committees (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a; Heilmann 2005). Reforms to widen PBoC 
provincial boundaries to reduce the influence of local governments, discussed at the 3rd Plenum of the 
14th Party Committee, had not yet been implemented. The introduction of centralising reforms had 
become a priority for officials, as signalled by tax reforms in 1994. Such reforms would further 
strengthen market-based institutions in the banking sector.  
 
Conclusion: 
 
The banking reforms implemented at the establishment of the socialist market economy reflected the 
desire of policymakers to develop a stable banking system which would strongly promote economic 
development and modernisation. The high priority placed by China’s policymakers on financial stability 
in the gradual, pragmatic construction of its regulatory system was in sharp contrast to the model of 
deregulation and financial liberalisation employed in many Western developed countries. These reforms 
represented an evolution of historical patterns of political and economic organisation.  Officials in 
China’s bureaucratic system were urged that a core party of their duty was to maintain financial order 
and respect financial regulations. While there was a strong level of engagement with foreign experts, 
Chinese officials adapted the knowledge and technology acquired in a selective manner in order to 
develop a system of close regulation and supervision that had been forgotten by the West. Reforms 
empowered the PBoC to establish a stronger and more standardised system of regulation. Through the 
unification and strengthening of governance systems, the governance of China’s large state-owned 
banks was transformed into an enterprise model. These reforms provided the platform for a highly 
exploratory process of regulatory development designed to contain market risk. Regulatory 
developments included the development of PBoC audit systems, the segregation of financial institutions, 
improved control of entry and exit of financial institutions, and the implementation of systems of asset 
and liability management in SOCBs. China’s banking sector experienced an increase in risk because the 
development of institutions to regulate market risk could not keep up with the rapid pace of economic 
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growth. SOCBs had low levels of capital adequacy and high rates of NPLs due to the lack of a strong 
credit culture, the unfamiliarity of staff with modern risk management techniques, the duty to support 
SOEs in economic transition, the fragmented nature of party governance and the lack of sufficiently 
robust market regulation. Upon the advent of the Asian financial crisis, the high rate of NPLs would 
become an immediate systemic risk that would drive a new phase of regulatory development.  
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Chapter 4: Reducing Systemic Risk in the Socialist Market Economy (1997-2002)    
 
Within the orthodox view of Chinese banking reform, the period since the Asian financial crisis has been 
described as one of ‘reform stagnation’ (Shih 2007, 1238). For proponents of this view, reform ought to 
have pushed China’s financial system towards a Western, neoliberal model. Reform measures 
implemented in China post-AFC which did not accelerate convergence towards the neoliberal model 
were therefore deemed ‘evasive manoeuvres’ and its policies ‘inaccurately labelled reform’ (The Wall 
Street Journal Europe 1998; Shih 2007, 1241). It is argued that the orthodox view mischaracterises 
reform in this period because it neglects the influence of historical patterns of political and economic 
organisation. These historical patterns can explain the fundamental concern of officials for financial 
stability, the bureaucratic system embedded in China’s banking sector and the importance placed on 
financial sovereignty. Stability was the overriding reform principle as the Asian financial crisis alerted 
Chinese officials to the dangers of integration into an under-regulated and dangerous global financial 
system and the immediate systemic risk posed by the high levels of bad loans to China’s banking system.  
During interviews, a CBRC official pointed out that while each stage of banking reform inevitably posed 
challenges, the priority for officials was to avoid a big disaster that could derail the reform process 
(Interview with CBRC official, 10 March 2015). China’s officials resolved to mitigate the immediate 
systemic risk brought to light by the crisis. The party followed the traditional practice of sending a 
trusted party cadre from Beijing to the provinces to resolve potential instability, with Wang Qishan sent 
to Guangdong to resolve the province’s financial problems and lead negotiations with international 
creditors. There were reforms to the party’s model of governance of the banking sector. A new party 
body, the Central Financial Work Committee, was established to promote financial stability by 
enhancing central bureaucratic oversight of the banking sector. The response to the crisis also defined 
the direction of regulatory development. Policymakers progressively incorporated more international 
best practices into banking regulation. To improve credit risk management, an internationally 
recognised five-tier system of loan classification based on the U.S. system was introduced. Measures for 
the recapitalisation of China’s SOCBs and disposal of NPLs were implemented with reference to Basel 
requirements of capital adequacy and international case studies such as the U.S. savings and loan crisis. 
Global accounting and investment banks participated and advised upon the liquidation and restructuring 
of troubled enterprises. The direct impact of the crisis on China’s financial system also led to the vast  
restructuring of China’s NBFI sector. Navigating this process of restructuring, while also strengthening 
regulation to reduce future risk, enhanced regulatory capability and increased the accountability of 
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financial institutions. Officials maintained sovereignty over China’s banking sector despite intense 
pressure from foreign financial institutions and their governments who lobbied for the dismantling of 
the state-led model and greater foreign control of financial assets. This was confirmed by the decision 
reached at the Second National Financial Work Conference to list the Big Four state-owned banks as 
whole entities, thereby allowing the state to retain control. In an interview, a CBRC official attributed 
the protection of the banking sector from external influences, along with the suppression of private 
banking during this period, to the need for stability (Interview with CBRC official, 12 March 2015).   
 
The Asian Financial Crisis and the Dangers of the Global Financial System: 
 
Chinese officials at the core of Party system such as Zheng Bijian, former member of Central Committee 
and executive vice president of the Party school, felt that the fundamental cause of the crisis was a 
dangerous and insufficiently regulated global financial system. Zheng commented that the Asian 
financial crisis ‘has presented to the world in sharp relief and in a tempestuous way a series of deep-
rooted problems and major trends of the world economic situation’ and Western countries had 
promoted financial liberalisation in developing countries while failing to ensure the stability and 
resilience of their economies in the face of external shocks (Zheng 2011, 67). The countries that were 
worst affected by the Asian financial crisis (namely South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the 
Philippines) had been willing participants in the neoliberal, globalised financial regime led by the United 
States and United Kingdom, which had abandoned capital controls in the 1970s. According to the 
Reserve Bank of Australia, private capital flows into these Asian economies had increased fivefold in the 
years leading up to the crisis. Net private capital inflows of almost US$100b into these five countries in 
1996 had by 1997 become a net outflow of US$12 billion (Stephen Grenville 1998). The sudden reversal 
of short-term international capital flows, due in large part to speculative attacks against the Thai Baht 
and other currencies, forced a cycle of currency devaluation in the region.  
 
The crisis alerted officials to the dangers of premature integration into the global financial system and 
defined the attitude of policymakers towards the future opening of the capital account as one of 
extreme prudence and caution (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 71).  It was the lack of exposure to the 
volatility of short-term international capital flows, rather than the strength of China’s banking system, 
which prevented the crisis enveloping China. In fact a report published by Moody’s in June of 1998 
confirmed that ‘China has long had, by most measures, by far the weakest banking system among major 
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Asian countries’ (Harding 1998). China’s relative weakness implied a far greater vulnerability to the 
dangers of financial liberalisation. Famed currency speculator George Soros commented that ‘if the 
Chinese renminbi had been convertible, the Chinese banking system would have collapsed’ (Nolan 2008, 
108). China’s imposition of capital controls had largely prevented exposure to the risk of sudden capital 
withdrawal. Secondly, China’s exposure to foreign debt, and particularly short-term foreign debt, was 
much lower relative to countries worst affected by the crisis. Its ratio of foreign borrowing to GDP of 15% 
was lower than each of South Korea (28%), Malaysia (38%), Indonesia (51%) and Thailand (60%). 
Similarly, the level of China’s short-term debt did not leave it as vulnerable to capital withdrawals. The 
ratio of China’s short-term external debt to foreign reserves was 24% while in the cases of Thailand, 
Indonesia and South Korea this ratio well exceeded 100% (A. Sheng 2009, 282).  
 
While a meltdown of the banking system and the collapse of the currency had been averted, China did 
not escape from the crisis unscathed. There was a significant impact, as companies and financial 
institutions that had operations in Hong Kong had significant exposure international capital markets. 
There were two main groups who were affected, namely the ‘red chips’ (Chinese companies listed on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange) and the international trust and investment companies. When the crisis 
hit, these companies and financial institutions suddenly found it difficult to meet bond and interest 
payments to international lenders. The payments crisis threatened the stability of the financial systems 
of the mainland and also Hong Kong, which had returned to China in the early stages of the crisis. In the 
mainland there was a real threat of financial contagion.  The payments crisis had already began to affect 
vulnerable, small-scale domestic financial institutions in Guangdong, such as UCCs and rural financial 
associations, and threatened to spread across China (Nolan 2008, 97). In Hong Kong, mainland 
companies affected by the crisis played an important role in the Hong Kong economy, to the extent that 
their failure would threaten the stability of the Hong Kong stock market. 
  
In October 1998, the Hong Kong dollar came under attack from international currency speculators, 
forcing the intervention of the Hong Kong government, while there had also been rumours of a 
devaluation of the RMB (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 71). Having only regained Hong Kong from the 
British a few months earlier, the state desperately and ultimately successfully defended the Hong Kong 
currency against speculators, stopping the cycle of devaluations that had swept across Asia since the 
crisis began. Similarly the state chose not to devalue the RMB. While there had been some fear that 
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devaluations in the region would cause China to become less competitive as a trading partner, 
ultimately the state elected not to devalue the RMB in order to bring calm to global financial markets.  
 
The Asian Financial Crisis as a Driver for Domestic Reform: 
 
‘The Asian Financial Crisis has made us determined to resolve these problems according to their root 
cause, and we cannot hesitate any longer’ 
 
Vice Premier Zhu Rongji (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 262). 
 
Chinese officials did not view this crisis solely as the outcome of exposure to a volatile international 
financial system. According to Liu Mingkang, the crisis could be traced back to a ‘concealed banking 
crisis’ in the region and healthy domestic banking systems, such as those present in Singapore and Hong 
Kong at the time of the crisis, could have prevented or substantially reduced the impact of the crisis (Liu, 
Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 71). Instead the crisis left the banking systems of the Asian countries affected 
in a substantially weakened state with a greater number of bad debts and a lower net worth. In March 
1998 Wang Jun, deputy director of the PBoC’s audit department, summarised the learnings that China 
could take from the weaknesses of the banking systems of the affected Asian countries which had 
allowed capital inflows to contribute to speculative bubbles and increased enterprise debt. According to 
Wang Jun, banking systems in Asia suffered from an unhealthy credit culture, through which high rates 
of NPLs had emerged. Given the high level of bad debt within China’s banking system, the crisis made 
officials aware of how vulnerable it was. China’s Minister of Finance at the time of the crisis, Xiang 
Huaicheng, stated that ‘the Asian financial crisis has offered us a useful lesson. We did not realise before 
how serious a problem bad loans could be’ (Harding 1998). 
 
As the issues present in these countries were even more apparent in China’s banking system, the crisis 
informed the thinking of officials with regards to a program of domestic banking reform aimed at 
strengthening regulation and reducing credit risk. The problem of excessive NPLs was acknowledged by 
Chinese officials to be the biggest threat to its stability. In May 1998, PBoC Governor Dai Xianglong 
estimated the ratio of NPLs to be at 20% of total bank loans, though he acknowledged that the four-tier 
loan classification system employed at the time systemically underestimated credit risk  (Reuters News 
1998). International ratings company Moody’s consider the NPL rate to be ‘much worse than even the 
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most pessimistic of the official indications’, and was perhaps as much as 40-50% (Kynge 1998). External 
observers deemed the sector to be technically insolvent (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 47). The 
vulnerability to credit risk was exacerbated further by insufficient regulation, primarily weak accounting 
standards and loan provisioning methods which failed to ensure sufficient allowance for credit risk (Liu, 
Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 73–76). While East Asian and South East Asian countries had failed to 
rigorously enforce the standards of the American 5-tier loan classification system, China had yet to 
transition from a more basic system developed by its MOF in 1988. This system was only concerned with 
whether loans were overdue. It failed to give an accurate indicated of whether these loans where likely 
to be repaid and did not provide any guidance with respect to the risk of loans which had yet to reach 
maturity. China’s loan classification system therefore did not provide reliable information on the quality 
or risk of loans in the banking system. As with other Asian countries, China’s banks tended to put too 
much emphasis on loan collateral or guarantees in assessing loans, and insufficient emphasis on the 
cash flow which would make repayment of the loan possible.  
 
After the crisis officials were aware that reducing credit risk would also require the improvement of 
accounting and auditing standards, the augmentation of loan provisions and the imposition of a harder 
budget constraint on SOEs. Weak accounting provisions allowed banks to delay recording non-payment 
of loan principal and interest in China before 1997 for up to three years, a limit greater than the Asian 
countries and far exceeding international standards of three to six months (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 
75). More generally, the fact that China’s banks and many corporate lenders had not been subject to an 
audit by international accounting firms contributed to the lack of accurate and transparent information 
relating to bad loans. China’s loan provisioning system at the time of the crisis was extremely 
inadequate. Total loan provisions in 1996 only accounted for 1% of all loans and, due to the 
inadequacies of the loan classification system, provisioning failed to take into account the potential risks 
of loans yet to be repaid. China lagged well behind these Asian countries with respect to the write-off of 
loans. Prior to 1995 the PBoC had set a ceiling on the classification of bad loans at 2%, while Wang Jun 
revealed that limiting loan write-offs had become standard government practice (Lardy 1998, 115; Liu, 
Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 74). The banking system’s support for SOEs had not only created a soft budget 
constraint but made it problematic for banks to determine when a loan was non-recoverable. Indeed 
banks would often continue to attempt recovery of the small proportion of ‘bad loans’ it had written off, 
even in the rare case that there were suitable loan provisions.  
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The First National Financial Work Meeting: 
 
The State Council called a National Financial Work Meeting in November 1997, in the midst of the crisis, 
with the goal of mitigating immediate systemic risk posed by the crisis and developing a medium-term 
plan to make the financial sector stronger and more resilient. At the meeting, Vice Premier Zhu Rongji 
reaffirmed the State Council’s faith in the policy direction of the political centre, the Central Committee, 
praising the achievements of the financial sector in supporting the economy and raising living standards 
(Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 262). In his speech, Zhu reflected that the financial system was not suited to the 
sharp pace of economic reform and development and that the historical burden of transition from the 
socialist economy, principally the transformation of its SOEs into profitable and efficient enterprises, 
weighed heavily on the banking sector.  The resolution passed by the Central Committee and State 
Council at the National Financial Work Meeting represented a continuation of the existing reform path. 
It called for deeper reform of the financial system to bring order to the banking sector and reduce risk. 
The key areas of concern were reducing the amount of bad loans and resolving the issues of the NBFI 
sector. Other priority issues included identifying and resolving financial crime, which had become a 
more serious issue as autonomy of financial institutions had increased since 1993, as well as improving 
internal control and bringing order to the financial sector.   
 
Immediate Measures to Reduce the Level of NPLs: 
 
The recapitalisation of SOCBs and the stripping of NPLs were undertaken with clear reference to 
international standards and practices that were adapted to suit Chinese conditions. In March 1998, the 
National People’s Congress approved a plan by the State Council to inject RMB 270 billion into the 
banking system, at the time equivalent to 4% of China’s GDP. The state was making an investment in the 
long-term survival and future transformation of its state-owned banking sector, despite its weak state. 
The capital injection did not in itself establish a mechanism through which to improve allocative 
efficiency of capital or risk management. Officials had a responsibility to deliver future reform which was 
a both meaningful and sustainable in order to justify this cost to society. The justification for the precise 
amount of this capital injection was the state’s desire for the banking system to accord to international 
standards of capital adequacy as set out in the first Basel Accord, which China had adopted in 1994. To 
fund this recapitalisation, the deposit-reserve ratio was reduced from 13% to 8% to free up sufficient 
capital. SOCBs utilised the extra capital to each purchase a Special Purpose Treasury Bond which was 
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then lent back to the banks, effectively as a capital injection. The purpose of the capital injection was to 
raise the core capital and supplementary capital of China’s large state-owned banks to the Basel 
requirements of 4% and 8% of risk-weighted assets respectively. That these banks had not yet been 
subjected to an audit by international accounting firms and had weak loan classification standards 
increased the risk and uncertainty surrounding the ultimate impact of this reform.  
 
After resolving the urgent need of recapitalisation, the next objective in the reform process was to lower 
the rate of NPLs of the large state-owned banks. To reduce the quantity of NPLs held by the Big Four, 
the state established four asset management companies (AMCs), each tasked with absorbing and 
disposing of the NPLs of one of the Big Four banks. In designing a model for the purpose of carving off 
NPLs, China again looked outward for international case studies. Zhu Rongji instructed high-ranking 
PBoC officials to consult with staff from the Resolution Trust Company, an AMC which assisted with the 
resolution of the U.S. savings and loan crisis between 1989 and 1995 (Kuhn 2010, 267). It is likely that 
officials also examined the successful use of a state-owned AMC in Sweden to help resolve its banking 
crisis during the early 1990s. According to then vice governor of the PBoC, Liu Mingkang, the state 
ultimately selected a state-owned model of AMCs as the combination of China’s undeveloped legal 
framework and the conflicts of interests between commercial banks and AMCs would pose a greater risk 
if private companies were involved (Kuhn 2010, 267).  
 
Between April 1999 and October 1999 the Cinda, Huarong, Great Wall and Orient AMCs were 
established to dispose of the NPLs of CCB, ABC, ICBC and BoC respectively. NPLs valued at a total of RMB 
1.4 trillion were transferred to the AMCs the following year, including RMB 100 billion from China 
Development Bank. According to official estimates, this immediately reduced the NPL rate among the 
Big Four banks by 10% (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 80). Given the huge scale of the NPL problem, the 
state had little choice but to fund the AMC purchase of NPLs almost entirely through the issue of AMC 
bonds, purchased by the Big Four state-owned banks for RMB 858 billion. This method, which deviated 
from international practices, was selected as it provided China the means to fund the removal of NPLs 
from the banking system. There were obvious drawbacks. While the NPLs of the large state-owned 
banks were removed from their books, the banks remained exposed to these assets through their AMC 
bond. In 2000 the AMCs officially took on the bad loan portfolios from the Big Four. The AMCs paid face 
value for the loans at a total of US$170 billion, despite the impaired nature of the loans. This provided 
valuable capital to the banks but left the AMCs with a virtually impossible task with respect to loan 
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recovery. In short, the state’s lack of financial means, along with the lack of institutional capacity, caused 
it to find a pragmatic method to shift this historical burden of NPLs to specialised entities. Given these 
obstacles, the state would need to adopt the approach of ‘groping for stones to cross the river’ in 
finding long-term resolution to the NPL issue.   
 
The stripping of NPLs removed a historical burden from the large state-owned banks, providing them 
with a ‘clean slate’ and creating a more level playing field within the banking sector. The NPLs of state-
owned banks were a consequence of their role in providing financial support for the transition of SOEs 
and the development of public infrastructure. Liu Mingkang reported that the leaders of the state-
owned banks emphasised this historical legacy in the creation of bad loans. According the presidents of 
the Big Four, the bad loans were ‘…caused not by our mismanagement but by loans required by the 
state and imposed on us’  (Kuhn 2010, 266). This responsibility had adversely impacted the development 
of a credit culture in state-owned banks. With this burden removed, regulators would push the 
development of an improved credit culture within banks and hold top bank officials accountable for the 
creation of future bad loans. At a news conference, PBoC governor Dai Xianglong revealed that with the 
improved asset quality following NPL disposal, there was an expectation that the commercial 
performance of banks would improve so that further government bailouts would be unnecessary: ‘I 
consider the establishment of the asset-management companies as the last dinner for the state-owned 
commercial banks’ (Brown 2000). 
 
SOE reform as a removal of the historical burden: 
 
Reform of the SOE sector, while not complete, had also helped relieve the banks of some of the policy 
burden. Since the early 1990s, the state had adopted a strategy of creating a modern enterprise system 
by carving assets from ministries and instituting modern forms of corporate governance. By the end of 
the 1990s, the state had established 120 centrally controlled enterprise groups and transferred their 
administrative function to bodies that were subsidiary to the State Economic and Trade Commission (J. 
Wu 2004, 156). Shareholding reform and listing of SOEs had proceeded rapidly since the mid-1990s. 
While not complete, the development of a modern enterprise system, the separation from 
administrative function, and the discipline of external shareholders all pushed more commercially-
orientated behaviour within SOEs.   
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One important aspect of these reforms was the downsizing of the SOEs. According to Naughton, almost 
50 million workers lost their jobs in the state sector from 1993-2004, with more than half of the layoffs 
occurring between 1996 and 1999 (Naughton 2007, 186). The trimming of surplus labour reduced the 
state’s burden to support SOEs, much of which was offered through policy loans from the banking sector. 
The banking sector also benefitted directly from downsizing. A large scale, systematic rationalisation of 
the branch networks of the Big Four was carried out from June 1998 by the PBoC. Mergers and closures 
of bank branches were implemented according to ratio between staff numbers and deposits (except in 
the case of ABC). Branches that were superfluous to the hierarchical structure were consolidated. 
Between 1998 and 2002, the Big Four closed approximately 55,000 branches, which represented a third 
of their combined organisational network, laying off more than 550,000 workers in the process (Liu, 
Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 79). While the reform of the state-owned enterprise sector remained a work in 
progress, the development of the modern enterprise system had reduced the policy loan burden on the 
banking sector and enhanced the ability of centrally controlled SOEs to act as more independent and 
commercially viable enterprises.  
 
Reform to Regulate the Market: 
 
After the Asian financial crisis, China’s officials wanted to establish a more robust regulatory system to 
mitigate market risk. The decision to develop a system of close supervision and regulation of financial 
institutions caused China to take a different path to that of Western developed countries which had 
implemented policies of deregulation and financial liberalisation. The PBoC played a leading role in the 
initial development of this regulatory system. While the Commercial Bank Law and Central Bank Law had 
provided guidance for the initial development of the banking regulatory system, this was a highly 
exploratory process which was at an early stage. The central bank steadily issued provisional regulations 
after the enactment of these laws in 1995. Following the National Financial Work Conference, the 
regulatory responsibilities of the PBoC in the securities and insurance sectors were devolved to specialist 
regulatory agencies. The PBoC head office was then reorganised into divisions according to type of 
banking or non-banking financial institution. In 2001 the PBoC issued a number of comprehensive, 
though provisional, regulations targeted at specific types of financial institutions as a result of this 
exploratory process (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a).   
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As part of this process, the PBoC gradually constructed a risk management system which according to 
Liu Mingkang ‘began to shift the core of financial regulation from regulatory compliance… towards 
regulation according to law and risk’ (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 105). Between 1998 and 2002 the 
PBoC developed and improved its on and off-site evaluation systems, regulatory reporting system, and 
statistics and information management systems. These formed the basis of its risk assessment activities. 
Following the initial reforms of the PBoC structure, much work was done to ensure there was 
accountability for regulatory activities at the various levels of each bank, from head office to branch 
level. Within this more robust regulatory structure, there were a range of complimentary rules and 
regulations that were established in order to change the credit culture within Chinese banks. These 
efforts to develop a more comprehensive regulatory structure provided a platform for fundamental 
reforms which, as they took hold, would greatly enhance the capacity of all Chinese banks to manage 
credit risk. Provisional rules instructing on the recognition of NPLs, the further standardisation of 
reporting procedures for bank NPLs and the investigation of branches of the large state-owned banks 
with particularly high rates or quantities of NPLs provided a strong signal to bank officials of the PBoC’s 
intent to deal with the NPL problem (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 109).   
 
Wang Qishan, the official charged with resolving the financial problems in Guangdong during the crisis, 
stated that ‘the 1997 Asian financial crisis helped us gain a deeper understanding of the need to 
establish principles for commercial credit in accordance with international practices’ (Qide Chen 1999). 
The introduction of an internationally recognised five-tier system of loan classification, based on the U.S. 
system and which better reflected loan quality and the risk of non-repayment, was perhaps the most 
important of these reforms. Up to this point, the loan classification system had essentially recorded the 
extent to which the principal of the loan was overdue. The new system required staff to grasp an 
entirely new definition of credit risk and develop an understanding of the quality and risks of new and 
ongoing loans, with particular attention paid to the financial circumstances of the borrower. The 
decision to implement the new loan classification came after extensive consultation with international 
organisations such as international accounting and advisory firm Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC). 
While PWC recommended wide-ranging reform of bank prudential supervisory systems, the state 
decided that initially the banking system could only cope with the introduction of the new loan 
classification system (Interview with David Li, Beijing Senior Partner, PWC, 3 April 2015). Trials 
commenced from May 1998 in Guangdong and included all commercial banks. The PBoC announced 
that from 2002 comprehensive implementation of the 5-tier loan classification would begin. Another 
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fundamental reform was the standardisation of the credit approval process. According to a director of a 
national-level commercial bank, prior to this reform there was very little separation between the 
processes of loan-assessment and loan-making. To make a loan, a loan officer would simply require the 
approval of his or her supervisor (Interview with Yao Libao, Director of Personal Credit, Beijing Branch, 
Guangdong Development Bank, 9 October 2014). The lack of a standardised process with robust checks 
and balances on loan officer decision-making created the potential for error or corruption to occur. As 
part of the new credit approval process, loan assessment committees were instituted at the branch level. 
This system was first trialled within ICBC in 1995 and a unified client credit authorisation system was 
rolled out across the banking sector in 1997 (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a).     
 
The combination of asset stripping and regulatory measures appeared to have a significant impact on 
the NPL problem. 2001 marked the first year when the total amount of NPLs and the NPL rate both 
decreased. Between 2001 and 2002, according to the five-tier loan classification system, the official NPL 
rate decreased from 31% to 26.1% (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 80). However as previously stated, the 
problem of bad loans was more serious than these official figures suggested as rigorous systems of NPL 
reporting and recognition were still under development. The meagre loan provisions of the large state-
owned banks caused them to remain technically insolvent.   
 
Clean-up of the NBFI sector: 
 
The party moved urgently to address the financial chaos in Guangdong province which had been 
exposed by the Asian financial crisis. The rise of economic fortunes in the province, following Deng’s 
Southern tour in 1992, had spurred speculative investment, particularly in real estate and stock markets. 
Guangdong’s financial institutions were able to offer a higher return on domestic capital, particularly in 
the NBFI sector where illegal high interest rates were offered to attract capital from across the country. 
International investors also wanted to be part of this growth story, particularly given the state’s record 
of bailing out troubled firms. 40 ITICs, located at various levels of government, along with the ‘red chip’ 
companies listed in Hong Kong (and other Chinese ‘window’ companies with a presence in Hong Kong) 
had borrowed heavily from international commercial banks. The debt of ITICs registered with the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) had reached US$18 billion by the end of the 1990s. The 
advent of the Asian financial crisis had burst the speculative asset bubbles and many financial 
institutions were in severe financial trouble, especially those suffering from corruption and poor 
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management. The problems of financial institutions which had borrowed abroad quickly spread to other 
parts of the NBFI sector such as the urban and rural cooperatives, which were also heavily leveraged. 
The difficulties in Guangdong were perceived in Beijing as a failure of party leadership to ensure stability 
and financial order in the province. According to South China Morning Post, the province was seen as ‘a 
kingdom unto itself, the key reason being ‘the sky is high and the emperor is far away’’ (South China 
Morning Post 1998). The party leadership in Beijing transferred trusted party cadres to the Guangdong 
provincial party committee. Wang Qishan, former vice governor of PBoC under Zhu Rongji and then 
governor of CCB, was appointed executive vice governor of Guangdong in charge of financial affairs. 
Wang would work under newly appointed governor Li Changchun, and with Xiao Gang, the former 
assistant to PBoC governor Dai Xianglong and new head of PBoC’s Guangdong branch.   
 
Wang had to find a middle path which balanced the economic instability created by closure and 
bankruptcies with this potential threat of future systemic risk. At the beginning of the crisis, it is 
estimated that the international debts of TICs and red chips represented 60% of China’s foreign 
exchange reserves (Nolan 2008, 107). The huge scale of financial debts relative to China’s financial 
capabilities made an easy resolution of these financial difficulties impossible for Wang Qishan. 
International creditors expected the troubled ITICs and firms to receive the backing of the Chinese state, 
which had been loath to allow its firms to fail in the past. A full bail-out of all the institutions implicated 
in the crisis, while perhaps desirable, would have greatly diminished China’s foreign exchange reserves 
and threatened the stability of the financial system in the face of future systemic threats. Two of the 
troubled entities were of particular importance to the Guangdong economy. The first was the 
Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation (GITIC), which was an investment vehicle 
wholly owned by Guangdong province. According to Wang Qishan, GITIC’s foreign debt accounted for 80% 
of the foreign debt of Guangdong’s ITICs (China Securities Bulletin 1999a). The other was Guangdong 
Enterprises (GDE), a conglomerate involved primarily in import processing, assembly, and export which 
also functioned as the effective ‘window company’ for the Guangdong provincial government. Five of 
GDE’s companies were listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In October 1998, provincial officials 
announced the closure of GITIC. Three months later officials confirmed that GITIC would be liquidated, a 
decision which shocked foreign creditors. Wang Qishan announced that signs of corruption would be 
followed up, stating that ‘some high-level managers are under legal investigation’ (China Securities 
Bulletin 1999b). In October 1998, the Guangdong provincial government announced its intention to 
restructure GDE, through which investors would take a loss. Wang Qishan stated that he felt a ‘great 
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responsibility’ in the case of GDE, given its contribution to ‘the overall economy of Guangdong province’ 
and the impact its failure might have on the economy of Hong Kong, which he described as a ‘potential 
earthquake’ (South China Morning Post 1999). The case of GDE demonstrated that the state prioritised 
the rescue of firms whose survival was important for financial stability and whose contribution to the 
real economy was significant.  
 
The decision not to fully bail out GITIC and GDE caused a shift in the relationship between Chinese 
companies and the state, which also had a profound impact on international creditors. In prioritising the 
stability of the financial system, the state had demonstrated that enterprises and NBFIs no longer had 
the unconditional support of the state and would be allowed to fail in some circumstances. This was a 
big step in the transition of SOEs, particularly in the financial sector, in becoming more autonomous and 
responsible for financial performance. International creditors, which had previously benefitted from 
implicit government support despite lending at commercial rates, were outraged by the change in policy 
stance. Indeed a contingent of bankers from Hong Kong met with Zhu Rongji, unsuccessfully seeking 
assurance that the Guangdong provincial government would facilitate the repayment of loans (Guyot 
1999). One creditor of the Ningbo ITIC said of the foreign creditors: ‘Many of these companies don't 
realize, or they don't care, that the country's financial system is at stake’ (Chang 1999). The liquidation 
of GITIC, which caused international creditors to lose around US$3 billion, created an important 
precedent for future negotiations of other ITICs with international creditors and for the restructuring of 
enterprises such as GDE (Nolan 2008, 113). Meeting with GDE’s creditors during negotiations, Wang 
Qishan stated that ‘what we need is to fairly and equally bear the responsibility’ of GDE’s insolvency 
(Guyot 1999). He was careful to point out the low rate of recovery if GDE were to be liquidated following 
unsuccessful negotiations (South China Morning Post 1999). With this strong stance, the state was able 
to come to an agreement with international creditors, who agreed to a total loss of US$2.12 billion with 
the provincial government injecting assets worth a total of US$2.01 billion (Nolan 2008, 117).   
 
The restructuring, closure and bankruptcies that the crisis provoked provided another important 
stimulus for reform. In 1999, the State Council approved a plan for a PBoC-led clean-up of the trust 
sector which advocated the closure of insolvent or high risk trust companies. This marked the third 
major restructuring of the trust sector since reform began. Reforms also focused on standardising the 
scope and practices of trust companies. Despite the separation of sectors in 1993, commercial banking 
and securities operations remained prevalent with trust companies. In 2001, the PBoC confirmed its 
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intention to close 151 of the 239 ITICs in China, with the remaining 88 to be merged into 60 trust 
companies (Brown 2001). The trust companies that were not closed were required by regulators to 
undergo a reregistration process. The closures and separation of trust companies’ securities business 
were completed by the end of 2002 (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 86). Regulators also implemented 
large-scale restructuring programmes in the urban cooperative, rural cooperative and rural finance 
association sectors. Merger of troubled cooperatives with better performing financial institutions was 
undertaken in a pragmatic manner, with closures made where it was not practical. Where suitable, RCCs 
were upgraded to city-level to better reflect the new patterns of economic activity. As in the case of the 
AMCs, these activities also provided regulators with important experience dealing with troubled assets. 
Restructuring methods were predicated on an extensive, nationwide process of verification of assets 
and assessment of capital, conducted by the PBoC. In the cases of GITIC and GDE in particular, the 
appointment of international firms indicated the state’s emphasis on achieving resolution in a 
transparent fashion, utilising internationally recognised practices, rather than attempting to resolve 
matters internally. International accounting giant KPMG acted as liquidator for GITIC. Its investigations 
shed light on the widespread corruption and mismanagement that had occurred. KPMG leveraged its 
vast international experience, advising the government on how best to meet the interests of individual 
depositors and the other stakeholders involved. International investment bank Goldman Sachs worked 
closely with the Guangdong government to develop a plan for GDE’s restructuring. Upon announcement 
of the plan, Wang Qishan noted that it ‘…clearly demonstrates our determination to establish an 
independent, efficient and commercially viable enterprise through a commercial restructuring in 
accordance with international practices’ (Gasper 1999).  
 
The process of restructuring and closure of NBFIs post-AFC cemented the role of regulation in China’s 
transitional economy and reduced future moral hazard. At a speech at the Fortune Global Forum in 1999, 
Wang Qishan confirmed the new emphasis on the use of ‘laws to minimize or eliminate moral hazards in 
financial activities’ (Qide Chen 1999). Wang Qishan stated that legal monitoring and supervision of all 
financial activities, including those of government bodies, was imperative. That there was much 
progress to be made was evident to all. The restructuring, bankruptcy and closure of financial firms still 
lacked a comprehensive legal framework. In the absence of a bankruptcy law that was specific to 
financial institutions, the GITIC bankruptcy had proceeded according to the 1989 Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law. The order of repayment to depositors and international and domestic creditors in the event of 
restructuring had also not been standardised (Xie 1999). While it was a work in progress, the 
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discontinuation of unconditional support for SOEs and adoption of internationally recognised 
restructuring methods had greatly enhanced the stature of the socialist market economy. 
 
Bringing Fraud to Light: 
 
The governance of China’s large state-owned banks was placed under increased scrutiny after the Asian 
financial crisis. Investigations revealed cases of fraud and corruption by senior banking officials which 
were on such a massive scale that they threatened the stability of China’s economy (Nolan 2017). 
According to a CBRC official, the large-scale fraud occurred during this period as a result of a 
combination of a market-driven economy and a lack of robust systems of internal control (Interview 
with CBRC official, 10 March 2015). In May 2000, Li Fuxiang, the official in charge of China’s foreign 
exchange reserves, was under investigation for his conduct at BoC and the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE) when he took his own life. According to reports, ‘questions over what 
happened to billions in "missing" reserves remain unanswered to this day’ (Kynge 2002a). In 1998, the 
combined total of foreign exchange and the trade surplus was US$89 billion but foreign reserves 
increased by just US$5.1 billion. In 1999, the combined total was US$76 billion and reserves grew by 
only US$9.72 billion. Capital flight, which was estimated at US$35-40 billion by academics, accounted for 
only part of the discrepancy (Kynge 2002a). In 1999 the chairman of Everbright Bank, Zhu Xiaohua, was 
detained by party officials and accused of taking bribes in exchange for approving more than RMB 800 
million worth of loans (X. Sheng and Gao n.d.). Zhu had been in charge of China’s foreign exchange 
reserves prior to the appointment of Li Fuxiang. In 2003 Wang Xuebing, former head of both BoC and 
CCB, was sentenced to 12 years for receiving millions of dollars of bribes and accepting improper gifts 
such as luxury watches (McGregor 2003a). Li Fuxiang, Zhu Xiaohua and Wang Xuebing had all been ‘close 
associates’ who ‘spoke excellent English and had cultivated relationships with many of the world's top 
bankers’ (Kynge 2002a). Liu Mingkang, a banker with BoC and subsequently a PBoC official, was 
appointed by the party as the head of Everbright Bank in 1999 and BoC in 2000 in response to the 
corruption scandals that had engulfed both banks. Liu Mingkang promised that he and his new 
colleagues would take ‘firm action against irregularities’ (McGregor 2002). In 2002, Liu revealed that an 
internal audit had uncovered the theft of at least US$483 million over the course of seven years by five 
BoC officials at the bank’s branch in Kaiping, Guangdong. The five co-conspirators took advantage of a 
time lag within the bank’s internal united finds system to transfer funds into personal accounts and 
eventually move it out of China via Hong Kong (Lu, Long, and Zhang 2005). In an interview, PWC partner 
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David Wu said that fraud on such an enormous scale was only possible due to the lack of robust 
accounting practices at Chinese banks during the 1990s (Interview with PWC Partner David Wu, 3 April 
2015). Cases of fraud would later provide a stimulus for the introduction of regular audits of banks by 
international auditors and the upgrading and centralisation of IT systems to reduce operational risk. 
 
Improving Party Governance: 
 
The lack of stability in China’s financial sector was considered by party officials as not only a problem of 
insufficient regulation, but also of weak party governance. According to a senior CBRC official, it was 
Premier Zhu’s frustration with the lack of order in the financial sector that caused him to establish a new 
party body in 1998, the Central Financial Work Committee (CFWC), whose purpose was to strengthen 
this governance in order to promote the ‘safety, efficiency and stability’ of the financial system 
(Heilmann 2005). The official suggested that Zhu was motivated to create this new organisation, led by 
Zhu’s Vice Premier Wen Jiabao, because it afforded Zhu with greater control and influence over the 
reform process than if he were to work through existing party organisations (Interview with CBRC official, 
11 March 2015). Wen would play a central role in the reform of the banking sector from this time until 
his retirement in 2012.   
 
One key issue for the CFWC to examine was the excessive influence exerted by local government on the 
allocation of credit, particularly with respect to the Big Four state-owned banks. While the unification of 
the governance systems of these banks and development of regulation had somewhat eroded the 
influence of local governments in the allocation of credit, local party committees had retained control 
over appointments for banking officials at regional levels. According to Heilmann (2005), the major 
achievement of the CFWC was the implementation of reforms which centralised control of 
appointments for the Big Four. This was realised through the establishment of new party committees at 
the sub-national level for the Big Four banks. These party committees took over control of local 
appointments of the Big Four from local party committees. The strengthening of party governance in 
this manner was not fundamentally in opposition to the trend of regulatory development. The CFWC did 
not interfere with the business decisions of the state-owned banks. On the contrary, it complemented 
regulatory development by reducing the ability of local government to exert influence over the 
allocation of capital and undermine the standardisation of bank practices. In 1998, the same year that 
the CFWC was established, the PBoC began a reorganisation of its branches from 32 provincial branches 
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to 9 super-provincial branches. The goal of this major restructure of China’s central bank, responsible for 
regulation of commercial banks, was consistent with the newly created party organisation’s objective to 
reduce pressure on its branches from local governments.   
 
The dissatisfaction of party leaders with party oversight of banking officials led to the CFWC taking 
control of some of the responsibilities for the appraisal and appointment from the Central 
Organisational Department (COD). The CFWC was charged with the appraisal and appointment of senior 
executives in centrally controlled financial institutions from deputy bureau level to vice-ministerial level, 
including the Big Four, BoCom, the three policy banks, the four AMCs, CITIC Group, Everbright Group, as 
well as the central bank. While this reportedly created some tension between the COD and the CFWC, 
the two organisations worked closely together (Interview with government official, 10 October 2014). 
For example, the CFWC worked with the COD on the appointment and supervision of supervisory board 
members. It also assumed responsibilities for the appointment of secretaries for the CCP Discipline 
Inspection Committees of centrally controlled banks.   
 
The activities of the CFWC highlighted the importance of party governance within the financial system. 
The party had an active presence within the financial sector, with party officials located within every 
banking institution, responsible not only for personnel control but also with instilling management with 
the values and ideology of the party. In response to the rise of regulation and decline of administrative 
planning, the importance of party institutions had not suffered a decline. Instead, they had evolved and 
adapted to the changing nature of corporate governance in banks. In 2002, when the CFWC was 
disestablished, its appointment responsibilities returned to the COD. During the period of CFWC’s 
existence, the COD had retained responsibility for ministry-level appointments for centrally controlled 
organisations. Its reach even extended to the appointments of top executives of Minsheng Bank, which 
though majority owned by non-SOEs, was of a scale which required it to sit within the same structure of 
party governance.    
 
While some of the functions of the CFWC and COD could be compared to that of an investor, the 
governance of state-owned assets was undeveloped and the state had not yet established a firm policy 
direction. The fundamental work of the State Owned Assets Management Bureau guoyouzichan guanliju, 
which operated as a vice ministry level organisation under the MOF until 1998, was to reappraise the 
value of stocks and enterprises (Sun, Tao 孙弢 2012). In 1998 responsibilities for the management of 
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financial assets were divided between two companies established by the MOF. One was responsible for 
financial SOEs and the other for nonfinancial SOEs. This reform step foreshadowed later attempts by the 
state to create the institutional capacity for the management of assets belonging to financial institutions, 
including those in the banking sector. 
 
WTO entry as a threat and an opportunity: 
 
China’s impending accession to the WTO was of particular significance to China’s banking sector due to 
its high level of protection from foreign competition. Entry to the WTO would require China’s economy 
to become more highly integrated with the global economy. The final weeks of arduous negotiations, 
which had begun with GATT thirteen years earlier, related in large part to the access of US and European 
firms to China’s financial sector. In April 1999 US President Clinton had rejected an earlier ‘liberalisation 
offer’ from Zhu Rongji, at least in part due to lack of access to the banking sector (de Jonquieres 1999). 
‘The banking sector... had enjoyed the highest levels of protection and would be most affected’ by WTO 
entry, according to Chinese Newspaper Southern Weekend, making it ‘the biggest danger zone’ for the 
state (The Banker 2002). 
 
The impending entry of foreign financial institutions created an atmosphere of deep fear and 
uncertainty among banking executives in China, who described it as ‘the wolf is coming!’ (Interview with 
current Ministry of Commerce official, 10 April 2015). In contrast, international bankers were in a 
buoyant mood at the prospect of China opening the banking sector to foreign competition. The large 
international financial conglomerates were vastly superior to Chinese banks in scale, employee 
productivity, technology, and asset quality. For example the profits of Citigroup in 1999 were US$9.9 
billion, which was 20 times that of China’s largest bank ICBC, whose profits totalled US$498 million (Q. 
Wu 2001, 826). The superiority of foreign financial institutions was such that a rapid increase in market 
share following the lifting of restrictions appeared inevitable. A former commercial banker revealed in 
an interview that while Chinese bankers did not subscribe to some of the more radical predictions of 
foreign takeover of the sector, there was nonetheless strong concern that liberalisation of the sector 
would pose a risk to their bank or their own employment security (Interview with current Ministry of 
Commerce official, 10 April 2015). While more moderate estimates of foreign bank growth by Southern 
Weekend and Standard Chartered both rejected any scenario in which foreign banks possessed both the 
ability and regulatory space to dominate the banking sector, these estimates still predicted foreign 
 
 
97 
banks would make a rapid impact.  Southern Weekend predicted a rise in market share for foreign banks 
from 2% to 20-30% in just ten years (The Banker 2002). Standard Chartered released a report in 1999 
which estimated a compound growth rate of 40% per annum for foreign banks, and forecasted a more 
conservative 8% share of the market for foreign banks by 2010 (The Asian Wall Street Journal 1999).  
 
Despite this threat, China’s entry to the WTO was viewed by China’s policymakers as a means to 
promote reform during the period of relative economic uncertainty following the crisis. China’s chief 
WTO negotiator Long Yongtu’s statement regarding the pressures of the WTO accord on the economy 
that ‘a nation cannot develop and become strong without a sense of urgency and a sense of crisis’ had 
particular resonance in the banking sector (Kynge 1999). In an interview, UBS investment banker David 
Chin reported that during this time the senior management of China’s banks would urge employees to 
implement reforms expeditiously due to the fear of impending competition from foreign banks 
(Interview with David Chin, UBS, 4 November 2015). Thus the Schumpterian concept of ‘an ever-present 
threat’ from foreign financial institutions with different organisational methods and use of more 
sophisticated technology became a driving force for change in the banking sector (Schumpeter 1994, 85). 
 
Ultimately the terms agreed for China’s entry to the WTO allowed for the gradual liberalisation of the 
financial sector to foreign competition. The successful conclusion of bilateral trade negotiations with the 
United States in November 1999 removed a major obstacle to China’s accession to the WTO, which was 
achieved two years later. Under WTO terms, foreign banks could immediately undertake foreign 
exchange operations for Chinese banks and residents while local currency business with Chinese 
enterprises could occur within 2 years of accession. There was a commitment to remove restrictions 
relating to the establishment of foreign banks and branches within 5 years. Restrictions on foreign banks 
conducting local currency business with individuals were gradually removed, starting with trial cities 
Shenzhen, Shanghai, Dalian and Tianjin at the time of WTO entry. Each year a new group of trial cities 
was added until restrictions were removed completely after 5 years.  
 
WTO entry provided a stimulus for regulatory development and the entry of foreign banks changed the 
landscape of the banking sector. WTO requirements would provide an impetus for the standardisation 
of China’s banking rules and regulations. Chinese regulators had the challenge of incorporating these 
requirements while relying upon the country’s regulatory experience to date and being responsive to 
changes in national conditions. WTO entry pushed the development of regulations for foreign financial 
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institutions which would accord with the WTO rules and the Basel Accord while new, detailed 
regulations were issued in 2002 for foreign financial institutions (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 112). 
With the entry of foreign banks, competition would no longer be limited to loans and deposits which 
made up the vast majority of business for Chinese banks.  The central bank moved quickly to enact 
regulation which provided approval and guidelines for the development of consumer credit operations, 
along with fee and commission products. These were applicable to all commercial banks. Reforms which 
reduced the responsibility of SOEs for the provision of employee homes and other items were an 
important precondition for the expansion of this market. The PBoC developed new rules on consumer 
lending for home mortgages in 1998 and for automobiles and general lending for individual 
consumption in the following year. Provisional rules for the use of fee-related products such as bills of 
acceptance, guarantees, financial derivatives and commission securities business were enacted in 2001. 
The ratio of non-interest income in bank revenue increased as a consequence. In 2003 ICBC president 
Jiang Jianqing revealed that the year-end volume of consumer credit would be RMB 400m, equivalent to 
16% of the loan portfolio, after being at ‘almost zero’ in 1999 (Kynge and McGregor 2003). To encourage 
sales of new products, banks pushed improvements in customer service and developed incentivised 
sales teams to create demand for emerging products. Chinese banks partnered with international 
technology and payment companies such as Visa, who issued over a million international cards in 2003 
(McGregor 2003b). The number of credit cards in China rose exponentially, reaching approximately 25 
million by 2003, and there was enormous potential for growth in the future. The impetus provided by 
WTO entry created a new range of products which became an importance source of revenue growth for 
banks henceforth. 
 
Sovereignty of China’s banking sector: 
 
Western banks, supported by their governments, international financial organisations and Western 
media, placed relentless pressure on officials to open up the banking sector. These outsiders to China’s 
banking system were supported by a significant number of Chinese bankers, often working for foreign 
financial institutions. The pressure became particularly acute after the announcement of China’s entry 
into the WTO and prior to the confirmation of a detailed plan of shareholding reform. At this critical 
juncture in reform, these banks sensed a critical opportunity to influence the reform process and gain 
control over China’s valuable financial assets. The deregulation of the global financial services industry 
had precipitated a sharp rise in the mergers and acquisitions of financial institutions, particularly since 
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the 1990s. This allowed for the development of large financial conglomerates such as Citigroup, JP 
Morgan Chase, Deutsche Bank and UBS.  These financial conglomerates had gained a foothold in many 
countries around the world through cross border M&A, and there was a growing consensus that China 
was the next major prize. Senior executives from these financial conglomerates, typically backed by their 
home country governments, lobbied intensely for the lifting of rules which blocked their access to the 
financial sector.  The chief executives of the top investment banks all visited Beijing in late 2003 to lobby 
for access to domestic financial markets (Guerrera 2003). For a time Goldman CEO Hank Paulson was 
rumoured to visit China more than five times a year as part of his company’s lobbying efforts (Guerrera 
and McGregor 2004).  
 
Citigroup employees were perhaps the most vocal about their company’s desire to establish itself in 
China’s domestic banking sector through a strategy of merger and acquisition. In 2002, Citigroup 
Chairman Sandy Weill confirmed this priority, stating ‘we put China as the top country on our list as to 
where we want to put our energies and invest our assets in the future’. Gaining control of the best 
assets in the domestic banking sector was the ultimate objective. Gary Clinton, Citibank's head of global 
relationship banking for Asia, further explained that ‘the real opportunity will come when we can deal 
local currency with local consumers’ (China Securities Bulletin 2002). Chairman Sandy Weill provided his 
vision of neoliberal reform path leading to a privatised and deregulated Chinese economy supported by 
international financial conglomerates: ‘Over the next decade or next two decades, China is going to 
need hundreds of billions of dollars of foreign capital to privatise and develop the tens of thousands of 
companies that will grow and prosper in this country’ (China Securities Bulletin 2002).  
 
At this time, the international financial community was extremely confident that it knew what was best 
for the future of China’s banking sector. The argument was made that without greater involvement of 
foreign financial institutions, China’s banking sector would collapse. It was asserted by Western banks 
and the media that the stripping of NPLs was merely a stop-gap measure and that the China’s banking 
reform model was failing. Merrill Lynch economist Shawn Xu considered the issue of bonds to AMCs as 
‘a largely superficial exercise’ as the capital raised fell far short of that required to ensure capital 
adequacy, while Goldman Sachs economist Shan Li asserted that ‘if you don’t have a mechanism to 
ensure that these kinds of bad loans don't recur, you will run back into the same problems very quickly’ 
(Lindorff 1998). This negative outlook was reinforced by the perception that AMCs were unable to 
resolve bad debt after the protracted nature of negotiations with international financial institutions 
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regarding the sale of bad debt, despite it being offered at a fraction of face value. A report in 2001 from 
international ratings agency Fitch had confirmed that despite these measures China’s banking system 
remained insolvent and required further capital injections (Beckerling 2001). Clean-up of the sector in its 
current form was viewed as beyond the state’s capability. Standard and Poors calculated the cost of 
restoring the banking system to health at a massive US$ 518 billion, equivalent to 43% of China’s GDP in 
2002, while Goldman Sachs have put the cost at between 44 and 68 percent of GDP (BusinessWeek: 
Magazine 2002, The Economist 2003). One external commentator speculated that WTO entry could lead 
to a ‘vicious downward spiral of credit contraction leading to business failures’ as depositors withdrew 
funds from state-owned banks in urban areas, causing these institutions to become ‘insolvent’ as  
foreign banks assumed control of financial assets (Woo 2003, 7). Another predicted that the cost of 
recapitalisation, coupled with China’s looming accession to the WTO, meant that China’s banks were 
‘doomed’ (Chang 2001, 142–43).  
 
Critics of China’s banking system advocated for the breaking up of large state-owned banks to facilitate 
privatisation and the introduction of foreign competition. While this was couched as a policy 
recommendation for a more open and competitive banking model, there was a clear irony given the 
massive size and market power of the international financial conglomerates pressing for market access. 
A Wall Street Journal article published in October 1998 and entitled ‘A Chinese Model?’ summarised the 
prevailing view that reform measures were inadequate while the financial sector continued to support 
its SOEs and that greater private ownership was required. The state’s policy response to the AFC was 
deemed as ‘evasive manoeuvres’ that were ‘self-defeating’ and the economy would benefit significantly 
if ‘the government cleared obstacles out of the way of the private sector and directed bank credit away 
from the state behemoths’ (The Wall Street Journal Europe 1998). According to an editorial in the 
Financial Times, resolution of problems in the financial sector required the Communist Party to 
‘surrender control over the commanding heights of much of the economy’ and introduce foreign 
competition to provide much needed discipline (Financial Times 2001). Goldman Sachs Asia managing 
director Fred Hu wrote that ‘speedy resolution of NPLs and recapitalization... inevitably puts pressure on 
China's fiscal position (but) it is time for a “Big Bang” substituting the piecemeal measures taken so far 
for a more aggressive, more comprehensive and accelerated reform strategy’ (Dow Jones International 
News 2002). In 2003, Citigroup advised that China should ‘tear apart the big four banks into relatively 
small units in order to switch on the process of bank reform’, saying that ‘if the big four are not broken 
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up soon they will face bankruptcy’. Citigroup’s Chief Economist for the Asian region, Yiping Huang, 
confirmed that this was a ‘necessary step’ in China’s economic transition (Y. Huang 2002). 
 
The Second National Financial Work Meeting: 
 
China’s top officials rejected the discourse of Western-educated bankers and academics at the Second 
National Financial Work Meeting, convened in February 2002 to determine the future direction of 
reform. In his speech General Secretary Jiang Zemin articulated the Party view that the overall aim of 
this discourse was to further the power of Western nations and their financial institutions, stating that 
‘developed Western countries have already made control of international finance a strategic measure 
for global control’. Jiang cited the view expressed in Huntington’s book ‘Clash of Civilisations’ that 
control and operation of the international financial system, hard currency and international capital 
markets were all strategic objectives for Western civilisation (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 454). Despite the weak 
nature and small scale of the financial sector at the time, China steadfastly refused to relinquish 
sovereignty over the financial sector. If the state allowed foreign control over the financial sector, its 
ability to implement policies for the continued growth and development of the Chinese state would be 
severely compromised. When questioned about China’s insistence on retaining control of its banks 
during this period, a CCB official responded, ‘would America allow its banks to be taken over?’ 
(Interview with CCB official, 10 March 2015).  
 
It was nevertheless ‘fully acknowledged at the highest policymaking level’ of the Party that there was a 
need for comprehensive reform of China’s SOCBs (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 82). Jiang announced 
that ‘a fundamental transformation of the mechanism’ in the banking sector would occur through 
shareholding reform. Shareholding reform would not break up the banks and listing of the banks as 
whole entities, controlled by the state, would instead provide ‘an important exploration of effective 
forms of public ownership’ (Du, Hua 杜华  2007, 458). Jiang indicated that, once completed, 
shareholding reform would provide a path to listing of SOCBs. Reform would be a gradual, 
transformative process. Wang Lianzhou, vice director of the NPC's finance and economic committee, 
said of the reform measures: ‘There's no way China can reform all at once, so we have to move 
deliberately and carefully’ (Lindorff 1998).  
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Although China’s policymakers chose a different path from that advocated by Western financial 
institutions and their governments, they continued to be very open to ideas from external sources. 
David Chin, a banker at UBS, reported that he met and advised many levels of the state apparatus 
around this time. At the level of the State Council he met with the Premier Zhu and Vice Premiers Huang 
Ju and Li Langqing to discuss high-level policy objectives. He also met with PBoC for more detailed 
discussions of financial reform. According to Chin, officials were searching for case studies from abroad 
which could be applied to Chinese conditions (David Chin, email message to author, 18 January 2016). 
Besides their lobbying activities, Western financial institutions also provided consultancy services in the 
hope of securing future business, the most lucrative being assisting with the IPO of one or more state-
owned banks. In 2002, the international accountancy firm PWC was one of the foreign firms engaged by 
the Chinese state to develop a road map of banking reform. The road map covered three major areas, 
namely finance, operations, and accounting. Partner David Wu reported that the Chinese state did not 
have a concrete idea of how shareholding reform in the sector would proceed, and that the advice of 
international firms made ‘a significant contribution to reform’ (Interview with PWC Partner David Wu, 3 
April 2015).  
 
In contrast with the market-liberalising reforms advocated by the West, the Second National Financial 
Work conference had a clear focus on enhancing the stability of the financial system, strengthening 
regulation and developing a greater resilience to external threats. Indeed for Jiang Zemin, the 
strengthening of financial regulation was the ‘priority among priorities’ (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 456). There 
was a sense that although China had now developed a regulatory framework, its mechanisms, such as 
the use of law and rules, had not contributed sufficiently to the development of ordered financial 
markets and the reduction of systemic risk. Liu Mingkang pointed in particular to the need to transform 
the culture of regulation in the financial sector from one of approval to one of active regulation of 
financial enterprises and markets (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 115). For Jiang Zemin, healthy and 
stable economic development depended on having a financial sector with ‘solid foundations’ to serve 
the real economy (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 454). Jiang repeatedly emphasised the crucial need for China to 
mitigate financial risk and avoid financial crisis. It was evident that China’s leaders had observed the 
dangers of the global financial system, particularly with respect to developing countries. Jiang pointed 
not only to the experiences of South East Asian nations in the Asian financial crisis but also to the 1994 
Mexico peso crisis, the IMF bail-out of Brazil in 1999, the 2000/01 banking crisis in Turkey and the 
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Argentine financial crisis of 2001 (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 455). It was imperative that China learned from 
the difficulties experienced by these countries.    
 
Conclusion: 
 
After the Asian financial crisis, the party’s concern for financial stability drove measures to mitigate risk 
which centralised party governance of the banking sector, reduced the level of NPLs and led to the 
development of a more robust regulatory system which adhered more closely to international standards. 
In the development of its banking regulatory system, China’s officials had chosen a path that was very 
different from that taken by Western developed countries such as the United States which pursued 
policies of deregulation and financial liberalisation. The state viewed the market as a double-edged 
sword. While increasing the role of market forces in the economy had led to rapid economic growth, it 
had also produced high levels of speculation, poor governance of financial institutions and serious cases 
of financial crime, all of which had led to major financial instability. As such, policymakers selectively 
incorporated Western ideas about regulation which would help mitigate financial risk. At the Second 
National Financial Work Meeting, Jiang Zemin reemphasised that the strengthening of financial 
regulation remained the highest priority for policymakers. Officials strived to learn not only from their 
own recent experience, but also those of other developing countries which had suffered recent financial 
crises. China’s officials were able to resist pressure from Western bankers, supported by their 
governments and the media, to open up the banking sector to foreign competition. This occurred 
despite the weak state of China’s banking sector, which was characterised by poor governance and high 
rates of NPLs. It was evident that the large international financial conglomerates were far superior to 
Chinese banks by any number of measures. The international financial community was confident it knew 
what was best for China’s banking sector and advanced an argument that China needed to break-up and 
privatise its large state-owned banks and introduce foreign competition in order to save the sector from 
collapse. It is argued that China’s past loss of economic sovereignty and oppression by foreign powers, 
which had contributed to the decline of China’s economy after 1840, served as a reminder to officials of 
the risks of losing financial sovereignty. China’s officials chose to maintain control of the country’s  future 
reform path and prevent Western control of its banking sector. In his management of the restructuring 
of GDE and bankruptcy of GITIC, Wang Qishan prioritised the country’s financial stability ahead of the 
interests of international creditors, while also reducing the future moral hazard of SOEs. At the Second 
National Financial Work Meeting, China’s officials announced their decision to implement shareholding 
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reform and listing of the banks as whole entities in ‘an important exploration of effective forms of public 
ownership’ (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 458). The state rejected proposals to break-up the banks or allow 
foreign banks to acquire control of domestic banking assets. This decision reflected the willingness of 
the party to transform the state-owned banking sector through engagement with international financial 
markets and external stakeholders, in much the same way as it had pursued reform of other SOEs over 
the previous decade. While reform excluded mass privatisation, this was not a rejection of market-
orientated reform. Jiang Zemin proclaimed the goal of reform to be ‘under the conditions of developing 
the socialist market economy, for the market to have a fundamental role in the allocation of resources’ 
(Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 453). Improving national conditions would provide the basis for more fundamental 
reforms of bank governance and regulation which would greatly improve the safety and soundness of 
the banking sector going forward.   
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Chapter 5: The Development of a Sound and Sustainable Banking Model (2003-07) 
 
The orthodox reform view that the development of China’s banking sector from 2003 until the advent of 
the global financial crisis should be evaluated according to a neoliberal model mischaracterises banking 
reform in this period. In 2004 IMF Acting Managing Director Anne Krueger said that emerging market 
economies had failed to ‘to put the past behind them’ and showed only ‘skin-deep’ commitment to 
market reform, with politicians avoiding ‘the pain’ associated with such reform (Krueger 2004). Red 
Capitalism authors  Walter and Howie claimed that China’s banking system had arrived at ‘the end of 
reform’ in the year 2005 (Walter and Howie 2012, 14). Such views neglect the active role of the state in 
coordinating and sequencing reform. In direct response to Krueger’s remarks, Liu Mingkang emphasised 
the state’s crucial role in ‘grasping the rhythm’ of reform and implementing it in an ordered and 
balanced fashion (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2004). The orthodox reform view also failed to capture the 
state’s high priority for financial stability. Both these features are reflective of historical patterns of 
political and economic organisation rather than conformance with a neoliberal model. Centralised 
bureaucratic control of the banking sector can be linked to China’s bureaucratic tradition, while 
economic and social stability was a fundamental goal of scholar-officials in traditional society. 
 
In 2003 the first chairman of the CBRC, Liu Mingkang, declared that the principal goal of banking reform 
was to fundamentally improve bank governance and risk management to order to prevent any further 
build-up of credit or operational risk and establish a sound and sustainable banking model. While 
China’s officials had become aware of the risks posed by NPLs and large-scale fraud after the Asian 
financial crisis, regulators had yet to establish the necessary governance mechanisms and systems of risk 
management which could address these threats effectively. Despite the sector having undergone a 
costly process of recapitalisation and NPL-disposal, poor economic conditions had prevented further 
reform. According to international standards of prudential regulation, the Big Four banks had a negative 
capital adequacy rate and were insolvent (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 120). Prior to the establishment 
of the CBRC, the PBoC had acknowledged in early 2003 that the banking sector was ‘possibly the 
weakest sector in the national economy which received wide criticism and pessimistic forecasts from the 
outside world’ (Xinhua Financial Network News 2003). With regards to his new role, Liu stated that ‘it's a 
very challenging job and my house will be responsible for making sure it will be a 'never-again story' 
through corporate governance and transparency’ (Kynge 2003). Improved domestic and international 
economic conditions, along with the enhanced financial strength of the state, provided an opportunity 
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for more fundamental governance reform which Premier Wen described as ‘a do or die effort’ (Liu, 
Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 120). Under Liu, CBRC established reform guidelines, aiming to ‘make sure 
those state-owned banks in the next three to five years will drive into calm waters’ (Kynge 2003). The 
CBRC, in conjunction with other government agencies, would actively drive the development of a new 
system of corporate governance in China’s large state-owned banks brought about by the program of 
shareholding reform and listing announced by Jiang Zemin at the 2002 National Financial Work Meeting. 
New city commercial banks and rural commercial banks were formed through mergers, with the initial 
focus of regulators on instituting systems of governance and risk management. Party governance 
systems, which remained deeply embedded within the banking system, would be refined and adapted 
to the new corporate governance system. The reform program, which included financial restructuring, 
would rely heavily on the advice of international consulting firms and investment banks. Minority 
investors were carefully selected to provide management experience and technological methods prior 
to listing. The CBRC, which quickly established a high level of engagement with international institutions 
and other financial regulators under Liu Mingkang, pragmatically and selectively adapted international 
best practices of regulation to enhance the capability of China’s banks to manage risk.  
 
Improving Banking Supervision: 
 
There was a clear focus on improving banking supervision after the appointment of Wen Jiabao as 
premier following the retirement of Zhu Rongji in 2003. Wen was a career bureaucrat and former head 
of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee. His appointment as secretary of the Central Finance 
Work Committee, an organisation which had centralised systems of party governance in the banking 
sector, had allowed him to gain a strong understanding of the problems facing the banking sector. 
Under Wen, the party chose to close down Central Finance Work Committee and focus reform efforts 
on improving banking supervision. It was widely felt by experts, such as those in the State Council 
Research and Development Centre, that banking supervision under the PBoC had been inadequate, 
particularly given the alarming cases of bank fraud that had come to light since the late 1990s (Yang 
2004, 89). It is unclear whether the matter was discussed at the Second National Financial Work 
Meeting, though PBoC governor Dai Xianglong himself acknowledged the weak state of bank supervision 
(Li, Junling 李峻岭 2002). 
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The decision to establish CBRC was reached after vigorous debate within the party which involved wide 
consultation with banking professionals and academics. Certain parties, such as scholars Professor Chen 
Gong Meng of HK Polytechnic University and Yi Xianrong of Financial Research Centre of CASS, argued 
that the problem of weak banking supervision should be resolved through the reform of human 
resource mechanisms, strengthening the legal framework and improving regulators’ grasp of important 
regulatory concepts (Ding, Nan 宁南 2003). An official interviewed recently argued that the principal 
issue had been the lack of resources allocated to banking supervision (Interview with government 
official, 10 October 2014). A review of the existing organisational arrangement took place. There was a 
feeling that the dual responsibility for banking supervision and monetary policy created a conflict of 
interest for the PBoC. Deputy Vice Director Wei Jianing of the State Council Research and Development 
Centre’s Macro Department suggested that it was ‘highly likely’ the PBoC implemented more 
expansionary monetary policy ‘from the perspective of bank managers to protect the interests of 
commercial banks’ (Ding, Nan 宁南 2003). Wei’s view that the regulatory and monetary policy functions 
should be split and a separate institution for banking supervision be established formed part of an 
official report to the CFWC from the State Council Research and Development Centre in 2002. The 
report also raised two potential alternatives, the creation of a bank supervisory bureau within the PBoC, 
and the establishment of a super-regulatory body covering the finance, insurance and securities sectors. 
Some within the party asserted that the PBoC should retain the banking supervisory function. In January 
2003 an article was published in Jinrong Shibao, the official newspaper of China’s financial industry, 
advocating for the current model of regulation and pointing to the evolution of the US model as a sign of 
the declining relevance of sectoral regulation (Financial Times 金融时报 2002). Ultimately China’s 
leaders elected to establish the CBRC in March 2003, despite some media reports suggesting that the 
bureau option had been chosen  (see for example: Kynge 2002b; Sina Finance 2002). 
 
Figure 1: Photo of CBRC Headquarters in Beijing with ‘Shield’ Symbol 
 
[FIGURE REDACTED FOR REASONS OF COPYRIGHT]    
 
Source: South China Morning Post 2015 
 
It is argued that the decision taken under Wen Jiabao to establish a separate regulatory agency in 2003, 
the CBRC, was likely a pragmatic decision based on which institutional form was best suited to ensure 
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the safety of the financial system. The creation of a new agency would allow Wen, as a new leader, to 
have a strong influence over its organisational culture and push a new approach to regulation. The CBRC 
had a clear focus on banking supervision. This ring-fencing of the regulatory function allowed Wen to 
avoid the unnecessary bureaucratic challenges involved with creating a super-regulator and provided 
the new head of the CBRC, Liu Mingkang, with a clear mandate through which to ‘maintain a safe, sound 
and efficient financial system in China’ (Liu, Mingkang 2003a).  
 
The appointment of Liu Mingkang as the official to head the CBRC was based on his previous experience 
with restoring stability to the banking sector, his international outlook, his experience with corporate 
governance reforms and his passion and commitment for the banking industry. Liu aimed to ‘grasp the 
two ends and bring the middle forward’, to drive improvement of all parts of the banking system (Liu, 
Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 130). Liu had established a reputation as a ‘firefighter’ in the financial sector. 
He was appointed by the party to head up both Everbright Bank in 1999 and BoC in 2000 in the wake of 
the corruption scandals involving Zhu Xiaohua and Wang Xuebing respectively (Naughton 2003).  Liu was 
a career banker, having worked in the banking sector since the beginning of reform and opening, who 
had gained rare international experience while at BoC. Liu was posted to London, where he obtained an 
MBA from the Cass Business School, University of London. He returned to the banking sector upon his 
return but also held important bureaucratic posts in China including vice governor of Fujian, vice 
governor of the PBoC and as a member of PBoC’s monetary policy committee. Liu managed the 
restructuring and IPO of the Bank of China Hong Kong. He was also involved with the beginning of 
corporate governance reform and the transition of BoC’s bloated, so-called ‘honorary board of directors’ 
towards a more streamlined and operational form (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 127). One CBRC staff 
member recently commented that CBRC was ‘like a baby of Liu’s’. Liu was extremely passionate about 
his job and would often give written notes on the reports of junior staff members. In this way, he was 
considered by the CBRC official concerned as ‘easier to touch’ than his successor Shang Fulin, a career 
bureaucrat (Interview with CBRC official, 19 March 2015). Wen Jiabao maintained a close relationship 
with Liu, who commented that ‘he likes to sit down and talk with us. We pick the most important issues 
where we need his guidance’ (Kuhn 2010, 268).    
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The CBRC: 
 
‘The CBRC, with strong support from the Chinese government, has actively pursued its statutory 
mandate for safety and soundness of the banking sector through promulgating a prudential framework 
benchmarked to international standards and continuously improving supervisory effectiveness. This 
effort is facilitated by substantial enhancement in corporate governance and risk management in the 
Chinese banking industry through three decades of reform and opening up’. 
 
IMF Financial System Stability Assessment Report for China (IMF 2011, 71) 
 
The mandate of the CBRC as regulator of China’s banking system, noted above by the IMF, was formally 
enshrined in the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Banking Regulation and Supervision passed in 
December 2003. The CBRC was designated a ministerial-level institution, on par with the PBoC and 
above the vice-ministerial level of the large state-owned banks. Approximately 200 of the 400 original 
employees at the CBRC were transferred from the PBoC. The CFWC also contributed 120 employees 
(Naughton 2003, 3).  
 
A CBRC official commented that CBRC’s distinguishing feature was its high degree of exchange with the 
outside world, which was largely motivated by a desire to learn from the regulatory experience of other 
countries (Interview with CBRC official, 11 March 2015). On May 10, 2003 the CBRC International 
Advisory Council was established, ‘indicating that the CBRC is committed to learn from international 
best practices and benchmark its supervisory practices against the international level’ (CBRC 2007, 120). 
The council was made up of highly qualified senior regulators and bankers from developed countries 
such as former chairman of the FSA Sir Howard Davies and CBRC chief advisor and former chairman of 
the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission Andrew Sheng. The importance of the IAC function 
was underlined by the presence of Wen Jiabao at the first IAC meeting in November 2003. At the 
meetings council members would respond to briefings from CBRC senior officials, while the presidents 
of the Big Four state-owned banks would also attend. From August 2003, Liu began to sign a series of 
MOUs which created a platform for cooperation with other financial regulators globally, with 
agreements reached with 33 countries or territories by 2008 (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 6). Liu was 
vocal about his desire for international institutions involved in banking supervision to serve the needs of 
developing countries such as China. In July 2003, Liu wrote a letter to Mr Jaime Caruana, chairman of the 
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Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, in which he stated that Basel II ‘addresses the need of 
“internationally-active banks” in G10 countries’ and could ‘disadvantage banks in emerging markets’. Liu 
signalled that given Basel II’s unsuitability, China would remain on Basel I for a few years. He called for 
the Basel Committee to assist with developing an internal ratings system for credit risk that was tailored 
to the needs of developing countries, thereby contributing ‘to the safety and soundness of national and 
international financial systems’ (Liu, Mingkang 2003b). The open engagement with the international 
financial community helped improve the perception of China’s banking system internationally.  
 
The CBRC has received criticism from the Western media and international financial institutions because, 
despite its open culture, its lack of independence is considered to have prevented the implementation 
of market reforms seen in the West.  In the ‘People’s Republic of China: Financial System Stability 
Assessment’, completed in 2011, the IMF identified that State Council control of ‘budgeting 
arrangements, external headcount approval requirements and authority’ threatened to ‘compromise 
CBRC effectiveness and could affect operational independence’. The IMF felt that CBRC’s place within 
the administrative system limited its ability to develop a ‘forward-looking approach to resource 
planning’, to evaluate staff in a transparent (presumably market-orientated) manner and remunerate 
staff at a level which would allow CBRC to attract the necessary human capital needed to cope with an 
increasingly complex and demanding regulatory environment (IMF 2011, 64). A CBRC official questioned 
on this issue confirmed that both the headcount, determined by the centrally controlled State 
Commission Office for Public Sector Reform, and the quality and retention of staff was a significant issue. 
As of March 2015, there had been no increase in salaries since the establishment of CBRC, including any 
adjustment for inflation.  
  
While CBRC actively incorporates international standards of regulation, its function within China’s 
bureaucratic system reflects historical patterns of political and economic organisation. As part of this 
system, it has a duty to implement the reform vision of party leaders. One CBRC official confirmed that 
the strong bureaucratic presence in the banking sector was a legacy of China’s culture and history. She 
suggested that CBRC staff needed to ‘understand its own system and its merits’ and ‘avoid the 
disadvantages’ (Interview with CBRC official, 13 March 2015). When questioned on this topic, another 
CBRC official responded that CBRC’s independence from the bureaucratic system was unimportant and 
that no government department could ever be truly independent of the objectives of the state. The 
official acknowledged that while small conflicts could occur between different arms of the state, there 
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was no fundamental conflict with the common goal of stable economic development. He believed that it 
was a strength of China’s bureaucracy that state organs were unified in striving for this common goal 
(Interview with CBRC official, 19 March 2015).        
 
Officials at CBRC maintain a strong sense of duty and responsibility to the organisation and development 
of society, a continuation of the role of scholar-officials in China within a politically united, centrally 
controlled bureaucracy for over a thousand years. Many CBRC officials asked about their motivation for 
working at CBRC identified a strong sense of pride in guiding the direction of the banking sector and 
making a contribution to the country’s prosperity.  One CBRC official explained that she was most proud 
of her work relating to macroeconomic policies, principally because many of her reports went to the 
State Council level. She described a sense of pride knowing that her efforts would provide support to the 
country’s leaders, influence the economy and hopefully improve the welfare of the people (Interview 
with CBRC official, 20 March 2015). The responsibility of officials in ensuring the well-being of citizens 
was a fundamental tenet of Confucianism, adopted as the state doctrine by Emperor Wu of the Han 
dynasty, more than two thousand years earlier (Dawson 1964). Since that time, officials have been 
preoccupied with how best to fulfil this role through solving fundamental problems of food production, 
famine, water supply, and political stability (Will 1990; Nolan 2004). Interviews revealed that the mind-
set has not fundamentally changed. When asked of the motivations of the leaders of the Big Four banks, 
one official quoted the Confucian saying ‘a good scholar can become an official’, explaining that those 
with higher aspirations would likely study hard and see their role in the bank as part of a political career 
within the bureaucratic system (Interview with CBRC official, 20 March 2015).   
 
Shareholding Reform: 
 
Shareholding reform was the first step in changing the governance systems of China’s banks. Liu 
Mingkang points out that,  unlike in 1998-99 when the state ‘spent money but did not buy a mechanism’, 
this time the state had ‘spent money and bought a mechanism’ (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 126). 
Reforms would enable the development of a mixed ownership model within China’s banks as discussed 
by party leaders at the 3rd Plenum of the 16th Party Congress in 2003. Jiang Zemin had confirmed at the 
Second National Financial Work Meeting that the state would retain control of its largest banks, which 
would be listed as whole entities as part of ‘an important exploration of effective forms of public 
ownership’ (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 458). The success or failure of these reforms had enormous implications 
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for the entire economy. There was much debate about the pros and cons of shareholding reform within 
the party, with officials concerned about the potential for economic instability or the loss of economic 
welfare from society. According to an article in the Ming Daily (21 April 1997), Jiang Zemin had been 
forced to defend the concept to party insiders prior to the 15th Party Congress, quoting Engels’ view that 
shareholding reform was ‘no longer private production’ but instead ‘profit-seeking joint production’ (as 
cited in Ma 2010, 19). Through the publication Economic Perspective (Jingjixue Dongtai), academics 
voiced their support for shareholding reform as a form of ‘public ownership with Chinese socialist 
characteristics’, asserting that ‘as long as the shareholding system can maintain and enhance the value 
of public capital, it should be regarded as a form of public ownership’ (as cited in Ma 2010, 22).  
 
Shareholding reform began a process of adapting Western principles of corporate governance within 
China’s economic system. China’s Company Law and Commercial Bank Law together formed the guiding 
legal framework for shareholding reform. According to these laws, the state became a shareholder of a 
modern shareholding company. This was a fundamental shift. Central Huijin Investments was 
established by the PBoC in December 2003 to exercise the state’s function as an investor in major state-
owned financial enterprises. The limited liability of the state as an investor was enshrined by law, 
replacing what previously had been an implicit guarantee of total support from the state in the case of 
financial distress. The articles of association, which accorded with both laws, provided the legal basis for 
the establishment of a modern structure of corporate governance for each bank. They called for the 
establishment of a shareholders general meeting, a vehicle through which shareholders would elect 
members of a two-tier board structure, the board of directors and board of supervisors, and approve 
the annual budget and major investments. The board of the directors was responsible for guiding the 
bank’s overall strategy and establishing a basic management structure. It was the duty of the board of 
supervisors to provide a check on the activities of the board and senior management and the financial 
operations of the bank, and ensure that the bank has met the necessary standards of risk management 
and regulatory compliance. The structure was supported by committees focussing on particular aspects 
of governance. These reported to either the board of directors or board of supervisors. Committees for 
risk management, audit, strategic development and personnel and remuneration typically reported into 
the board of directors.   
 
As banking regulator, the CBRC drove the reform process and issued financial licenses to the new 
shareholding companies. While Liu Mingkang acknowledged the challenge of transforming corporate 
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governance practices, he vowed that ‘…my house will be responsible for making sure it will be a 'never-
again story' through corporate governance and transparency’ (Kynge 2003). In March 2004, the CBRC 
issued the Guidelines on Corporate Governance Reforms and Supervision of Bank of China and 
Construction Bank of China, a document which provided the first detailed vision of reform, namely to 
develop the banks ‘into modern and internationally competitive joint-stock commercial banks’ within 
three years. The guidelines explicitly stated that the banks’ motive was one of profit maximisation and 
encouraged banks to streamline the personnel structure and introduce incentives for management. 
Within the new corporate governance structure, it was imperative for banks to ‘have in place sound 
mechanisms for decision-making, internal controls and risk management’. Banks were encouraged to 
introduce foreign and domestic strategic investors in order to diversify equity structure, and learn from 
the ‘international advanced management expertise, technology and methodology’ of world-leading 
banks. In addition, the guidelines emphasised improved information disclosure and prudent accounting 
policies (CBRC 2004).  
 
As the dominant shareholder across China’s centrally controlled banks, it was the responsibility of Huijin 
(along with the MOF, which also held 50% of ICBC and ABC shares and 28% of BoCom) to act as a 
shareholder and not a government agency. Huijin vice chairman Jesse Wang summed up the change in 
the nature of banks’ relationship with the state: ‘We're not [the banks'] mother-in-law, but they report 
to us as shareholders. One of our major missions is to help them restructure. . . . We want shareholders 
to get more returns on equity and on assets, so our directors trouble them every day’ (Browne 2005). 
The board of directors was composed of the firm’s top management, acting as executive directors, along 
with non-executive directors. In the case of BoC and CCB, these were formally employed and 
remunerated by Huijin (B. Hu 2004a).  
 
The incorporation of Western principles of corporate governance was by no means an 
acknowledgement by officials of the superiority of a Western model of corporate governance. Head of 
ICBC Jiang Jianqing remarked: ‘What I especially wish to make clear is that the historically accumulated 
problems of China’s state-owned banks are not caused by the fact that they didn’t have a board of 
directors. Rather, they cannot be separated from the innumerable closely inter-related factors, including 
China’s economic structure, the credit structure, the reform of SOEs, and the economic transition’ (Ling 
and Zhang 2003). Banking officials viewed shareholding reform as a means to improve bank governance 
and help resolve problems of asset quality and operational risk. New PBoC head Zhou Xiaochuan 
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pointed out that ‘if the banks rely on gradual improvement of asset quality, it will take a very long time 
and not meet the demand made of the financial system by the economy as a whole, and there could be 
conflicts between this and the need to support economic growth. Therefore, in this respect, we need 
new thinking and new measures’ (The Banker 2003). Officials hoped that the program of shareholding 
reform would provide a means to ‘change the method of long-term reliance on state credit and financial 
support’ (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 119). 
 
Western structures of corporate governance were established to complement party governance rather 
than replace it outright. An article published in the Chinese journal Qiushi in December 2003 
promulgating Party views on reform stated ‘we cannot indiscriminately copy capitalist democracy… and 
if we adopt their model, it is bound to lead to chaos’. Instead it was necessary to ‘further raise the 
party’s level of governance’ through bringing about ‘systematized, standardised and procedural 
decision-making’ and to ‘improve decision-making mechanisms’ (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2003). 
There was an emphasis on the development of ‘scientific concepts’ of restraint and supervision of 
personnel and also the use of law when exercising power.  The party’s appointment system was an 
integral part of this vision of governance. After the establishment of the corporate governance structure, 
appointment powers remained within the party. The party’s COD retained the authority to appoint the 
top executives within the Big 5 state-owned banks. A party committee, set-up to deal with party-related 
matters such as the monitoring and discipline of officials, existed within each bank. According to the 
article, the vision was to ‘intensify reform of the cadre personnel system’ indicating that the use of this 
parallel structure would continue to evolve alongside newly formed corporate governance structures 
(BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2003). It could even be said that the party was learning from these 
structures to improve upon its own system. While, as one official commented, party structures were not 
ostensibly involved with the day to day running of the banks or in commercial decisions, the ultimate 
accountability of officials to the party defined the character of the system (Interview with government 
official, 10 October 2014). As such, China’s bankers are compared with officials rather than international 
bankers and the levels of remuneration for directors and executives in the banking sector is one 
representation of this.  
 
Agencies such as the CBRC, PBoC and MOF were subject to party governance and the conceptions of 
reform which originated at the highest levels of the party. China’s bureaucratic system ensured that 
officials would implement reforms according to the reform principles of the party centre and not pursue 
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the neoliberal agenda favoured by the West. This is evident from the party’s actions with respect to 
PBoC’s ownership of Huijin. Huijin belonged to the PBoC during the recapitalisation of CCB and BoC, 
which utilised foreign exchange reserves administered by the PBoC-administered SAFE. The 
recapitalisation wiped out the MOF’s shareholding and made Huijin the dominant shareholder following 
recapitalisation. It has been suggested the ‘“market-based” approach’ of the PBoC, which also impacted 
SOEs and the securities sector ‘violated every norm of bureaucratic behaviour’ (Walter and Howie 2012, 
19). There was wide criticism of the PBoC’s approach within China’s bureaucratic system. An article on 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) website publicly denounced the PBoC, 
claiming it had wrong assumed fiscal responsibilities of the MOF and suggested that the PBoC ‘stop 
grabbing more power’ (Browne 2005). This criticism of Zhou was linked by Western journalists to a so-
called ‘anti-reform agenda’ (McGregor 2006). After the recapitalisation of CCB and BoC, the party chose 
to gradually transfer control of Huijin to the MOF. It appears likely that the PBoC lost control of Huijin 
because it was perceived to have exceeded its authority and attempted to implement a neoliberal 
reform agenda which did not accord with the principles of the party centre. During ICBC’s 
recapitalisation, MOF was allowed to retain a 50% shareholding and by the time of ABC’s 
recapitalisation Huijin had been acquired by a sovereign wealth fund, the China Investment Corporation, 
which was under effective MOF control.  
 
Financial Restructuring of the Large State-owned banks: 
 
Officials felt a heavy weight of responsibility to deliver improvements to bank governance given the 
enormous cost of recapitalisation and NPL stripping. Zhou Xiaochuan publicly assured Chinese citizens 
that the decision to use China’s foreign exchange reserves to recapitalise the banks followed a long 
period of research and debate by officials (Jin 2004). PWC partner David Wu estimates the total cost for 
this round of recapitalisation of the Big Four to be approximately 3.6 trillion RMB or approximately 
2,800 RMB per person in China in 2010 (David Wu 吴卫军 2010). The financial restructuring was 
necessary to remove the historical burden of economic transition from China’s banks and give them the 
best opportunity to operate as sound and sustainable financial enterprises. This recapitalisation 
provided China’s banks with an equity base which would allow them to meet the minimum 
requirements for capital adequacy as set out in Basel I.  In addition to recapitalisation, China’s banks also 
underwent another round of NPL stripping. In the case of CCB, 2003 financial data revealed the value of 
equity to be equal to -115.477b RMB (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 123). The NPLs of CCB were 
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auctioned to CINDA AMC at 50% of face value. As this exceeded the estimate value of the bad loans 
concerned, it therefore provided another means to contribute equity to CCB (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 
2009a, 124). The state also recapitalised the large state-owned banks further by returning previously 
distributed earnings, including income tax paid (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 124, 126). Where any 
positive equity existed prior to capital injection, it was generally used to bolster loan loss provisions.  
 
Auditing of the Large State-owned banks: 
 
China’s large state-owned banks were also audited for the first time by international accounting firms. 
Each audit required enormous resources. The audit of CCB required over 1.2 million hours of labour 
(Walter and Howie 2013). Executive Assistant President of BoC Zhu Min (now deputy managing director 
of the IMF) said ‘the PwC people went everywhere. They went to the branches because they have to 
sign off on their NPL figures, unless they want to become KPMG-PwC’ (Kynge 2004). Auditors were 
typically appointed after trial audits of branches had produced satisfactory results. This was a highly 
significant first step towards greater transparency, a step which required China’s leadership to allow 
international firms access to the minute details of its financial system. Bank employees were initially 
highly reluctant to divulge such details, though auditors were able to gradually overcome this resistance. 
The audits were vital to providing assurance to international investors about financial information such 
as NPL levels (Kynge 2004).    
 
Minority Investors: 
 
Reasons for the Introduction of Minority Investors: 
 
Minority investors were introduced so that the banking sector could incorporate ideas and technology 
from outside to facilitate the transformation of the banking sector. As Liu Mingkang suggests, ‘the main 
reason for bringing in investors was not to bring in capital, but rather to bring in advanced management 
experience and technological methods’ (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 134). The introduction of minority 
investors was a requirement of the State Council group on SOCB shareholding reform. Minority 
investors could improve systems of internal control and risk management, assist with the training of 
management personnel, and encourage innovative product development and better service. Minority 
investors would also bring life to the new shareholding system and corporate governance structure. The 
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rights of minority investors were exercised through the new governance structure, causing this process 
to become more robust than it would be under total state ownership. A further reason for the 
introduction of minority shareholders was to give confidence to international financial markets. The 
decision of international financial institutions to invest in China’s banks, reached after performing due 
diligence, was an important step towards listing. It amounted to an acknowledgement by these 
institutions that China’s banks were ultimately capable of entering the world of international financial 
markets (David Wu 吴卫军 2009, 148). 
 
In December 2003, CBRC published regulations which reflected the state’s desire to find investors that 
were best suited to drive the transformation of China’s large state-owned banks. Overseas financial 
institutions which wished to become minority investors had to possess the necessary scale, profitability 
and regulatory record and had to demonstrate a long-term interest in China’s economic development. 
Shareholding for individual and total holdings by foreign financial institutions was limited to 20% and 25% 
respectively (CBRC 2003). During the second half of 2004, the CBRC further defined the key principles for 
foreign investment. These included the concept that cooperation with foreign investors would occur 
according to market principles and that the CBRC would not intervene in the selection and negotiation 
processes. CBRC would instead screen investors and monitor the investment to assess whether it had 
the impact desired by the state. Minority investors would be locked in for a minimum period of three 
years and were required to have representation at board level and participate in the corporate 
governance of the bank concerned. With regards to sovereignty, CBRC stated unequivocally that the 
state would not give up its absolute control of the Big Five banks (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 134).  
 
Officials were concerned that some ideas promoted by minority investors could be harmful to China’s 
banking system. Western governments and their financial institutions had promoted a neoliberal model 
characterised by deregulation and financial liberalisation. In the eyes of China’s officials, adoption of this 
model had created a dangerous and insufficiently regulated global financial system which was highly 
vulnerable to financial crises. These ideas were seen as a potential threat to the stability of China’s 
banking sector and potentially its entire economy. Officials felt a strong weight of responsibility to 
protect China’s banking sector against a crisis which could derail China’s economic reform program and 
create social instability. Officials were also concerned that if foreign banks gained a high degree of 
influence over China’s banking sector, the sector would not be effective in implementing the country’s 
reform goals or serving the real economy. A critique published in ‘Securities Market Weekly’ suggested 
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that China’s corporate governance reforms could create a layer of professional managers whose 
interests in short-term profits will be aligned with those of foreign capitalists. The authors alleged that 
managers would employ ‘complex technical terms’ to deceive policymakers and advance their own 
interests to the detriment of the country. According to the article, ‘under the guidance of market-
orientated corporations, the financial system is now progressively separating itself from the 
fundamental benefits of modernisation, by itself becoming part of an international capital chain of 
interests which at its core benefits the United States as the financial  imperial power’ (Zhengquan 
Shichang Zhoukan 证券市场周刊 2005). 
 
There was intense deliberation within the party about how best to incorporate helpful ideas and 
technology while avoiding the spread of harmful ideas that could threaten stability and economic 
development. Much of the debate centred around restrictions on foreign ownership, which were 
directly linked to the influence that foreign financial institutions could exercise on the corporate 
governance of Chinese banks through seats on the board of directors. The restrictions of 20% and 25% 
for individual and total holdings by foreign financial institutions not only safeguarded the sovereignty of 
Chinese banks but also limited the influence of the ideas of Western financial institutions. The 
restrictions permitted officials to maintain the fundamental character of China’s banking system. There 
was some support within the system for the softening of restrictions in order to create a dynamic which 
would support deeper internal reform of the banks. Vice chairman of CBRC Tang Shuangning publicly 
raised the idea of relaxing ownership restrictions on small and medium-sized banks (Kong 2006). This 
was strongly considered in December 2005 when Citigroup, as part of a consortium of foreign and 
domestic investors, bid US$3 billion for 85% of the troubled Guangdong Development Bank, ‘widely 
considered one of the weakest banks in the country’ (Kong 2006). It was argued that relinquishing 
control of financial enterprises was in the interests of the banking sector, which needed ‘foreign groups’ 
management expertise and corporate governance discipline’ (Kong 2006). The bid implied a total foreign 
ownership stake of 49.9%, of which 40% would belong to Citigroup. As this exceeded the regulatory limit 
of 25%, Citigroup attempted to pressure the Chinese government to relax this requirement, going as far 
to asking former President Bush to write a letter of support (Shih 2011, 174). French President Jacques 
Chirac also visited China personally to lend support for rival bidder Societe Generale (McGregor and 
Wighton 2006). After seven months of deliberation, Wen Jiabao confirmed the party’s decision that the 
restriction on total foreign ownership would remain at 25% (Shih 2011, 174). 
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Sale to Minority Investors: 
 
Foreign financial institutions were initially very reluctant to invest in China’s banks. Liu Mingkang reports 
that upon inviting investment in BoC and CCB, only four large-scale financial institutions showed interest. 
Of these four, Citigroup, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley and RBS, both Citigroup and Morgan Stanley 
later dropped out. There was no response at all to ICBC’s initial invitation (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 
135). While financial restructuring had raised capital adequacy and lowered NPL levels, there was little 
confidence that Chinese banks could become sustainably profitable given their past performance. 
Foreign bankers were also wary of the influence of China’s bureaucracy on lending, particularly with 
SOEs as the major clients. The project of the newly-created State‑owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) to restructure China’s large SOEs was at an early stage, and there 
was also scepticism towards the goal of developing competitive and commercially-orientated firms that 
were state-owned. Former Chief Representative of Deutsche Bank Shanghai, Stephen Harner, stated at 
the time that foreign banks ‘. . . much prefer to be on their own’, while another former banker 
commented the entry of foreign banks was ‘…a political favor to the government. That's it’ (Leggett 
2001). The fact that many investors had already taken a minority stake in small commercial banks 
decreased the likelihood of gaining regulatory approval for a stake in the large state-owned banks, thus 
further limiting the number of eligible investors. The lack of willing foreign investors caused negotiations 
to be long and arduous as the remaining investors bargained for a lower price.  
 
Table 4: Minority Investments in China’s Large State-Owned Banks 
 
Bank Date of investment Minority Investor Shareholding (%) 
BoCom August 2004 HSBC 19.9 
CCB August 2005 
Bank of America 8.515 
Asia Financial Holdings Pte Ltd. 5.878 
BOC December 2005 
The Royal Bank of Scotland 10 
UBS 1.61 
Asian Development Bank 0.24 
Asia Financial Holdings Pte Ltd. 5 
ICBC March 2006 
Goldman Sachs Group 6.05 
Allianz Group 2.36 
American Express 0.47 
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Transfer of Knowledge from Minority Investors: 
 
Minority investors made a significant commitment to improving the practices of Chinese banks. As part 
of the negotiation process, the parties devised a comprehensive strategy for improvement which 
became part of a formal agreement for cooperation. Foreign financial institutions typically kept offices 
within Chinese banks with the presence of a stable team to coordinate a wide range of projects. In its 
partnership with CCB, Bank of America committed the equivalent of fifty full-time Bank of America 
employees to work at the bank (Linebaugh 2006a). HSBC sent 99 full-time staff to BoCom and the two 
banks cooperated on more than fifty separate projects. In the initial years of co-operation, HSBC staff 
executed more than one thousand training courses at BoCom (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 138,139). 
Interaction between minority investors and Chinese banks occurred through representatives at the 
board level, meetings between the chairmen of the Chinese bank and the corresponding foreign 
financial institutions, and at an operational level. 
 
Officials prioritised the improvement of systems of corporate governance, risk management and internal 
control. The cooperation between ICBC and Goldman Sachs had a clear focus on developing the 
capability to manage market risk. The two parties established a project committee and seven working 
groups for project implementation. There were working groups specifically for corporate governance, 
risk management, NPL management and staff training (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 141). According to 
the ICBC 2007 Annual report ‘Goldman Sachs assisted the Bank in carrying out risk strategy studies, 
stress testing, loan portfolio risk management, country risk management, risk management for the 
Group’s customers, and optimization of the credit business process, and put forward suggestions on 
improving the management of market and operational risks’ (ICBC 2008, 92). ICBC established the post 
of chief risk officer in July 2006 to ‘assist the President to supervise and decide on risk management of 
the Bank’ (ICBC 2007, 100). RBS seconded four experts on risk management to BoC. These experts 
worked with BoC staff to design training courses on corporate and credit risk and also to provide a 
framework for classifying and processing operational risks. ADB provided BoC with advice regarding anti-
money laundering, operational risk management and internal control (BoC 2007, 102). BoCom 
incorporated a comprehensive range of risk management concepts from HSBC, including the concept of 
risk-orientated audits. The adaptation of these concepts fundamentally changed the approach of 
management to risk (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 139). From 2006 to 2007, Bank of America and CCB 
worked together on six projects relating to the development of IT infrastructure and two projects 
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relating to risk management (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 139). Goldman Sachs provided over 2000 
ICBC staff with training at its Pine Street Initiative which included courses on risk management and 
leadership (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 141). At Shenzhen Development Bank, the introduction of 
minority investors helped address serious failures in corporate governance, brought to light following 
the arrest of its former chairman and party secretary for the granting of illegal loans (Mitchell 2006). 
Chairman and CEO Frank Newman was appointed in June 2005 subsequent to an 18% investment by 
Newbridge Capital. Newman stabilised the bank after this scandal and centralised the coordination of 
credit and management functions to reduce operational risk (McMahon 2010; Linebaugh 2006a). 
 
Minority investors also enabled Chinese banks to introduce new products, improve customer service 
and upgrade and streamline core business practices. As part of its investment into BoCom, HSBC worked 
with BoCom’s Pacific Credit Card unit, which had issued over 10 million credit cards by 2008 with annual 
spending of roughly RMB 100b, surpassing some of the large state-owned banks (BoCom 2009a, 71). In 
October 2009 the two banks announced the intention to launch a credit card joint venture company due 
to ‘the unexpected rapid growth of the business of the Existing Card Centre’, the significant contribution 
of ‘human resources, materials and financial resources’ by JV partners and the ‘huge potential of the 
PRC credit card market’ (BoCom 2009b). American Express facilitated the development of a credit card 
customer service model and process within ICBC. Together the two companies jointly launched two 
credit cards. Allianz assisted ICBC with the development of its bank insurance agency service and helped 
introduced new insurance products (ICBC 2008). BoC worked with RBS Group on corporate banking 
projects relating to aircraft financing, shipping financing, and supply chain financing (BoC 2007, 101). In 
2007, with the assistance of Bank of America, CCB rolled out a project which standardised service and 
sales functions in approximately 39% of total branches. The project more than doubled sales volume 
and dropped waiting times by 29% (CCB 2007, 16). BoC was able to upgrade its core business practices 
after reviewing RBS Group practices on with respect to treasury, planning, budgeting, internal funds 
transfers and product pricing (BoC 2007, 103).   
 
Listing of China’s Large State-owned Banks: 
 
Officials gained significant knowledge during consultation with international firms during the 
shareholding reform of Bank of China (Hong Kong), which ‘would pave the way for restructuring and IPO 
of Chinese banks’ (Chin 2016). Bank of China (Hong Kong)’s reform brought together a total of twelve 
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affiliates in Hong Kong which were ‘loosely coordinated by a “Hong Kong management office”’ (Chin 
2016). Goldman Sachs and UBS were rewarded for their contributions to banking reform with the 
opportunity to act as lead underwriters for the bank’s IPO. In his autobiography, then Goldman Sachs 
CEO Hank Paulson described his company’s wide-ranging role as that of a ‘policy advisor, management 
consultant and investment banker’ (as cited in Chin 2016). Chinese officials worked with international 
advisors to carve out NPLs, develop a new system of risk management, and institute corporate 
governance and organisational structures which were in accord with international practices. Important 
discussions were held regarding the sequencing of such reforms and costs and benefits of NPL stripping 
prior to listing. BoC Chairman Liu Mingkang ultimately favoured UBS’s recommendation for a Hong Kong 
listing, based the premise that the ‘marginal benefit of a US listing was not meaningful compared to the 
legal and accounting costs’ (Chin 2016). Standard Chartered Bank was brought in as a strategic investor 
at the time of IPO, having committed to buying US$50 million dollars’ worth of stock to bolster investor 
confidence and facilitate further cooperation post-listing (Irvine 2002). Bank of China (Hong Kong) 
provided an important reference point for the appetite of overseas investors for Chinese financial assets. 
While Bank of China (Hong Kong) was in a stronger financial position than the large state-owned banks 
on the mainland, it still had to overcome the recent scandals that had plagued its parent company BoC 
which had exposed the bank’s weak corporate governance and poor control of operational risk.  
 
Officials determined that banks with the most favourable financial circumstances would list first. This 
was part of a ‘one bank, one strategy policy’, aimed at reducing the difficulty of reform implementation 
(Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, p121). Wu Xiaoling, vice-governor of the PBoC, commented that ‘the 
situation varies from bank to bank, so we need to study the issue according to each bank’ (Kynge and 
McGregor 2003). The levels of capital adequacy and NPLs of the banks were important in determining 
the listing order. The listing of China’s large state-owned banks on the HKSE began in June 2005 with the 
IPO of BoCom and ended in August 2010 with the listing of ABC. Between October 2005 and September 
2006, CCB, BoC and ICBC all listed on the HKSE. Governance reforms at ABC proceeded at a more 
gradual pace due to the bank’s high NPL rate and weak financial circumstances.  
 
Processes of corporate governance and financial restructuring occurred throughout the banking sector. 
Regulators hoped to expose financial institutions to external market discipline where possible. The 
domestic listings of shareholding banks such as Pudong Development Bank (1999), Minsheng Bank (2000) 
and Huaxia Bank (2003) preceded listings of the large state-owned banks. Minsheng Bank, along with 
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other shareholding banks such as China Merchants Bank and Citic Bank, successfully listed on the HKSE. 
The restructuring of city commercial banks and rural commercial banks involved mergers with other 
commercial banks and cooperatives. The listing of Bank of Ningbo, Bank of Beijing and Bank of Nanjing 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007 marked a breakthrough for city commercial banks. In 2010, 
Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank was listed on the HKSE. 
 
The success of the IPOs allowed the state to increase capital adequacy in China’s banks significantly 
without compromising financial sovereignty. The IPOs were vastly oversubscribed as investor euphoria 
for grabbing a piece of China’s economic growth story trumped any concerns about their weak financial 
state. One journalist commented after ICBC’s 2006 IPO that ‘in the past year, sentiment toward China's 
lenders has made a 180-degree shift’ (Linebaugh 2006b). Shares allocated to institutional investors for 
the BoC listing were oversubscribed by up to twenty times, while ICBC’s listing raised over US$300 billion 
after extraordinary demand from institutional investors for an estimated value of US$19.1b worth of 
stock (Lague 2006; Linebaugh 2006b). CCB’s IPO was the largest ever in the global banking industry, 
while ICBC’s 2006 IPO became the largest IPO ever until it was eclipsed by the US$22.1b IPO of ABC in 
2010. CCB’s capital adequacy ratio rose from 11.29% to 13.57% in 2005, with proceeds from the IPO 
being used ‘for strengthening the Bank’s capital base’, while ICBC’s rose over 4% in 2006 to 14.05% (CCB 
2006, 4, 91; ICBC 2007, 5). This was achieved despite only a portion of the banks’ total shares being 
available to external investors, allowing the state to retain control of its large, centrally controlled banks. 
Following ICBC’s IPO, only 13% of total shares were not subject to restriction on sale, while Huijin, MOF 
and the National Council for Social Security Fund of PRC together held approximately 75% of total shares 
(ICBC 2007, 16, 19).   
 
While raising capital was important, improving bank governance was the primary objective of listing (Liu, 
Mingkang 刘明康  2009a, 142). After listing, China’s banks were now required to conform to 
international best practices. The banks became part of a new institutional setting where newly 
introduced concepts of governance were now standard and were monitored and enforced by more 
robust laws and regulation. The public disclosure of detailed financial information, which began during 
preparation for listing as part of the due diligence process and continued in a manner and frequency 
which accorded with the rules of the HKSE, represented a huge change in the culture of the banks. The 
enhanced transparency facilitated more rigorous supervision of bank operations by regulators and 
investors, as well as third party organisations such as rating agencies. Reporting standards included 
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specific guidelines by the HKSE on the corporate governance practices of listed firms. Within this 
structure, shareholders were able to exert influence on bank governance. Independent non-executive 
directors had a duty to protect the interests of minority shareholders. Shareholder rights were 
supported by a more comprehensive and effective legal system than that of the mainland.   
 
Corporate Governance after Listing: 
 
CBRC actively fostered good practices of corporate governance within Chinese banks. Liu Mingkang saw 
corporate governance as his ‘biggest’ challenge, saying that CBRC had ‘taken bold steps, but they’re not 
sufficient. The credit culture is still very weak in China. It must be nourished: discipline, incentives, 
education, cultivation — it’s a huge endeavor’ (Kuhn 2010, 270–71). Less than one year after listing, 
Bank of China (Hong Kong) head Liu Jinbao was investigated for granting illegal loans while working in 
Shanghai, with a suspected connection to Shanghai property tycoon Zhou Zhengyi (Leahy and McGregor 
2003). This episode demonstrated to officials that it was vital to strengthen the corporate governance 
framework to prevent fraud and allow it to play a greater role in guiding the commercial decisions of 
China’s banks. As regulator, CBRC was able to exert influence through its right to examine the 
qualifications of top level managers and board members and veto appointments. CBRC sets the tests 
which determine the competence of directors. CBRC also closely observes the board meetings of the 
large state-owned banks. The CBRC typically sends two or three representatives to each board meeting 
to listen and observe, usually senior heads of departments. Jim Stent, who previously held the post of 
non-executive director of Everbright prior to joining its supervisory board, suggested that bank staff did 
not view this as interference but rather as a means for CBRC to understand their concerns, and that 
CBRC support for bank improvement was appreciated within the sector (Interview with Everbright 
supervisory board member Jim Stent, 16 May 2015). It appears that directors less familiar with China’s 
system and more familiar with Western forms of corporate governance experienced some frustration 
with CBRC’s active role. One director and member of the audit committee of a Big Four bank reportedly 
became frustrated with what he perceived as CBRC interference and resigned from his post (Interview 
with PWC Partner David Wu, 3 April 2015).  
 
At the beginning of 2006, CBRC issued the Guideline on the Corporate Governance Reforms and 
Supervision of State-owned Commercial Banks, developed from the initial guidelines for corporate 
governance reform of the pilot banks, CCB and BoC (CBRC 2007, 36). This guideline standardised 
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corporate governance procedures for state-owned banks. In April, it was further amended to create a 
more robust and functional structure. Banks were required to align meetings of shareholders, the two 
boards and senior management to facilitate communication between each tier of the corporate 
governance structure (CBRC 2007, 71). The duties and incentives of each role were further refined. CBRC 
required banks to develop market-orientated HR management systems and, with CBRC support, 
establish performance evaluation schemes. In 2007, the CBRC focused on the establishment of ‘sound 
procedures’ for board meetings, improving the effectiveness of the supervisory board and developing 
‘the check and balance mechanism for senior management’ (CBRC 2008, 72). Liu’s aim to ‘grasp the two 
ends and bring the middle forward’ was also evident, as he sought to apply the standards of listed banks 
to the industry in general. Small and medium-sized banks were encouraged to establish a structure of 
corporate governance, while the Guidance on Corporate Governance of Trust Companies was issued in 
2007 (CBRC 2008, 72,73). In July 2007, the CBRC issued rules on information disclosure which set rules 
on the disclosure of financial statements, corporate governance and risk management practices, and 
internal control procedures (CBRC 2008, 94).   Widely followed in 2007, this had become standard 
practice within city commercial banks by 2010, with listed banks subject to even stricter disclosure 
requirements as set out by CSRC (CBRC 2011a, 31). The issuance of guidelines each year on detailed 
aspects of corporate governance represented a core element of CBRC’s policy-making process. In 2010 
the State Council asked the CBRC to consolidate these guidelines and a ‘set of common principles and 
standards’ was drafted regarding  ‘good corporate governance applicable to all types of commercial 
banks’ (CBRC 2011a, 54). The following year Guidelines on Corporate Governance of Commercial Banks 
(Consultative Document) was released and previous guidelines were abolished, signifying a milestone in 
the policy-making process (CBRC 2011b). A CBRC official interviewed reported in 2015 that the Basel 
Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) was working with the CBRC on combining rules around 
information disclosure and transparency into one comprehensive document, with the capability of 
small-scale banks to comply with BCBS templates an important consideration (Interview with CBRC 
official, 13 March 2015). 
 
The large state-owned banks introduced independent, non-executive directors into their corporate 
governance structure. Liu Mingkang had been encouraged by the work of a director representing the IFC 
on the board of Nanjing Commercial Bank. ‘They invited an independent director called John Langlois 
(on to the bank's board),’ Mr Liu said. ‘He is a big mouth. Push, push, push. In six months [the bank] has 
changed quite a lot’ (Kynge 2003). These directors typically had a high level of academic or professional 
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experience in the banking sector and many had strong international experience. These directors were a 
force in pushing a more rigorous application of corporate governance processes. The contribution of 
Hong Kong directors in upgrading the audit functions of large state-owned banks through their roles on 
audit committees, for example, is an important part of this story which requires further examination. Liu 
Mingkang reported that independent directors were quick to question executive board members on 
CBRC reports, asking ‘Why didn’t we know this? What happened? And what’s your plan to rectify or 
mitigate the risks noted by CBRC? ’ (Kuhn 2010, 270). In this way, non-executive directors helped to 
create a more open atmosphere within the board and its committees. Independent directors were able 
to create discussion and debate in meetings which had previously been highly stylised.  
 
The party remained deeply embedded within the corporate governance structure of China’s banks. The 
COD retained de facto authority over the appointment of the board-level executives of the banks. The 
chairmen of centrally controlled banks were typically officials that had been rotated from positions in 
the central bank. BoC chairman Xiao Gang (2003-2013), CCB chairman Guo Shuqing (2005-2011) and 
ABC chairman Xiang Junbo (2009-2011) had all served as a vice governor of the central bank. BoCom 
Chairman Niu Ximing (2013-) had formerly assumed the post of vice chairman of ICBC. The new 
corporate governance system functioned alongside the party system and was gradually strengthened. 
The powers vested in the board of directors and supervisory board according to China’s Company Law 
provided them the authority to supervise the performance and recommend the dismissal of directors or 
senior management where necessary. According to an official from the COD, appointments of provincial 
and large city branch heads of centrally controlled banks gradually became more competitive after 
listing. These were posts that had previously been allocated to officials (Sun 2012). For the recruitment 
of new chief risk officers and chief credit officers, CCB and BoC both hired head-hunters which operated 
internationally (B. Hu 2004b).  In 2012 the office of the Central Committee published a set of rules on 
leaders of centrally controlled financial enterprises which summarised the philosophy of the state 
towards the dual responsibility of officials to the bureaucratic system and shareholders. The head of the 
State Council RDC’s Financial Research Institute, Ba Shusong, explained that according to these rules 
officials needed to integrate both responsibilities and in doing so ‘achieve systemisation, standardisation 
and greater transparency’ (PRC Central Government 2012). The state adapted its policy of rotation of 
officials to the appointment of auditors from 2010, favouring the benefits of greater auditor 
independence over establishing long-term partnerships (Gillis 2012). The principle of rotation also 
applies to non-executive directors, which have a maximum term of six years.   
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Risk Management: 
 
CBRC drove the adaption of international standards of risk management to Chinese conditions. In its 
2011 Financial System Stability Assessment report, developed with the assistance of CBRC, the IMF 
commented that ‘CBRC guidance is generally of high quality and was often developed directly from Basel 
documents’ (IMF 2011, 61). While China delayed implementation of Basel II due to issues of suitability, 
the provision of international standards and best practices by the Basel Committee enabled risk 
management in China’s banks ‘to evolve at an accelerated pace’ (Liu, Mingkang 2003b). The minimum 
capital requirements for China’s banks were not adjusted, but CBRC encouraged banks to adopt the 
most useful elements of the other two tiers of Basel II, namely supervisory review and market discipline. 
CBRC has required foreign banks in China to complete surveys and questionnaires relating to regulatory 
practices of these banks in their home jurisdictions (He 2013, 294). In its 2009 annual report, CBRC 
acknowledged the contribution of such surveys in the development of standards for risk management 
(CBRC 2010).     
 
Credit Risk: 
  
CBRC adopted international best practices to combat credit risk. According to the IMF, credit risk ‘is the 
most important risk facing Chinese banks and will remain so for some time’ (IMF 2011, 62). One of the 
most pressing tasks for CBRC upon its inception was to complete the roll-out of the five-tier loan 
classification system based on the U.S. system. In 2003 it issued a notice requiring all banking 
institutions to adopt this system by 2004. Implementation within RCCs followed and by the end of 2006 
all banking and non-banking financial institutions employed the new loan classification system. Because 
the new system required banks to consider risk in a more forward-looking manner, CBRC actively 
implemented training programs to enable bank employees to grasp this new concept of risk (CBRC 2007, 
73). Similarly, international practices were also adopted within the credit approval process. The use of a 
credit score to assess loan applications became common practice in SOCBs from 2003 (Yeung 2009). It 
was based on a business report and three years of audited statements (Yeung 2009, 289). This method, 
along with the use of the ‘five Cs of credit’, which incorporate the more intangible qualities of a 
borrower, were both widely used by Western banks. While CBRC does not have specific rules for loan 
authorisation, bank practices have steadily evolved towards a greater centralisation of loan approvals 
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(Interview with CBRC official, 19 March 2015). At China Everbright, the power of individual sub-branch 
presidents to approve loans was gradually reduced and then replaced by centralised lending approval 
centres established in eastern, southern and western China by 2004 (Yeung 2009, 291). The lack of 
provisions and measures for dealing with problem assets, traditionally a weakness in the banking sector, 
had been addressed through the development of improved accounting standards (IMF 2011, 62). This 
was achieved through the development of a modern legal framework for accounting followed by 
gradual convergence with IFRS from 2005. It was supported by extensive visits of staff in the MOF 
accounting department to their counterparts in Western countries, particularly since 1999, to gain the 
necessary exposure and understanding of international practices (World Bank 2009, 3).    
 
The CBRC has been cautious with the development of financial derivatives, openly prioritising the 
development of functional supervision ahead of financial innovation (see for example CBRC 2008, 77).  
Even before the 2008 financial crisis, Liu Mingkang felt that complex financial derivatives, such as 
collateralised debt obligations and credit default swaps, had the potential to create severe financial 
instability and that it was the role of CBRC to protect China from such instruments. The gradual 
development of CBRC’s rules regarding derivatives and credit asset securitisation, beginning in 2004, 
reflected CBRC’s desire to develop ‘practical, transparent, and straight-forward innovations that serve 
the fundamental demands of the real economic sectors’ (CBRC 2011a, 41).     
 
In 2004 and 2005 the CBRC and other agencies worked with the IFC to develop a legal framework which 
would permit the use of accounts receivable and other movable assets such as machinery or patents as 
collateral. This work was reported to the NPC’s Legislative Affairs Work Commission and later became 
part of China’s 2007 Property Law. The project team visited Canada and U.S. to learn from their 
experiences. According to a CBRC official who worked on the project, certain aspects of the proposal 
were not accepted as were not perceived as compatible with China’s legal tradition, which largely 
stemmed from Japanese and German civil law (Interview with CBRC official, 11 March 2015). 
 
In addition to the adoption of international standards, the CBRC also needed to address aspects of credit 
risk that were specific to China’s national conditions. ‘The client risk statistics and early warning system’ 
was developed by CBRC internally and completed in July 2004. It was designed to address the risk of 
enterprises borrowing excessive capital through multiple subsidiaries to prevent banks from gaining a 
full picture of their financial circumstances, thereby exploiting the lack of information sharing between 
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China’s banks. For example, following the 2004 collapse of the Delong group, an industrial and financial 
conglomerate with more than 100 subsidiary companies, investigations finally revealed that the group 
had been able to borrow an astonishing RMB 20b in total loans (Interview with CBRC official, 12 March 
2015). To combat this problem, the warning system required banks to report regularly to CBRC 
regarding large-scale lending, defined in 2006 as total loans to clients exceeding 100m RMB (CBRC 2007, 
74). The risk warning system, which was the first major statistical system that CBRC developed, was 
highly prioritised and has been upgraded twice subsequently. It remains hugely relevant due to the 
existence of hugely complex and diverse conglomerates in China such as Fosun International, which has 
more than two thousand subsidiaries. The risk warning system ‘has succeeded in helping banking 
institutions through the sharing of client risk information between banks’ (CBRC 2007, 74). 
 
According to a CBRC official, an important reason for the restructuring of CBRC departments in early 
2015 was to enable regulators to identify the common features of credit risk and capture the synergy 
between different aspects of regulation. The PBoC and CBRC both issued many different regulations 
over the years in an attempt to improve regulatory coverage of credit risk, which is considered the 
oldest form of risk in China’s banking system. After the restructuring, the Prudential Regulatory 
Department has the authority to approve all new regulation. This will provide it with the necessary top-
down viewpoint to capture regulatory synergy (Interview with CBRC official, 19 March 2015).   
 
Operational risk: 
 
CBRC strongly prioritised the reduction of operational risk in response to the shocking cases of fraud and 
corruption which emerged in China’s banking sector from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. CBRC 
employed a multi-pronged approach with the principal features being as follows: the upgrading and 
centralisation of IT systems in banks; educational campaigns on financial crime; on-site examinations of 
banks; and linking the approval of bank licenses and supervisory ratings with the capability of banks to 
manage operational risk. Between 2005 and 2006, the CBRC organised 10 anti-crime conferences which 
it used to promote a series of measures designed to improve management of operational risk and 
prevent banking crime (CBRC 2007, 78). Centralisation of IT systems for back office operations occurred 
in all commercial banks. BoCom completed a 4-year project in 2006 which centralised the processing of 
credit authorisation, audit, and accounting documentation in the bank’s back office function. The 
project enhanced the bank’s control of operational risk and ensuring there were no major incidents of 
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fraud in the 2008 reporting period (BoCom 2008, 2009a, 2010). Foreign technology such as IBM’s secure 
file transfer system was crucial to this process (IBM Corporation 2011). In 2007, the CBRC held a press 
conference to inform the media of 10 major cases of bribery within financial institutions in effort to 
increase transparency and change the culture within banks. By the end of 2007 CBRC had successfully 
resolved 106 cases of commercial bribery cases involving funds totalling RMB13.82 million (CBRC 2008, 
76). The focus of CBRC gradually shifted from developing a robust coverage of fundamental areas of 
operational risk towards addressing particular areas of risk in greater detail.  
 
Human Resources: 
 
One consequence of the rapid increase in the scale of China’s banking sector, along with its increasing 
complexity, was that there was a shortage of qualified workers in the banking sector. Shortly after his 
appointment in 2005, then CCB head Guo Shuqing admitted that ‘more than 90% of the bank's risk 
managers are unqualified’. The problem was not limited to banks. Head of CBRC’s International 
Department Han Mingzhi lamented that ‘we lack people who understand commercial banking and 
microeconomics. It is a headache for the CBRC’ (The Economist 2005). While from 2007 to 2009 there 
was a drive by CBRC to appoint more staff with international experience, according to the IMF FSAP the 
bureaucratic limits placed on CBRC in terms of headcount and budget have limited its ability to ‘attract 
and retain talent’ (Interview with CBRC official, 13 March 2015, IMF 2011, 60). The development of the 
necessary human capital remained of vital importance to the transformation of China’s banks.  
 
Reforms led the HR systems of banks to conform (at least partially) with those of modern capitalist 
enterprises while maintaining the transmission of party values and ideology to staff. There was 
increased emphasis on a management hierarchy which was based on the relative responsibilities and 
performances of workers in order to create a system which was less politicised. In 2006 BoCom made 
fundamental reforms of its human resources management system. The new system was based on five 
key principles, which also reflected the new remuneration policy of the bank: internal fairness and 
market competitiveness, efficiency, individual and team performance, proactive career development 
and a consistent, standardised system (BoCom 2007). As recent as 2016, human resource development 
at BoCom had a clear focus on party values. Staff ‘followed the studies on the theoretical and practical 
issues of Party building, focused on Party Constitution, Party regulations and professional skill training’ 
(BoCom 2017, 121). BoCom has continued to refine and perfect its human resources system, optimising 
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performance assessment procedures and developing more focussed performance incentives for workers. 
As part of its 13th five-year plan, BoCom planned to cultivate 2,000 experts over three years as part of its 
strategy to develop sufficient human capital (BoCom 2017).  
 
Legal Development: 
 
China’s officials are gradually developing a legal environment which will permit the bankruptcy of 
financial institutions as a means to contain financial risk within failed enterprises and diminish the risk of 
moral hazard. Cases of bankruptcy in China’s banking sector up to this point had been extremely rare 
with the assets and liabilities of banks in financial difficulty typically taken over by another bank in an 
effort to maintain stability. New laws had resulted in improved property rights for banks. The 
development of laws regulating commercial activities such as the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and the 
Property Law, both enacted in 2007, gave greater protection to the rights of banks as creditors. The new 
bankruptcy law gave secured creditors priority over worker’s wages in the event of an enterprise closure. 
The IMF suggests that these laws have assisted with the enforcement of contracts generally in Chinese 
courts, particularly in urban centres (IMF 2011, 56). Property rights for creditors were much stronger 
than during the period of enterprise restructuring and layoffs in the 1990s, when the State Council 
issued regulation to ensure that worker pension and social welfare took precedence over bank rights to 
seize collateral (Lardy 1998).  
 
The CBRC has actively participated in the development of a deposit insurance scheme and a bankruptcy 
law specific to financial enterprises. In 2008, CBRC was charged with the drafting of the Regulation on 
the Bankruptcy of Banking Institutions and assisted with the formulation of a deposit insurance scheme 
(CBRC 2009, 63). With respect to the bankruptcy law, state media reported the view of bank industry 
officials that ‘given banks serve as the stabilizer of the economy, the ordinance must be able to minimize 
the aftermath of bankruptcy of banks and financial institutions and simultaneously provide the 
maximum protection to the interests of depositors, creditors and taxpayers…’ (Xinhua 2008). As a PBoC 
official pointed out, the implementation of these reforms would fundamentally challenge the 
relationship between banks and depositors (Interview with PBoC official, 2 April 2015). It was in the 
hands of the State Council and ultimately the Central Committee to determine the timing of 
implementation based on its relative priority compared to other economic reform initiatives and on 
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China’s national conditions. Deposit insurance was introduced in 2016, while a bankruptcy law specific 
to financial enterprises remains forthcoming.    
 
Interest rate reform and Wealth Management Products: 
 
Figure 2: History of Interest Rate Liberalisation in China 
 
[FIGURE REDACTED FOR REASONS OF COPYRIGHT]    
 
Source: China: The Path to Interest Rate Liberalization, 2015. 
 
Under Zhou Xiaochuan, the PBoC increased the flexibility of bank interest rates to promote a more 
efficient allocation of resources. As the Figure 2 above shows, this was part of a greater process of 
interest rate liberalisation which started with the introduction of the concept of market-based allocation 
of resources by the CCP at the 14th Party Congress in 1992. Throughout reform and opening, the state 
has repressed interest rates to reduce borrowing costs and facilitate the transformation of its SOEs, 
including its banks. The PBoC’s control over benchmark deposit and lending rates allowed banks to take 
advantage of the wide interest rate margins and discouraged the development of differentiated lending 
products based on risk. The reform measures gradually allowed banks to charge lower lending rates and 
offer greater returns on deposits. In 2004, upon the removal of the lending rate floor, Zhou said that 
now ‘commercial banks must learn how to price risk’ and focus on capital adequacy, rather than simply 
on matching the relative quantities of assets and liabilities (PBoC 2004). The policy has reduced interest 
rate income, increased competition between banks and stimulated banks to further develop non-
interest rate sources of income. It has also provided banks with an incentive to look beyond 
relationships with SOEs. PBoC deputy governor Yi Gang stated in 2015, ‘it is fair to say that interest rate 
liberalization is the main channel to meet the increasingly diversified financial demands and promote 
economic development’ (Yi 2015).  
  
According to one CBRC official, the development of the wealth management sector was another means 
to gradually liberalise interest rates (Interview with CBRC official, 12 March 2015). Wealth management 
products offered a return to investors that was higher than the interest rate on deposits. The wealth 
management businesses of commercial banks were actively regulated by the CBRC. Policymakers 
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wanted state-owned banks to play a central role in the wealth management industry so that they would 
develop greater capability to assess projects and price risk. According to CBRC vice chairman Wang 
Huaqing, commercial banks were also permitted to engage in overseas wealth management business to 
‘gradually get familiar with international financial markets and to build up the investment and 
management capability, thus to strengthen banks’ overall competitiveness’ (Wang 2008). The CBRC 
issued the Administrative Rules for Pilot Incorporation of Fund Management Companies by Commercial 
Banks in 2005, in conjunction with the PBoC and CSRC. The pilot project, which allowed for three of the 
Big Five banks to operate as the largest shareholder in fund management companies, was quickly 
expanded to include other commercial banks. Through the pilot project CBRC was able to expand upon 
its 2005 provisional regulations, issuing the Notice on Issues Relevant to Further Regulating Commercial 
Banks’ Wealth Management Business in 2008, later followed by comprehensive regulations in 2011 
(CBRC 2009, 50; Li 2014, 204). Due to their vast retail networks, banks quickly came to dominate the 
wealth management industry, with total assets marketed by commercial banks skyrocketing from 195b 
RMB in 2005 to 3.8 trillion RMB in 2008 (Liu, Mingkang 刘明康 2009b, 597). The practice of commercial 
banks of using another financial institution as an investment vehicle (usually a NBFI such as a trust 
company or a securities company) kept the investments off bank balance sheets.  
 
While contributing to the banking sector’s ability to price risk, the development of the wealth 
management sector also had the potential to reduce transparency and create scope for regulatory 
arbitrage. Where banks did not directly invest, the implicit guarantee of banks to investors was not well 
defined and products were not usually visible on the balance sheets of banks (Perry and Weltewitz 
2015). The ability of investors to assess risk was limited by a lack of transparency with regard to the 
product and its underlying assets. The different types of financial institutions involved, along with the 
variable nature of their relationship with the partnering commercial bank, made it difficult to establish a 
uniform regulatory structure for these products. 
 
The Lifting of Restrictions on RMB Business for Foreign Banks post-WTO entry: 
 
The state asserted its sovereignty over the banking sector and prioritised domestic policy objectives in 
its regulation of foreign banks and in particular through its application of WTO requirements. China had 
committed to allowing foreign banks to conduct local currency business with Chinese individuals by 11 
December 2006, five years after its entry to the WTO. China’s accession to the WTO and the prospect of 
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deregulation of the financial sector attracted foreign banks in unprecedented numbers. By the end of 
2005, over 70 banks from 20 countries had established operating branches in China (Dickie 2006). In 
November 2006, the State Council issued the Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Invested 
Banks.  According to the State Council, these rules were designed to ‘strengthen and improve the 
supervision and management of foreign banks and promote the stable operation of the banking sector’ 
(Areddy 2006a). Policymakers elected to subject foreign banks, which operated outside within the party 
system of governance, to the same regulatory oversight as Chinese banks, thereby ‘making the industry 
more transparent and safer for depositors’ (Areddy 2006b). The rules required foreign banks 
incorporate locally in order to accept deposits and conduct other retail business including the issuance 
of credit cards, with banks only eligible for incorporation after three years of operations in China. 
Chinese regulators preferred local incorporation as it clearly defined CBRC as the regulator responsible 
for foreign banks, a policy which foreshadowed the global trend following the 2008 financial crisis. 
Foreign banks were given five years to comply with regulations on asset and liability management, 
which required them to reduce total loans to 75% of deposits. According to Ba Shusong, senior official at 
the Development Research Centre of the State Council, the rules would create an environment of ‘fair 
competition’ between Chinese and foreign banks (Dickie 2006). 
 
The new rules were subject to criticism externally because, while in conformance with WTO terms, they 
were not viewed to be in the spirit of the WTO agreement. Charlene Barshefsky, the U.S. Trade 
Representative who helped negotiate the WTO agreement, found the new rules ‘troubling’ and 
commented that ‘the intent was to open the sector to the maximum extent possible’ (Areddy 2006a). 
Local incorporation imposed significant set-up costs and inconvenience on foreign banks which 
perceived it as an affront to their global business model (Dickie 2006). Foreign banks would compete 
with Chinese banks, not for control of deposits but in high value areas such as investment banking for 
Chinese multinationals, pushing improvement in customer service. The rules favoured foreign banks 
which had a genuine long-term interest in China’s economic development. This was in keeping with the 
goal of policymakers for foreign competition to aid the transformation of Chinese banks. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
From 2003 the CBRC led reforms which, according to Liu Mingkang, made the banking sector ‘much 
stronger and more resilient’ (Liu, Mingkang 2010a). While China’s record-breaking IPOs took the 
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headlines, between 2003 and 2009 officials were able to reduce the level of NPLs from 17.9% to 1.58%. 
Banks in compliance with capital adequacy requirements constituted 99.9% of banking assets in 2009 
compared with just 0.6% of assets in 2003. In the same period, the loan provisioning coverage ratio 
grew from 19.7% to 155% (Liu, Mingkang 2010a). Liu viewed this dramatic improvement as due to 
governance reforms, or what he termed ‘the fundamental reform and opening-up of the banks’ 
structures and mindsets’, along with ‘the relentless efforts of the banking supervision and regulation’ 
(Liu, Mingkang 2010a). Reforms adapted Western ideas and technology within a Chinese system. Under 
Liu, the CBRC implemented major reforms such as the full roll-out of the international standard 5-tier 
loan classification system, the centralisation and upgrading of the credit approval process, and the 
centralisation of IT systems within China’s banks. Minority investors made a significant contribution to 
improving the capacity of Chinese banks to manage risk, while also helping to introduce new products, 
improve customer service and upgrade business practices. The CBRC gradually fostered systems of 
corporate governance. China’s bureaucratic system remained central to the governance of the banking 
sector. The implementation of reform by agencies such as the CBRC and PBoC reflected conceptions of 
reform from the party core. The sense of duty to the organisation and development of society felt by 
CRBC officials was a continuation of the role of scholar-officials in traditional Chinese society. According 
to one CBRC official, the leaders of the Big Four banks view their role as part of a political career within 
the bureaucratic system (Interview with CBRC official, 20 March 2015). As premier, Wen Jiabao played a 
leading role and worked closely alongside Liu Mingkang. He and other party leaders wished to avoid the 
‘chaos’ of a Western governance model and chose to adapt the model of party governance, which 
appointed and monitored officials at the highest levels of China’s banks. The strict limits placed on 
ownership of Chinese banks by minority investors, along with new regulations for foreign invested banks 
enacted prior to the lifting of WTO restrictions, were implemented not only to ensure sovereignty of the 
financial sector but also to limit the influence of dangerous ideas relating to deregulation and financial 
liberalisation. The greater resilience of China’s banking sector would prove invaluable in confronting the 
2008 global financial crisis, which had its origins in these very same ideas.   
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Chapter 6: Reacting to the Global Financial Crisis (2008-17)      
 
There was a heavy weight of responsibility on China’s officials to ensure stable development of the 
banking sector after the global financial crisis. While CBRC’s prudent policies on financial innovation 
minimised the exposure of China’s banks to the complex derivatives which helped spread the 2008 
global financial crisis, the crisis created an adverse economic environment in China through which new 
risks to the banking sector emerged. The global financial crisis brought the world economy into 
recession, severely reduced asset values and created panic and uncertainty in financial institutions 
which caused credit markets to dry up globally. The total cost of the crisis was estimated at over US$22 
trillion, over a third of 2008 World GDP (Melendez 2013; World Bank 2016c). Due to its reliance on 
exports and FDI, China’s economy was relatively vulnerable to the effects of the crisis. The banking 
sector was under enormous pressure to continue to make profitable loans, maintain asset quality and 
control risk in this adverse economic environment. The level of debt in China’s economy grew swiftly 
after the crisis.  
 
The focus for China’s policymakers after the crisis was to mitigate this new financial risk and maintain 
the stability of the financial system. The CBRC maintained a policy of close supervision and strong 
regulation to address areas of high credit risk. China’s system of party governance played an important 
role in minimising risk by rooting out corruption and reducing the compensation and expenditure of 
officials. China’s banks mitigated risk by diverting capital away from certain sectors, particularly SOEs in 
heavy industries where overcapacity existed, to more productive areas of the economy. The state also 
elected not to close down or restructure the NFBI sector, instead seeking to strengthen regulation and 
enable the sector to safely serve the real economy. Reform measures were implemented to improve the 
efficiency of capital allocation, reduce moral hazard, and improve the pricing of risk by banks. The 
appointment of Guo Shuqing as head of CBRC in February 2017 was indicative of the party’s intention to 
take a more proactive approach to reducing financial risk. Guo has a deep understanding of financial risk, 
having previously assumed roles as head of both CCB and CSRC, vice governor of PBOC and director of 
SAFE. 
 
The crisis underlined the concerns of officials for what they considered to be a dangerous and under 
regulated global financial system. China’s leaders had been extremely concerned about the risks posed 
by the global financial system long before the advent of the 2008 financial crisis, having been alarmed by 
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the frequent occurrence of financial crises as the financial liberalisation promoted by Western countries 
caught on (see for example Jiang Zemin’s speech in Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 455). The high degree of 
openness of China’s economy and consequent exposure to the dangers of the global financial system, 
along with the close adoption of international standards of banking regulation, made it vital for China to 
advance its ideas of close supervision and strong regulation to mitigate the inherent risks of financial 
markets. The crisis provided an opportunity for China to raise concerns and propose solutions regarding 
future cooperation and governance of the global financial system. 
 
The War of Ideas over Financial Regulation: 
 
In the years prior to the 2008 financial crisis, China’s leaders had prioritised the development of a 
banking system that was fundamentally sound and resilient to financial risk. The favourable economic 
environment, both domestically and internationally, allowed the state to deliver fundamental 
institutional change which lifted capital adequacy to international standards, bolstered loan loss 
provisions and reduced the NPL rate drastically. The determination of regulators to focus on financial 
stability during this period was likely informed by theorists such as Minsky, who warned that ‘over 
periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable 
system to financial relations that make for an unstable system’ (Minsky 1992, 8). Minsky suggested that 
in good times, bankers would engage in excessive innovation and speculation which was ultimately 
unsustainable. After the crisis Liu Mingkang alluded to this pattern of behaviour, suggesting that ‘people 
in this business (the financial sector) always have short memories’, requiring banking regulators to have 
‘longer memories’ in order to maintain a strong culture of regulation and mitigate the risk of moral 
hazard (Liu, Mingkang 2010b). From 2006 the CBRC implemented counter-cyclical macro-prudential 
policies to prevent overheating and risk contagion and increased its supervision of complex derivative-
based products (CBRC 2009, 9).  
 
Figure 3: Wall Street Crumbles 
 
[FIGURE REDACTED FOR REASONS OF COPYRIGHT]    
 
Source: “Stock Markets Reel from Lehman Brothers Crisis” 2008. 
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While the crisis began with the collapse of the United States sub-prime housing market, its true origins 
lay in a free market ideology which encouraged deregulation, financial innovation, and the consolidation 
of America’s financial sector into a few very large and powerful financial institutions. Johnson and Kwok 
(2010) point out that the interests of regulators were ‘captured’ by the interests of banking insiders, 
whose economic and political power reinforced their free market ideology, convincing politicians and 
regulators alike: ‘As banking became more complicated, more prestigious, and more lucrative, the 
ideology of Wall Street—that unfettered innovation and unregulated financial markets were good for 
America and the world—became the consensus position in Washington on both sides of the political 
aisle’ (Johnson and Kwak 2010, 5). That the crisis created such large-scale losses, forcing the bailouts and 
bankruptcies of flagship Western financial institutions in the US, Europe and beyond was a strong 
indictment of unfettered free markets. Lehman Brothers, the world’s fourth largest investment bank, 
went bankrupt, by some measure the biggest bankruptcy in history. Two other global investment banks, 
Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch, were sold at huge discounts. In an attempt to bring stability to the 
financial system, the US federal government took ownership stakes in its major banks in exchange for 
capital. This large-scale intervention was a clear abandonment of free market principles. In a 
congressional hearing after the crisis, former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan acknowledged 
the flaws in his concept of self-regulation: ‘I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interests of 
organisations, specifically banks and others, were such that they were best capable of protecting their 
own shareholders and their equity in the firms’ (Treanor and Clark 2008).  
 
As early as May 2008, senior Chinese banking regulators had begun arguing that ‘the western consensus 
on the relation between the market and the government should be reviewed. In practice, they tend to 
overestimate the power of the market and overlook the regulatory role of the government and this 
warped conception is at the root of the subprime crisis’ (Anderlini 2008). After the crisis, Liu Mingkang 
commented that ‘the western regulatory authorities are too obsessed with innovation and market force 
and have neglected the role of prudential regulation’ (Liu, Mingkang 2008b). While party insiders such as 
party school vice president Zheng Bijian had already warned that financial globalisation had ‘created  
conditions for a financial crash across the world’, the fact that the most powerful and advanced country 
in the world allowed a global financial crisis to begin in its domestic housing market no doubt impacted 
upon the thought processes of China’s leaders (Zheng 2011, 67).  One Chinese official put it that, ‘we 
used to see the US as our teacher but now we realise that our teacher keeps making mistakes and we’ve 
decided to quit the class’ (Beattie and Dyer 2009).  
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The Direct Impact of the Crisis: 
 
To quote Liu Mingkang, the crisis caused a severe disruption to China’s economy which exposed its 
banks to ‘a more violent environment with higher credit risk, market risk and operational risk’ (CBRC 
2009, 11). Since 1978 a major element of China’s reform strategy has been integration with the global 
economy through raising exports and attracting foreign direct investment. By 2007, China’s exports had 
reached a level equivalent to approximately 35% of GDP (World Bank 2016b). China also received more 
foreign direct investment than any other country besides the United States. This high level of integration 
with the world economy made China highly vulnerable to external shocks caused by the crisis. The 
global economic slowdown reduced the demand for China’s exports in important developed country 
markets, while overseas investors had suffered losses and become more risk adverse. Between 2008 
and 2009, the total value of China’s exports and FDI decreased by 16% and 24% respectively (World 
Bank 2016b). China’s GDP growth fell from 14.2% in 2007 to 9.6% in 2008 (World Bank 2016b). The 
volatility in global markets spread to China. The Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index fell by almost 
two thirds in 2008. Banks were exposed to greater uncertainty surrounding interest rates, prices and 
exchange rates.  Wealth management operations were immediately thrown into turmoil. According to a 
report in the China Daily, 17 of the 46 Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor products offered by 
domestic banks fell by over 50%, greatly enhancing legal and reputational risk for the banks concerned 
(Wang Zhenghua 2008).  
 
China’s banks also absorbed direct losses from their holdings of U.S. mortgage-backed securities, as well 
as debt and equity holdings in troubled or bankrupt financial institutions. In September 2008, BoC held a 
total of US$8.9 billion of mortgage-backed securities including US$3.3 billion of U.S. subprime mortgage-
backed securities. CCB and China Merchants Bank owned US$191 million and US$70 million of Lehman 
brothers-related debts respectively. Some of China’s banks, such as BoC and CCB, also had holdings of 
debt securities issued or backed by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Banks also incurred loses as the value 
of equity investments in financial institutions declined. By October 2008 the market value of China 
Development Bank’s £1.5bn investment in Barclays Bank, made in 2007, had declined by more than 50% 
(Caijing.com.cn 2008).      
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The Stimulus Plan and Increased Bank Lending: 
 
The Chinese state acted rapidly to preserve economic stability. In November 2008 Premier Wen Jiabao 
announced the implementation of an economic stimulus package estimated at a total of 4 trillion RMB 
(or 586 billion US dollars), focussed on infrastructure projects and designed to ‘offset adverse global 
economic conditions by boosting domestic demand’ (Xinhua News Agency 2008). According to Premier 
Wen, one of the key aims of the stimulus plan was to ‘preserve financial stability to support economic 
development’ (Financial Times 2009). Social stability was also a grave concern as approximately 20 
million of China’s 130 million migrant workers had lost their jobs and returned home, potentially 
threatening the stability of rural areas (Anderlini and Dyer 2009). While necessary, implementing the 
stimulus represented a major disruption to the state’s programme of economic and financial reform. An 
article released by Xinhua news agency commented that ‘the macro-economic policy changes 
announced on Sunday are one of only a few major shifts during the 30 years since the beginning of 
reform and opening up in 1978’ (Xinhua News Agency 2008). China’s banking sector would play a 
fundamental role in the stimulus plan by providing an estimated US$233 billion of funds, equivalent to 
40% of the total stimulus plan, to support priority infrastructure projects and other areas as designated 
by the plan (World Bank 2016b). The expansion of credit was achieved through a removal of limits on 
credit growth, a relaxation of restrictions on property-related lending, and a decrease in interest rates 
and reserve requirements.  
 
Figure 4: Monthly Average Loan Growth of Banking Institutions and Annualised GDP Growth 
 
[FIGURE REDACTED FOR REASONS OF COPYRIGHT]    
 
Source: CBRC 2011a, 44. 
 
The banking sector played an important role in mitigating the effects of the crisis. The total credit supply 
of 9.5 trillion RMB represented a remarkable 32.7% increase on the previous year (Liu, Mingkang 2010a). 
New loans in 2009 amounted to 31 percent of GDP (IMF 2010, 4). Almost half of the total credit for the 
year was distributed in the first quarter following the announcement of the stimulus plan. China’s 
bureaucratic system made it possible for the banking sector to provide such swift support to the 
economy despite the uncertain economic environment. The location of banking officials within China’s 
bureaucracy, responsive to party organs of personnel appointments and party discipline, caused them to 
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view the implementation of government policy as a core part of their role. Everbright supervisory board 
member Jim Stent commented in an interview that ‘in China money goes to the problem, unlike other 
places where it goes away from the problem’ (Interview with Everbright supervisory board member Jim 
Stent, 16 May 2015). The reduction of the credit supply in 2010 to around 8 billion RMB further 
demonstrated the state’s ability to control the credit supply according to circumstance (CBRC 2011a, 44). 
The stimulus plan was highly successful in facilitating the recovery of China’s economy from the crisis. In 
2010 GDP growth, exports, and FDI all rebounded to levels well above those recorded in 2008, restoring 
the confidence of consumers and financial markets. The successful execution of the stimulus plan was 
also vitally important for the recovery of the world economy from the crisis. The IMF praised the 
effective nature of China’s stimulus plan, commenting that ‘China has led the global recovery’ (IMF 2010, 
3). 
 
The priority for the CBRC as banking regulator was to minimise the risks of the stimulus plan. The major 
concern was that the distribution of a large quantity of credit in a short timeframe would lower asset 
quality. The achievements of the CBRC prior to the crisis of developing a banking system that was more 
resilient to risk put the banking system in a better position to contain the risks posed by the stimulus 
plan. The provisioning coverage ratio had increased dramatically between 2003 and 2009 from 19.7% to 
155% as loan loss provisioning reached over one trillion RMB. This gave the banking sector a much 
stronger buffer against potential credit risk (Liu, Mingkang 2010a). CBRC measures to mitigate risk after 
the crisis reflected the ongoing application of a regulatory approach which Liu Mingkang characterised 
as ‘a risk-based and consolidated supervision with strong control and great transparency’, reliant on ‘a 
set of simple, useful and effective ratios, limits and targets, modeling those used by some developed 
markets in the past and were later abandoned by themselves during the frenzy [of] innovation and 
deregulation’ (Liu, Mingkang 2010a). To cope with the increase in credit risk, the CBRC drew upon this 
approach. In 2009, the CBRC raised capital adequacy standards and increased loan loss provisioning 
requirements in order to develop a counter-cyclical buffer. The minimum capital adequacy ratio was 
raised from 8% to 10% for small and medium-sized banks and to 11% for systemically important banks. 
The provisioning coverage ratio was raised from 100% to 130% and again to 150%. New guidelines were 
issued requiring banks to hold more liquid assets to reduce liquidity risk (CBRC 2010, 46). 
 
The 2008 financial crisis provided an important warning to Chinese regulators about the dangers of 
financial contagion, excessive leverage, financial innovation and short-term behaviour by executives. 
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The CBRC issued a number of regulations to prevent credit risk spreading to the capital markets and the 
real estate sector. In 2009, banks were prohibited from guaranteeing corporate bonds. Rules around the 
disbursement of loans were strengthened to prevent the use of funds for stock trading. The deposit 
requirements and interest rates for real estate loans were increased (CBRC 2010, 49). In 2011, after 
some investigation, the CBRC issued the Regulation on Leverage Management of Commercial Banks, 
which ‘sets forth clear-cut fundamental principles for leverage ratio supervision and measurement 
methodologies’ (CBRC 2012, 61). Chinese regulators viewed the prevention of excessive leverage as 
fundamental in the prevention of speculation. The crisis also taught Chinese regulators that it was 
necessary to have supervisory oversight of the incentive schemes in financial institutions to avoid 
excessive risk-taking by banking executives. The failure of Western corporate governance in this respect 
reinforced the value of party governance within China’s corporate governance structure. The crisis 
underlined the CBRC’s position that China should not aspire to the excesses of financial innovation seen 
in the West and that derivative products must be simple, well understood by regulators and serve the 
needs of the real economy.   
 
Credit Risk: 
 
The fundamental risk to China’s banking sector after the crisis was credit risk due to excessive leverage. 
Between 2007 and 2011, when the impact of the stimulus plan was at its height, the balance sheets of 
Chinese financial institutions grew by 92% (Xiao Geng and Sheng, Andrew 2014). While China acted 
quickly to mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis, it was faced with a slowing domestic and 
global economy with reduced trade flows. In 2014, Xi Jinping confirmed that China would have to adapt 
to the ‘new normal’ of a lower economic growth rate (Bloomberg.com 2014). The new economic 
conditions challenged China’s model of export-led growth supported upstream by its large SOEs. 
Premier Li Keqiang stated at the National People’s Congress that ‘systemic, institutional and structural 
problems have become ‘tigers in the road’ holding up development’ (Branigan 2015). The stimulus plan 
directed credit to industries such as mining, energy, and steel. The excess capacity created by this 
investment was compounded by weak global demand, leading to sustained low profitability in these 
sectors. Weak global demand had negatively impacted the manufacturing sector. The level of debt and 
consequent financial risk was greatest with respect to local governments and SOEs. The diminished 
ability of debtors to service debts not only represented a huge credit risk for China’s banking sector but 
drove further borrowing. From the end-2007 to end-2015, China’s credit to GDP ratio rose from 148% to 
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255% of GDP (Evans-Pritchard 2016). The reduction in viable commercial projects pushed lending 
towards areas where there was a greater dependency on collateral. Local governments relied heavily on 
the use of land sales to repay debt. Speculators borrowed heavily from banks to invest in China’s 
housing market. Real estate loans rose from 3.7 trillion RMB or 15% of total loans in 2006 to 17.4 trillion 
or 20% of total loans in 2014 (Liao Min, Sun Tao, and Zhang Jinfan 2016).  Construction and real estate 
sectors reached a combined 12% of GDP by 2011 (Lu Yinqiu and Tao Sun 2013, 11). 
 
 
Figure 5: China Total Debt (% of GDP) 
 
[FIGURE REDACTED FOR REASONS OF COPYRIGHT]    
 
Source: Evans-Pritchard 2016. 
 
External commentators suggested that China’s debt problem could cause a global financial crisis. 
Investor George Soros suggested that the problem ‘eerily resembles what happened during the financial 
crisis in the U.S. in 2007-08, which was similarly fueled by credit growth’ (Kishan, Cao, and Ye Xie 2016). 
Much of the increased funding had been accessed from commercial banks through NFBIs, meaning it 
was off bank balance sheets (IMF 2014). Markus Rodlauer, deputy director of the IMF’s Asia-Pacific 
department, commented that ‘the level of financial and corporate debt and the complexity of the 
financial system and rapid growth in shadow banking is on an unsustainable path’ (Bulman, May 2016). 
Speculative investment through the shadow banking system contributed to increased volatility in 
China’s stock markets, which fell 30% in three weeks over June and July 2015 (Duggan 2015). Once again, 
the state faced criticism from those advocating a free market, neoliberal financial system. Shortly after 
the stock market fall, former Treasury Secretary and chief executive of Goldman Sachs Henry Paulson 
called for China to increase the pace of financial liberalisation and to fully open the sector to foreign 
financial institutions as a means to reduce market volatility. Paulson implied that the issue at hand was 
China’s ideological opposition to markets, saying that it was ‘no surprise that those ideologically 
opposed to markets would use recent events to make the opposite argument - that to prevent market 
instability, Beijing should slow the pace of financial liberalisation or perhaps even abandon market-
based reforms altogether’ (Paulson 2015).  
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For the Chinese state, the solution was not financial liberalisation but rather improved supervision and 
regulation of areas of the banking sector exposed to this new credit risk.  While concerns regarding the 
stability of China’s banking sector recalled the events surrounding the AFC, the state was undoubtedly in 
a stronger financial position post-GFC. The level of the central government’s net assets and foreign 
exchange reserves, equal to 192% and 21% of GDP at end-2011 and end-2013 respectively, indicated 
there was no threat of national insolvency or a foreign exchange crisis (Xiao Geng and Sheng, Andrew 
2014). Nevertheless the Communist Party was extremely concerned about the risk that leverage posed 
to financial stability. Comments from an ‘authoritative person’, published in the People’s Daily, 
communicated the view of the party’s core that ‘a tree cannot grow to the heavens, high leverage 
inevitably brings about high risk, which if not controlled can trigger a systemic financial crisis, leading to 
economic recession and even eat up the savings of ordinary people, which is fatal’. The continued use of 
leverage to push growth was considered by the interviewee as ‘having one’s cake and eating it too’. 
Structural reforms of the economy, therefore, were the central theme of economic reforms going 
forward, which according to the official was a ‘war that could not afford to be lost’ (Gong, Wen 龚雯, Xu, 
Zhifeng 许志峰, and Wu, Qiuyu 吴秋余 2016). The continued focus on regulation and supervision was 
part of an overall strategy aimed at improving the efficiency of capital allocation to SOEs and 
government entities in order to reduce NPL creation and lower the risk of financial instability. 
 
The party also sought to reduce credit risk by improving the efficiency of its SOEs through reform of its 
mixed ownership model. In the Communiqué of the 3rd Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, the party 
prioritised the ‘transformation of government functions’ as a means to ‘unwaveringly consolidate and 
develop the publicly owned economy’ (CCP 2013). Former Communist Party Secretary and Deputy 
Director of the State Council Development Research Centre Chen Qingtai has proposed that the 
cornerstone of SOE reform going forward be the shift from ‘managing SOEs’ to ‘managing state-owned 
assets’ (Qingtai Chen 2014b). If implemented, under this policy the state would withdraw from direct 
ownership of SOEs and develop its role as an investor of state-owned capital. Chen expects the 
liberation of SOEs from government intervention to accelerate market-orientated behaviour, foster 
creativity and innovation, and liberate productive forces (Qingtai Chen 2012). Improvements in the 
efficiency of SOEs would reduce credit risk directly while the state’s enhanced role as an investor would 
provide it with greater flexibility to prevent the misallocation of capital to sectors with overcapacity. The 
withdrawal of direct state ownership would also enable a full transition to a market economy in which 
enterprises with different ownership models would be subject to an equal and unified system of market 
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regulation. The liberation from ownership responsibilities would enable the state to direct more 
resources to the supervision and regulation of markets and to the provision of public services (Qingtai 
Chen 2014a). The state would focus on establishing investment funds to maximise the profits of state-
owned capital which could be held by social security and public welfare funds so that profits accrued 
could be used to benefit society. The state has already developed an entity which serves as the principal 
investment fund for centrally controlled banks, Central Huijin Investments. The clear focus of Huijin in 
this role of investor distinguishes it from SASAC, whose role of ‘managing people, business and assets’ is 
the ‘hub of many current institutional conflicts’ (Qingtai Chen 2014b). The reform of Bocom’s mixed 
ownership model, which explores concepts of employee shareholding plans and stock options, has the 
potential to serve as a template for future ownership reform of China’s largest banks (Wildau 2015c).  
 
After the crisis, the state sought to mitigate credit risk in industries with overcapacity. In late 2015, 
Premier Li Keqiang reiterated his commitment to this policy, stating: ‘We must summon our 
determination and set to work. For those ‘zombie enterprises’ with absolute overcapacity, we must 
ruthlessly bring down the knife’ (Wildau 2016a).  In the short to medium-term, the CBRC had a crucial 
role in instructing banks how to improve their credit structure, following the requirements of 
‘absorption, transfer, consolidation and phase-out of overcapacities’ and the principle of ‘conforming to 
the rules, adopting differentiated industrial policies, and addressing both symptoms and root causes’. 
Policy guidance and planning was enhanced to reduce credit risk from loans to overcapacity industries 
(CBRC 2014, 35, 56). The CBRC Shanghai office was praised for its efforts to reduce Shanghai banks’ 
exposure to steel traders from RMB 220bn in 2011 to 21.4bn in 2016. Close supervision of the steel 
industry allowed regulators to detect a number of illegal practices including fake receipts, improper use 
of steel holdings as collateral, and the use of loans for unrelated speculative activities (Liao 2016).    
 
Local Government debt: 
 
Following the implementation of the stimulus plan, the increasing indebtedness of local governments 
rapidly became an issue which had the potential to threaten the stability of China’s financial system. It is 
important to distinguish this phenomenon from the type of speculation that occurred in the United 
States housing market prior to the global financial crisis. Local government debt in China was not built 
up through speculative activities which were disconnected from the real economy. The implementation 
of projects through local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) was a vital part of the stimulus plan 
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which reflected the important role of local government throughout reform in the provision of a wide 
range of services related to infrastructure and social welfare  (World Bank 2016b). According to CBRC 
Chief Advisor Andrew Sheng, ‘China’s massive infrastructure investment, funded largely through LGFVs, 
will most likely be remembered for its critical contribution to the country’s economic modernization’ (A. 
Sheng n.d.). Infrastructure projects, such as those relating to roads or utilities, typically have a stable 
and recurring revenue stream based on the monopolistic position of local governments as the sole 
provider of infrastructure. Local government infrastructure investment prior to the crisis was funded 
through long-term loans from China Development Bank which suited the nature of returns on 
infrastructure investment (A. Sheng n.d.). After the crisis, the need for LGFVs to rollover existing 
infrastructure loans or take on new short- or medium-term loans reflects the maturity mismatch which 
occurred during the implementation of the stimulus plan rather than any fundamental misallocation of 
capital.   
 
After the crisis, the banking sector as a whole took responsibility for the increase in lending to local 
governments. According to the IMF, while the MOF raised RMB 200b for local government spending, the 
majority of funding needs for the stimulus plan were met through bank loans supported by CBRC and 
PBoC guidance (Lu Yinqiu and Tao Sun 2013, 21). As by law local governments were unable to borrow 
directly without central government approval, LFGVs were utilised to finance infrastructure projects. 
According to IMF estimates, more than 80% of LGFV debt at the end of 2010 was comprised of bank 
loans, which in turn represented 15% of total corporate bank loans (Lu Yinqiu and Tao Sun 2013, 9). A 
national audit of local government debt undertaken by the National Audit Office (NAO) revealed the 
stock of local government debt to be equivalent to RMB 10.7 trillion as of the end of 2010. Of this, 4.97 
trillion RMB was acquired through LGFVs (Lu Yinqiu and Tao Sun 2013, 5). A further audit by the NAO 
dated to June 2013 revealed that local government debt had risen 67% to RMB 17.9 trillion, around one 
third of GDP (The Economist 2014). According to the audit, LGFV debt stood at RMB 7.0 trillion at end-
June 2013 (Jin Hui and Rial 2016, 5). Of this, local governments had guaranteed debt worth RMB 2.7 
trillion and had implicitly guaranteed a further RMB 4.3 trillion (The Economist 2014).  
 
The risks posed by LGFVs and local government debt had many of the same components as the financial 
risks seen during the Asian financial crisis. As lenders, banks were subject to the same concept of moral 
hazard. There was an assumption that local government would bailout LGFVs if in trouble and that local 
governments themselves would not be allowed to fail. As a consequence, banks put less emphasis on 
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the commercial circumstances of the borrowing vehicle. Banks also took advantage of the stimulus plan 
to expand lending to LGFPs after the crisis. The non-transparent nature of local government finances, 
which included extra-budgetary revenue and expenditure, made it difficult for banks to assess credit risk. 
The complex networks of implicit and explicit guarantees from local governments or their subsidiaries to 
LGFVs and the provision of collateral (typically land or future government revenue) to gain funding 
greatly increased the challenge for banks. The dependency of local governments on land sales for 
revenue made them highly vulnerable to a potential collapse of the real estate market.  
 
Figure 6: Land Sales Revenue as a Share of Local Government Revenue 
 
[FIGURE REDACTED FOR REASONS OF COPYRIGHT]    
 
Source: Lu Yinqiu and Tao Sun 2013, 8. 
 
A collapse in the real estate market had the potential to spread to China’s financial sector, whose 
significant exposure to medium and long-term loans in both the real estate and construction sectors was 
exacerbated by the increase in local government debt. If LGFVs were unable to fund the repayment of 
loans through land sale, a significant proportion of loans to LGFVs were likely to become non-performing. 
The slowdown in the housing market after 2010 outside of China’s largest cities intensified concerns. An 
IMF working paper published in 2013 suggested that in the worst case scenario LGFP losses could lead to 
a bailout of banks, worsening problems of moral hazard and reducing the state’s capability to deal with 
future financial instability (Lu Yinqiu and Tao Sun 2013).     
 
The CBRC worked with the PBOC, MOF and the NDRC to mitigate the risk of local government debt to 
the financial sector. As banking regulator, CBRC’s major role was to guard against the increased credit 
risk. CBRC had been actively developing rules and regulations to improve monitoring and risk control by 
banks of LGFVs since they emerged in their current form in 2005. In 2009, the CBRC developed three 
immediate ‘bottom lines of defense’ against credit risk: banning package loans to local government, 
prohibiting banks from making large loans to local governments for commercially unviable projects and 
restricting lending to local governments with poor financial circumstances or lacking the necessary levels 
of internal control, corporate governance and risk management (CBRC 2010, 9). The syndication of loans 
was encouraged where possible to reduce loan concentration risk (CBRC 2010). In 2010, banks were 
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required by the State Council to review every loan to LGFVs, clarify the parties responsible for the loan 
and re-categorise the loan based on cash flow analysis. In the eyes of the regulators, it was vital that 
banks were aware of the risks of their current loan portfolio, had written off bad loans promptly and 
established adequate loan loss provisions to prepare for any losses (CBRC 2011a). In an attempt to 
reduce moral hazard, local governments were prohibited by the State Council from guaranteeing LGFV 
debt (Lu Yinqiu and Tao Sun 2013, 17). From 2012, CBRC advised banks to reduce their total stock of 
LGFV loans. Credit approval was given according to the principle of ‘securing credit for on-going projects, 
reducing credit for redundant projects and controlling credit for new projects’ (CBRC 2013, 67). 
Processes of loan classification and disposal were further refined, while by 2014 CBRC had developed a 
comprehensive statistical system which monitors the different forms of LGFV debt (CBRC 2015, 107). 
These measures were complemented by regulation of real estate lending designed to curb speculation 
and prevent a bubble in the property market.  
 
In August 2014, China issued a revised Budget Law which aimed to increase the transparency of local 
government debt by allowing local governments to issue bonds and prohibiting further borrowing 
through LGFVs. State Council Directive 43 introduced specific rules including the requirement for central 
government approval on local government debt issuance and any land sales for financing (A. Sheng and 
Ng 2016, 198). In 2015, bonds at a face value of RMB 3.8 trillion were issued by local governments, RMB 
3.2 trillion of which represented a transfer of existing debt which lowered the debt servicing costs of 
local government (Lockett 2016). Successful implementation of the Budget Law, through the prevention 
of off-budget borrowing and overcoming problems of moral hazard to develop more commercially-
orientated borrowing practices, is viewed by the IMF as fundamental for the state to maintain a stable 
debt to GDP ratio in the future and reduce the risk of contagion to the banking sector (IMF 2016a, 48). 
At the 2015 Davos Forum, Premier Li Keqiang asserted that China’s government debt risks were 
‘controllable’ (Xinhua News Agency 2015). 
 
Shadow banking: 
 
Another key area of risk that had developed in China’s financial sector was located in its shadow banking 
system, broadly defined by the Financial Stability Board as ‘the system of credit intermediation that 
involves entities and activities outside the regular banking system’ (FSB 2011, 3). The development of 
credit provision outside the formal banking system was vitally important as it allowed sectors of the 
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economy which were marginalised by the banking system to have access to credit. The traditional 
support of China’s banks for SOEs along with the financial repression of the regular banking sector 
through lending quotas and interest rate regulations had limited the access of other firms to credit. The 
shadow banking sector grew rapidly from 2010, driven by the growth of wealth management products. 
According to a CBRC official, the development of WMPs is considered as a trial for interest rate 
liberalisation (Interview with CBRC official, 12 March 2015). Such products, which offer a higher return, 
can promote the development of a more commercially-orientated allocation of credit and allow banks 
to develop increased capability to price risk.  Despite this rapid growth, non-bank credit intermediation 
remains at an early stage of development in China. The FSB estimated global shadow banking at 120% of 
GDP in 2014, while the IMF estimated shadow credit products in China to be approximately 58% of GDP 
in 2016 (FSB 2014; IMF 2016b).    
 
While policymakers encouraged the development non-bank credit intermediation in order to promote 
more commercially-orientation of credit, it also became a source of risk.  Shadow banking contributed to 
the development of what the IMF terms ‘an increasingly large, leveraged, interconnected, and opaque 
financial system’ (IMF 2016a, 10). The strong degree of interconnectivity between the banking and 
shadow banking sectors greatly enhances the risk to the financial sector. According to the IMF, ‘much of 
the nonbank credit provision in China, excluding bond financing, has consisted of commercial banks 
doing bank-like business away from their own balance sheets’ (IMF 2014, 32). This may be achieved 
through the sale of trust products to wealthy clients or selling shares in WMPs. This extra layer of 
complexity has created a lack of transparency around the risks posed by the shadow banking sector. As 
Sheng and Ng point out, there is no accepted measure of the quantity of NPLs in the shadow banking 
system (A. Sheng and Ng 2016, 138). This lack of transparency has incentivised banks to shift loans off 
their books which are of poor quality. In doing so, banks avoid regulations on capital adequacy and are 
no longer required to make loan loss provisions. While the shadow banking sector assists SMEs, many 
loans are also made to LGFVs and real estate developers who have found it difficult to gain funding 
through the regular banking sector. The IMF estimates that RMB 19 trillion or around half of total 
shadow credit products can be categorised as high-risk as they have either poor quality loans (defined as 
‘nonstandard credit assets’) or equities as the underlying asset (IMF 2016b, 17–18). The responsibility of 
banks with respect to shadow products has not been well defined. However the expected yield of WMPs, 
for example, appears to be roughly the same regardless of whether an explicit guarantee exists or not 
(IMF 2014, 32). This likely indicates that investors in these products believe that there is an implicit 
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guarantee from either the partnering commercial bank or issuing financial institution, a belief supported 
by the past restructuring of WMPs in financial difficulty. This presents a problem of moral hazard as 
investors are less likely to consider the risk of the investment, while the potential for a bank bailout may 
also push NBFIs to engage in more risky behaviour. Shareholding banks and city commercial banks have 
a much greater exposure to shadow credit than the Big Four banks, whose exposure is equal to 
approximately 1-2% of assets or 10-15% of ‘loss-absorbing buffers’ (defined as combined equity and 
loan-loss reserves). In contrast, the exposure of smaller banks averaged 280% of total buffers (IMF 
2016c, 36). These smaller banks are more reliant on the interbank market for wholesale funding, which 
has surged from around 10% of total bank funding to over 30% between 2010 and 2015 (IMF 2016c, 37). 
This short-term borrowing has created another source of interconnectedness between banks and other 
financial institutions who are net lenders on the interbank market.   
 
Figure 7: China Shadow Assets as a Share of Capital Buffers (Percent) 
 
[FIGURE REDACTED FOR REASONS OF COPYRIGHT]    
 
Source: IMF 2016c, 36. 
 
The lack of transparency and regulatory coverage relative to the formal banking sector has given rise to 
unwelcome short-term financial innovations which have led to ‘financialisation, usurious lending, Ponzi 
schemes, fraud and outright abuse of controls and regulations’ (A. Sheng and Ng 2016, xxiii). The high 
yields offered by China’s peer-to peer lending sector, for example, has resulted in loans growing ten-fold 
between 2013 and 2015, reaching a total of RMB 982b (Bloomberg.com 2016). The lack of regulatory 
coverage in the P2P sector has allowed lending platforms to engage in a number of criminal practices, 
such as illegal fundraising, misappropriation of funds and other fraudulent behaviour. As of end-
September 2016, industry website Wangdaizhijia reported that while there were over 4000 platforms 
currently operating, more than 2000 platforms had closed down (“‘Wangdaizhijia Shuju’ 网贷之家数据 
[Wangdaizhijia Data]” n.d.). The central government and police reported that in 2015 illegal fundraising 
cases rose by 70% and involved funds totalling approximately RMB 250 billion and affected more than 
1.5 million people (Wang Yuqian 2016). In the worst case, a leading P2P service provider named Ezubo 
defrauded 900,000 people out of over RMB 50 billion in a Ponzi scheme which diverted funds to the 
founder’s own investment projects (Wang Yuqian 2016; Mitchell 2016). In August 2016, Fosun Chairman 
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Guo Guangchang went as far as to characterise the entire peer-to-peer sector as ‘basically a scam’ 
(Moshinsky 2016). 
 
The policy response of officials to the problems encountered in the shadow banking sector 
demonstrates the important role of NBFIs in allocating capital to the real economy. The state has not 
chosen to close down or restructure the NFBI sector as occurred during the 1980s and again after the 
Asian financial crisis. Instead the state has chosen to mitigate the risks of the shadow banking system 
and provide a regulatory framework which will encourage NFBIs to allocate capital in a safe manner to 
the real economy. The range of financial institutions involved in shadow banking activities necessitated a 
strong degree of cooperation between the CBRC, PBoC, CSRC and other regulatory agencies to develop 
regulation. In August 2013, the inter-ministerial joint meeting system for financial regulation and 
coordination was established by the State Council (State Council 国务院 n.d.). The first joint regulation 
issued, Notice 127 [2014] of the PBoC, standardised interbank lending in order to prevent banks 
channelling liquidity into shadow finance assets and thereby ‘accelerate the normalized development of 
asset securitization’ (CBRC n.d.). The State Council issued another notice in late 2013, jointly drafted by 
the CBRC and other agencies, which clearly defined supervisory responsibilities for shadow banking 
(CBRC 2014). With regards to WMPs, CBRC head Guo Shuqing stated in 2017 that ‘we [China’s regulatory 
agencies] are working on a joint regulation to set basic standards that every institution can follow’ 
(Xinhua News Agency 2017).  
 
The CBRC has worked to mitigate the risks of the shadow banking sector through greater transparency, 
enhanced regulation and supervision of shadow banking activities and the establishment of firewalls 
between the formal banking sector and the various parts of the shadow banking sector. The CBRC has 
issued regulations designed to move assets related to wealth management activities and trust business 
back on to bank balance sheets and for provisions to be made accordingly (CBRC 2012, 2013). The CBRC 
has also enhanced supervision and monitoring of bank off-balance sheet assets, drafting new rules for 
managing the off-sheet activities of commercial banks, increasing on-site examinations and developing a 
comprehensive system for credit classification, capital calculation and provisioning that covered off-
balance sheet assets as well as non-credit assets (CBRC 2014, 2015). Regulations issued have focussed 
on the partnership between banks and NFBIs. Banks were urged to review the financial circumstances 
and risk management capabilities of their business partners to prevent exposure to unwanted financial 
risk (CBRC 2013). Other regulations have been aimed at cleaning up these partnerships by improving 
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information disclosure and curbing illegal practices such as the use of wealth management funds for 
trust loans (CBRC 2012). CBRC has issued regulations which have limited the scope of trust activities to 
traditional trust business along with wealth management (A. Sheng and Ng 2016, 198). Trust companies 
have been banned from running non-standardised cash pool and trust bill business, absorbing interbank 
deposits and investing in open-ended securities and equities of non-listed companies (CBRC 2011a, 2013, 
2015). Banks were required to establish ‘an independent organizational and management system to 
strictly separate wealth management funds from banks’ own funds’, thereby reducing the risk of 
contagion (CBRC 2014, 109). The CBRC has introduced regulations which restrict the level of a bank’s 
WMP investments in ‘non-standard assets’ to 35% of total WMP assets or 4% of total bank assets. 
According to China Confidential, the Financial Times’ emerging markets research service, WMP 
investments in non-standard assets across the banking sector fell from 45% end-2012 to 25% by mid-
2014 (Xiao Qi 2014). The construction of an electronic information registry system has facilitated 
improved supervision of bank WMPs (A. Sheng and Ng 2016, 198).   
 
The inherent risks in the growing P2P lending and broader internet finance sector made the 
development of a comprehensive regulatory framework for the sector a priority for CBRC in 2016. In 
April, regulators in major centres of P2P lending including Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen temporarily 
stopped approval of new financial services firms in an attempt to bring order to the sector (H. Wu 2016). 
In developing a regulatory framework for P2P lending and other forms of internet finance, the CBRC has 
employed the same pragmatic approach seen throughout reform and opening of issuing a series of 
exploratory regulations. The exploratory regulations were replaced by a set of comprehensive 
regulations on internet finance issued in August 2016, the Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Healthy 
Development of Internet Finance (Guiding Opinions), jointly issued by the CBRC and nine other ministries 
or government bodies (HKMB 2015b). Regulators leveraged off international experience in developing 
these regulations, with particular consideration given to the US and UK where P2P platforms were 
already well developed and of significant scale (Interview with CBRC official, 17 March 2015). The 
regulations limit the scope of activities undertaken by P2P lending platforms which are forbidden from 
raising money for their own projects, pooling funds from lenders and guaranteeing investors a specific 
rate of return (Wildau 2015e, 2016b). The rules are designed to establish a clear firewall between P2P 
platforms and other financial sectors. Platforms are not permitted to take deposits, sell wealth 
management products or asset management plans, use funds for mortgage down payments, engage in 
crowd-funding and asset securitisation, or re-package and sell debts from trust companies or investment 
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funds (Wang Yuqian 2016; Wu Hongyuran 2015). The new rules required P2P platforms to entrust 
lenders’ funds with banks to prevent fraud (Wu Hongyuran 2015). To increase transparency and 
promote investor education, P2P platforms are required to disclose to borrowers and lenders their role 
as a financial intermediary, review lender and borrower qualifications and notify investors regarding the 
risk profile of borrowers (Wildau 2015e; Wang Yuqian 2016).   ‘The era of wild growth in Internet finance 
has ended and a new spring has finally come’, said Liu Yang, chief executive officer of leading platform 
Miniu98.com (Wong 2015). 
 
Party Initiatives to Reduce Expenditure and Stop Corrupt Practices: 
 
In response to the adverse economic conditions in the financial sector, the party utilised its control over 
personnel to reduce bank expenditure by lowering salaries, including those of the senior executives of 
China’s largest banks. In 2015 the salaries of the chairman and presidents of China’s five largest banks all 
fell by approximately 50%. As a former senior researcher of Development Research Center of State 
Council pointed out, it was more appropriate to compare China’s banking executives with senior 
government officials than with foreign bankers (Interview with Wang Dashu, 25 March 2015). ICBC 
chairman Jiang Jianqing’s salary of RMB 550,000 was equivalent to just 0.3% of JP Morgan Chase & Co 
CEO Jamie Dimon’s salary of US$27 million (Reuters 2016, 2). The support of banking executives for this 
policy was directly related to their identity as bureaucrats who, in keeping with the role of scholar-
officials in China’s history, had desire for higher political office. The chairman of CCB, Wang Hongzhang, 
voiced his support for the pay cuts: ‘Cutting salaries was an extremely correct decision by central 
authorities and is a good policy to solve the problem of fair pay for leadership cadres’ (Wildau 2015b). 
CCB head Zhang Jianguo’s surprising claim that China’s banks were ‘a disadvantaged group’, made at a 
meeting of the CPPCC, was met with great amusement by party leaders in attendance, including Premier 
Li Keqiang (Li, Jiaxin 李佳欣 2015). The economic slowdown also resulted in layoffs, with the ‘Big Four’ 
banks reporting a total reduction of around 25,000 workers in the first six months of 2016 (Dong Jing, 
Wu Hongyuran, and Han Wei 2016). 
 
Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign created shockwaves across the banking sector. Xi Jinping had 
warned in his first speech to the Politburo that corruption had the potential to ‘doom the party and the 
state’ by undermining their legitimacy (Bradsher 2012). The banking sector was a priority area for the 
campaign given the potential for financial instability and loss of public welfare as a result of corrupt 
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practices. Wang Qishan led the investigations into banking officials through his role as head of the 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the party institution responsible for the internal 
control of officials. The President of ABC, Zhang Yun, was demoted within the Communist Party 
following an investigation by the CCDI and was forced to resign from his position in December 2015 
(Cendrowski 2015). Li Changjun, former party chief and president of the Beijing branch of the Export-
Import Bank of China was detained after reportedly admitting to issuing letters of credit or guarantee 
for personal purposes (H. Wu, Zhang, and Wu 2017). Bank of Beijing board member Lu Haijun and Mao 
Xiaofeng, the president of Minsheng Bank (considered China’s first ‘private bank’), were other high 
profile causalities of the campaign (Wildau 2015a). In late 2015 the CCDI began a two month 
investigation of staff at regulators and financial institutions which included the CBRC, large state-owned 
banks and policy banks. CCDI investigators attributed cases of corruption to ‘a loosened grip by the 
party’. Investigations uncovered cases of officials taking bribes, misusing public funds and taking 
advantage of regulatory loopholes for private gain (Ren 2016). In April 2017 Yang Jiacai, assistant 
chairman of CBRC, was ‘reportedly placed under investigation in relation to a loan scandal in Hubei 
province’ (Zhuang 2017). This followed the detention of Xiang Junbo, head of the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission, that same month on suspicion of involvement in corrupt practices (Feng 2017). 
The CCDI reported in November 2015 that four bank regulators were demoted for a violating party 
procedures, including Wang Yanyou, Communist Party secretary at the China Banking Association and 
former head of the innovative supervision department (South China Morning Post 2015). Premier Li 
Keqiang explained the goal of the campaign: ‘We want to ensure that government power will be 
exercised with restraint and the government will live up to its due responsibilities to boost market 
vitality, eliminate the space for rent-seeking behaviour and uproot corruption’ (Barber, Pilling, and 
Anderlini 2015).       
 
Reducing Moral Hazard and Encouraging Efficient Allocation of Capital: 
 
The state implemented further reforms with the goal of reducing moral hazard and improving the 
efficiency of capital allocation. The overall vision for these reforms came from the 3rd Plenum of the 18th 
Party Congress, which stressed that the market had a ‘decisive function’ in the allocation of resources 
(CCP 2013). In May 2016, the State Council introduced a deposit insurance scheme which covered all 
deposit-taking financial institutions. The scheme protects deposits up to a maximum value of RMB 
500,000, enough to cover the savings of 99.63% of China’s depositors (HKMB 2015a). Chinese officials 
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viewed the deposit insurance scheme as part of a ‘market-based framework to prevent moral hazard’ as 
it defines the parameters through which deposits are protected in the case of bank failure (IMF 2016a, 
26). The state’s intention to maintain a harder budget constraint in the financial sector was further 
demonstrated by the advent of defaults in the mainland corporate bond sector from 2014, notably 
affecting the so-called ‘zombie’ SOEs. Creating the necessary conditions for bank failure was important 
not only to reduce moral hazard but also to support other market-orientated reforms such as the 
liberalisation of interest rates and introduction of private banking institutions. In October 2015 the last 
remaining controls on interest rates, namely ceilings for term deposits, were removed. This signified the 
completion of China’s gradual liberalisation of interest rates, a process which has stimulated banks to 
price risk more effectively and to pay greater importance to asset quality.  
 
Figure 8: Market Share (by assets) of Banking Institutions (2003-2015) 
 
[FIGURE REDACTED FOR REASONS OF COPYRIGHT]    
 
Source: CBRC 2016, 26.  
 
To ensure that the banking sector was able serve the real economy, regulators continued to develop all 
types of banking institutions. As Figure 8 above demonstrates, shareholding banks, city commercial 
banks and rural financial institutions continued to increase in scale and gain market share relative to the 
large state-owned banks. These banking institutions made an invaluable contribution to China’s 
economic development. Each type of banking institution served a particular purpose. City commercial 
banks have had a natural focus on the provincial economy and have served the needs of small and 
medium-sized enterprises. The governance and risk management reforms of these banks, as noted in 
the previous chapter, are ongoing and subject to constant improvement. The merger of financial 
institutions has been commonplace in the formation of city commercial banks and rural commercial 
banks. It has facilitated the pooling of financial resources which has strengthened these institutions and 
provided the foundations for more rapid transformation. Bank of Jilin, originally established as 
Changchun City Commercial Bank in 1997, was created through a merger with Jilin and Liaoyuan City 
Commercial Banks. Regulators approved the subsequent absorption of other city commercial banks in 
Jilin province and the strategic partnership with South Korea’s Hana Bank in an effort to allow the bank 
to develop the scale and knowledge to serve Jilin’s economy effectively (Reuters n.d.). Zhongyuan Bank 
signed an agreement with the Grameen Trust to establish the Grameen microcredit programme ‘based 
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on the principle of social business’. The bank, which was formed in 2014 through the merger of 13 
commercial banks, will cooperate with experts from Grameen Trust to develop pilot branches in Henan 
province. If successful, the pilot will form the basis for the expansion of the microloan program across its 
nationwide branch network (The Daily Star 2016).  
 
In March 2014 CBRC head Shang Fulin announced that the state had approved the establishment of five 
private banks with a total of ten private investors (Gough 2014). According to a CBRC official, the state 
placed importance on the emergence of private banks to serve the needs of the real economy and 
particularly small enterprises. The official pointed out that this was an appropriate time for the 
introduction of private banks given the banking sector’s relatively advanced stage of regulatory 
development and the continued growth of the SMEs which had created ‘bottlenecks’ for bank capital 
(Interview with CBRC official, 12 March 2015). The most important criteria for selecting private banks 
were the ability of banks to manage risk, the attitude of investors towards regulation, the track record of 
investors in business, and the amount of net capital. It was also important for each bank to have a 
differentiated strategy and market positioning (CBRC 2015, 37). By now a few large private corporations 
had emerged in China, such as Tencent and Alibaba, which became major investors in pilot banks 
registered in Shenzhen and Zhejiang provinces respectively. These two banks, WeBank and MYbank, 
were highly innovative in that they did not have brick and mortar branches, while Alibaba and Tencent 
hoped to utilise ‘big data’ from small businesses using Alibaba’s Taobao online trading platform and 
Tencent’s social networking platform to improve lending decisions. Tencent and Alibaba had already 
established strong footholds in internet finance through recent highly successful ventures into internet-
based money market funds and payment platforms. The five banks were part of a pilot program which 
would allow for the pragmatic development of a regulatory framework for private banks. CBRC 
announced in June 2016 its intention to consider further applications to expand the pilot on private 
banking (Reuters 2015, 2). 
 
China’s Global Engagement: 
 
After the 2008 financial crisis, China sought to promote its philosophy of close regulation of the financial 
sector to preserve global financial stability. To achieve this, China took on a more leading role in the 
governance of a global financial system which its leaders viewed as fundamentally unstable. This was of 
vital importance to China’s own financial stability given the increasingly interconnected nature of the 
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global financial system and the strong emphasis globally on a shared set of regulatory principles and 
standards. Prior to the crisis, China did not have a strong voice in institutions of global financial 
governance. Western developed countries had designed and controlled these institutions, beginning 
with establishment of the global lender of last resort in a crisis, the IMF at the Bretton Woods 
Conference in 1944. The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Forum were 
later established by the G10 and G7 respectively. In Asia the voting rights of the Asian Development 
Bank have been dominated by Japan, the United States and European countries, with the president a 
Japanese citizen by convention. Together these countries promoted a regime of financial liberalisation 
and deregulation of the global financial system in an era described by financial crisis historian 
Kindleberger as ‘…the most tumultuous in international monetary history’ (Kindleberger and Aliber 2005, 
277). In a 2015 interview, Li Keqiang stated: ‘We are ready to continue to play our role in building the 
current international financial system. We are also ready to work with other countries to help make the 
system more just, reasonable and balanced’ (Barber, Pilling, and Anderlini 2015).  
 
Figure 9: China's Growing Voice in Global Financial Institutions 
 
[FIGURE REDACTED FOR REASONS OF COPYRIGHT]    
 
Source: Jacques 2008 
 
China’s voice in the governance of the global financial system grew after the GFC. Former Minsheng 
bank President Dong Wenbiao commented that in 2004 Chinese representatives felt like ‘sitting at the 
back’ during World Bank meetings (Dong Wenbiao, Chairman of Minsheng Bank 2014). Post-GFC, 
China’s banks had now become some of the largest in the world in terms of capital, enhancing the 
legitimacy of China’s regulatory philosophy. Many of the foreign financial institutions which had 
invested in China’s banks sold much or all of their stakes after the crisis with some seeking badly needed 
capital from China’s financial sector. In late 2007, China Investment Corporation made a US$5 billion 
dollar investment in Morgan Stanley (Santini and Areddy 2007). Furthermore, given severity of the crisis, 
its resolution demanded a solution which required institutional change that would allow the 
participation of all major economies in global financial governance. Martin Wolf wrote that the frequent 
G20 summits following the financial crisis demonstrated how ‘the G20 has become the principal body 
driving the global response to the crisis’ (Wolf 2009). The G20, originally established ‘with the aim of 
studying, reviewing, and promoting high-level discussion of policy issues pertaining to the promotion of 
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international financial stability’, served to coordinate countries’ response to the crisis and reform of the 
international financial system (Ramachandran 2015). In 2009, China was a member of the G20 working 
group ‘Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency’. China participated in the drafting 
of ‘Strengthening Prudential Supervision’, a policy proposal for the 2009 G20 summit in London (CBRC 
2010, 63). The decision to replace the Financial Stability Forum, established by the G7, with the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB), with all G20 states as members, followed this same pattern. The FSB ‘promotes 
international financial stability’ by ‘coordinating national financial authorities and international 
standard-setting bodies as they work toward developing strong regulatory, supervisory and other 
financial sector policies’ (FSB 2017). In 2009 China became a member of both the FSB and the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. The CBRC was delegated one of China’s three seats on the FSB and 
has actively participated in its work, while Chairman Liu Mingkang was appointed FSB’s vice chairman of 
the Standing Committee on Supervisory and Regulatory Cooperation (CBRC 2010, 63). From this point, 
‘CBRC has been actively engaged in standard-setting under the BCBS in a multi-leveled, substantial 
manner’ (CBRC 2010, 63). Liu Mingkang commented that ‘we will use these positions as an opportunity 
to share views, draw lessons and contribute to enhancing supervision both in China and internationally. 
Together, we will build a more efficient and transparent international financial system’ (Liu, Mingkang 
2009). At the IMF, China’s voting rights eventually increased from 3.8% to 6% in late 2015, though 
strong resistance from US Congress delayed these reforms for 5 years. China’s voting share remained 
substantially lower than that of the US (16.5%), who did not give up its veto power (Asia Times 2015). 
China also had greater representation in the senior ranks of these organisations. For example former 
PBoC deputy governor Zhu Min served as deputy director of the IMF between 2011 and 2016, and was 
succeeded by another Chinese national, Tao Zhang. Liu Mingkang reflected that ‘cooperation and 
exchanges among regulators will not only promote the financial prosperity and stability, a cornerstone 
of our mission, but also safeguard the world civilisation in a larger sense’ (Liu, Mingkang 2008a). 
  
In October 2013, China’s leaders announced the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank with the goal to ‘address the daunting infrastructure needs in Asia’ (AIIB n.d.). The bank is closely 
linked to China’s One Belt, One Road initiative to develop infrastructure and commercial relationships 
through building ‘on the history of ancient trade networks and cultural interaction between China and 
Central and Southeast Asia’ (Nolan n.d.). Premier Li Keqiang emphasised China’s desire to ‘work with 
others to uphold the existing international financial system’, further explaining that ‘[The AIIB] is 
intended to be a supplement to the current international financial system’ (Barber, Pilling, and Anderlini 
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2015). While China has the largest voting share with 28%, the bank has a policy of openness and 
inclusivity and has 57 founding members from within Asia and beyond (AIIB 2016).  
 
As the CBRC strengthened its engagement with the international financial community, international 
standards of banking regulation issued by the BCBS became increasingly important. While China had 
delayed full compliance with Basel II, which it considered to be unsuitable for banks in emerging 
markets, it largely adopted new rules and regulations issued by BCBS. Compliance with both Basel II and 
III, which occurred over 2012 and 2013, was actually achieved through a gradual incorporation of 
international standards within the domestic regulatory framework. The comprehensive regulations for 
capital requirements issued in 2010, for example, combined the knowledge of a series of rules issued 
post-Basel I.  After the financial crisis, new amendments to international regulatory policies issued by 
BCBS formed the basis of regulations designed to mitigate risk including those related to capital 
management, leverage and liquidity risk. China adjusted the statistical rules for its off-site surveillance 
system to reflect the new ratios required by BCBS. A CBRC official responsible for the implementation of 
Basel II and III stated that the priority was to ensure that implementation was achieved in a manner 
suitable to national conditions (Interview with CBRC official, 13 March 2015). A peer review 
administered by BCBS in September 2013 assessed China as ‘compliant’ with Basel II’s risk-based capital 
standards, the highest of four possible grades. China’s capital requirements were higher and applied 
more broadly than the minimum required Basel standards (BCBS 2016).   
 
Chinese officials also utilised their representation in international organisations to advance their views 
on the risks posed by the global financial system. In a meeting of the IMF in 2010, Zhou Xiaochuan made 
a statement calling for reform of the international monetary system, stating that ‘the current global 
financial crisis is… primarily the result of the inappropriate financial sector in developed countries’. Zhou 
further emphasised that the ‘primary risks to the global economy come from developed countries’ and 
that the instability of capital flows from developed countries causes problems for emerging market 
economies. He also made specific suggestions for elements of financial sector reform in developed 
countries and asked the IMF to ‘strengthen surveillance over developed countries, mature financial 
markets, and cross-border capital flows, in order to avoid a recurrence of the crisis’ (Zhou Xiaochuan 
2010).  
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Conclusion: 
 
This chapter has demonstrated how China’s leaders sought to mitigate risk in the banking sector 
following the advent of the global financial crisis. While the banking sector’s capacity to deal with the 
crisis had been greatly enhanced by the dramatic improvement in capital adequacy and NPL rates 
recorded during the early to mid-2000s, new forms of financial risk emerged which were associated with 
the implementation of the stimulus plan and adverse global economic conditions. In the face of this risk, 
the first CBRC chairman Liu Mingkang advocated supervisory practices which were ‘invasive and 
interactive, keeping an eye on what banks are doing’ (Liu, Mingkang 2010b). He also advocated the use 
of simple regulatory tools to address complex regulatory problems (Liu, Mingkang 2009). In areas of high 
credit risk, regulators enhanced supervision and strengthened regulation, improved transparency, 
developed firewalls to prevent financial contagion and ensured that banks set aside adequate provisions 
for losses. The problem of moral hazard was addressed by encouraging more commercial-orientated 
borrowing practices, while the development of a deposit insurance scheme should pave the way for a 
bankruptcy law specific to financial enterprises. The ‘regulatory windstorm’ unleashed by new CBRC 
chairman Guo Shuqing has demonstrated his intent to tackle the problem of financial risk in a forceful 
manner. Under Guo, CBRC has pledged to ‘thoroughly examine and rectify the problem of transactions 
with too many participants, complex structures and excessively long chains’ through which funds ‘take 
leave of the real and enter the virtual’ (Wildau 2017).  China’s system of party governance played an 
integral role in reducing risks associated with officials, ensuring that levels of executive compensation 
reflected the adverse economic conditions and removing corrupt officials and stamping out corrupt 
practices. The capability of China’s leaders to restructure its economy and allocate capital more 
efficiently will have a large bearing on the potential for all these measures to contain the risk posed by 
excessive leverage in the economy. Chinese regulators’ determination to guard against financial risk, 
almost certainly informed by Minsky’s idea of an inherently unstable capitalist economy, was in stark 
contrast to the culture of deregulation and unbridled financial innovation advanced by America’s 
politicians, regulators and bankers that was ultimately behind the global financial crisis. The advent of 
the crisis both demonstrated the need for China to advance its own ideas on how to establish a more 
stable global financial system and provided it with a greater opportunity to do so through institutions 
such as the BCBS and the FSB.   
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Conclusion          
 
This thesis has answered the research question: ‘What factors explain the evolution of China’s banking 
system since the establishment of the socialist market economy?’ 
 
Part I: Summary 
 
The development of China’s banking system can best be understood as an evolution of institutions 
which reflect historical patterns of political and economic organisation in China. China’s leaders applied 
the concept of ‘Chinese studies at the base, Western studies for practical use’ (中體西用 zhongti xiyong), 
when adopting Western ideas and technology within China’s traditional political and economic system 
to modernise the banking sector (Suzuki 2009, 93; see also Levenson 1964). China transitioned to a 
modern banking system with deposit-taking and lending institutions, a modern central bank, and a 
system of financial regulation. It benefited greatly from the experience of others, incorporating 
technology and techniques from advanced countries and international bodies. However, modernisation 
of China’s banking sector did not equate to Westernisation. China’s highest officials, and not its financial 
technocrats or the international financial community, determined how reform would be implemented. 
The core institutional features that were particular to China, namely pragmatism, the focus on financial 
stability, and the strong influence of party governance, defined the character of the banking sector. The 
incorporation of outside ideas was conditional on their suitability for Chinese conditions. Ideas that were 
deemed by China’s leadership to be unsuitable, or even harmful, were resisted.  
 
Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Reform and Opening’ policy, implemented from 1978, provided the overarching vision 
of reform. The goal of this policy was to modernise China’s economy, thereby raising living standards 
and ensuring social stability for China’s people. As the name of the policy suggested, Deng advocated 
opening China to the ideas, technology and capital of more developed countries to enable China to 
catch up to the West. China’s leaders wanted the country, with its proud history as one of the world’s 
oldest and most stable and prosperous civilisations, to rise again (Nolan 2017). China had suffered the 
humiliation of military defeats and a loss of control of its borders to foreign powers, which contributed 
to its economic decline. Attempts to establish a modern banking sector after the Qing dynasty ultimately 
failed after the advent of the Second World War, while the banking sector under the planned economy 
suffered due to the ideological excesses of the Cultural Revolution and other movements. To achieve 
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this, Deng proposed a pragmatic approach to reform based on empirical evidence or ‘seeking truth from 
facts’. China’s reform path would depend on a gradual process of trial and error, as if ‘groping for stones 
to cross the river’. Deng’s ideas have remained highly influential ever since, with Xi Jinping vowing there 
would be ‘no stop in reform, and no stop in opening up’ (Xinhua News Agency 2012). Deng wanted 
China’s banks to play an active role in the modernisation of China’s economy by becoming ‘real banks’ 
which would be empowered to allocate capital for the purpose of promoting economic development 
and technological innovation (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 9). 
 
The below sub-sections draw out the major institutional features of the evolution of China’s banking 
system: 
 
China’s Bureaucratic Tradition: 
 
Policy for China’s banking sector was conceived and implemented by officials through a politically united, 
centrally controlled bureaucracy reflective of China’s bureaucratic tradition. Central to Confucian 
thought was the idea that officials should be virtuous and serve the interests of society as a whole in 
order to maintain legitimacy as rulers. The party remained deeply embedded within the banking sector 
during the period of research. The values and ideology of the party were transmitted through the party 
system to officials in the banking sector. Furthermore officials at the core of the party system, namely 
those within the Politburo and the Standing Committee, were responsible for the general direction of 
policy for China’s banking sector. Regulatory agencies such as the CBRC and PBoC were subject to party 
governance and the conceptions of reform which originated at the highest levels of the party. The 
existence of party committees within each bank served as part of the bureaucratic network through 
which banking officials were monitored, disciplined and reminded of their responsibilities as party 
members. The CCDI monitored and investigated high ranking officials.  Party institutions, of which the 
COD was the most prominent, controlled the appointments of officials within the banking sector. 
Currently the COD is responsible for the appointment of the executive board members of centrally 
controlled financial enterprises. China’s top bankers fundamentally identify themselves as officials with 
a political career within the bureaucratic system who wish to contribute to the country rather than 
simply as career bankers. The rotation pattern of officials to and from banking regulatory institutions 
and commercial banks, and to political positions beyond the sector, is indicative of this broader identity.          
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Party institutions of governance have adapted to the evolution of the banking sector. Before the advent 
of the socialist market economy, the decentralised nature of the banking sector, with its fragmented 
governance structure, created an environment in which local party officials were incentivised to 
prioritise domestic economic development ahead of national goals with respect to financial regulation, 
credit allocation and monetary policy. After the establishment of the socialist market economy, financial 
enterprises were unified and regulation became more prominent. Zhu Rongji emphasised to officials 
that maintaining financial order and respecting financial regulations was a core part of their duty as 
officials. In this way, officials remained central to governance of the banking sector even as banks 
became more autonomous with regards to commercial decisions. The mismanagement of financial 
institutions, corruption and fraud which occurred during a period of rapid economic development, 
culminating in the 1997 Asian financial crisis, prompted reform to party governance  of the financial 
sector. The CFWC was established to resolve these problems of financial order and refine the 
appointments system to enable greater central oversight of the large state-owned banks. It is from this 
time that Wen Jiabao, head of the CFWC, played a central role in the development of the banking sector. 
Wen worked closely alongside CBRC head Liu Mingkang to develop a system of corporate governance in 
banks which would complement party governance. Party officials at a high level viewed the pure 
imitation of a Western model of corporate governance as likely to lead to financial instability and chaos. 
It is widely speculated that party governance of the banking system was formalised in party documents 
in 2016, though it has not been possible to confirm this claim. The advantages of party governance were 
evident during China’s rapid implementation of a large-scale economic stimulus plan, led by the banking 
sector, in response to the 2008 financial crisis. The system of party governance has been central to 
efforts to mitigate risks that have emerged in the banking sector after the crisis. Official compensation 
has been reduced significantly to contain bank expenditure and an anti-corruption campaign has helped 
identify cases of official corruption in the banking sector. Former Communist Party Secretary and Deputy 
Director of the State Council Development Research Centre Chen Qingtai has proposed that future SOE 
reform be viewed as a shift from ‘managing SOEs’ to ‘managing state-owned assets’. If implemented, 
such a policy would likely require officials to govern without direct ownership of SOEs (Qingtai Chen 
2014a). The party system will continue to evolve as reform progresses, just as China’s bureaucratic 
institutions have been gradually refined over the past 2000 years.   
 
 
 
 
 
166 
 
Stability: 
 
When implementing policy for the banking sector, the first concern for China’s officials was always the 
stability of the financial system. China’s officials felt the same heavy weight of responsibility to provide a 
stable and prosperous society for its citizens as experienced by China’s scholar-officials in traditional 
Chinese society. Many of these officials, particularly those serving in the first two decades of Reform and 
Opening, had been sent down to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. They had first-hand 
experience of the devastating impact of instability brought about by the Cultural Revolution and other 
ideological movements. Stability had been a central focus of traditional Chinese political thought as 
officials attempted to find ways to solve fundamental problems of food production, famine, water 
supply and prevent the fall of a dynasty which inevitably brought great misfortune to the population.  
 
The emphasis on stability fundamentally defined the approach of officials towards the regulation of a 
market system. The comments of China’s current General Secretary Xi Jinping, made to the Politburo in 
2014, that officials should ‘…make good use of the role of both the market, the “invisible hand”, and the 
government, the “visible” hand’ are indicative of this approach (Xi 2014, 128). As part of the gradual 
transition from the planned economy, China had to develop institutions of market governance and 
financial regulation. China’s officials saw it as their duty to maintain financial order and stability in the 
banking sector. While the incentives created by a more market-driven economy were a valuable 
instrument for modernisation, officials viewed financial markets as inherently unstable and requiring 
close supervision and regulation. China’s officials had paid close attention to the increasing number of 
financial crises occurring around the world as financial deregulation and liberalisation took hold from 
the 1970s. Institutions which would maintain financial order by monitoring and governing banks were 
established, refined and provided with greater resources and human capital. For bankers and regulators, 
the greatest challenge was to understand new concepts and adapt them effectively. The appointment of 
Vice Premier Zhu Rongji as head of the central bank shortly after the establishment of the socialist 
market economy facilitated the political empowerment of the central bank relative to local governments 
and central planning ministries.  This was reinforced by the 1995 Central Bank Law, which empowered 
the central bank by law to act as financial regulator and allowed for the issuance of financial rules and 
regulation on the basis of this power.  
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Banking regulators were preoccupied with the question of how to maintain financial order in the 
banking sector and render mechanisms of regulation effective throughout the reform period. As head of 
the central bank, Zhu helped make officials aware of their duty to support the healthy operation of 
China’s new banking regulatory framework. He also sought to maintain basic financial order through the 
issuance of regulations which addressed illegal financial activity and segregated banking operations from 
the security, trust and insurance sectors to minimise the risks of financial contagion. Regulators were 
concerned with how to devise and implement regulation to address fundamental issues such as the 
illegal establishment of financial institutions and the illegal financing which had undermined state policy 
efforts to direct capital to productive areas of the economy. The PBoC established and developed early 
systems of internal control such as its audit function. As part of reforms which transformed China’s 
banks from specialised banks to state-owned commercial banks, China introduced concepts of risk 
management, including asset and liability management and capital adequacy management, from 
advanced countries. The adoption of the BCBS’s 1988 Basel Accord for capital adequacy marked an 
important step in China’s journey towards the progressive adoption of international standards of 
financial regulation. China’s regulators continued to address the basic questions of how best to manage 
financial risk and maintain financial order by constantly updating and refining regulatory institutions.  
 
The Asian financial crisis alerted officials to the systemic risks posed by the insufficiently regulated global 
financial system. The sudden withdrawal of short-term capital flows brought countries affected by the 
crisis into recession and forced a cycle of currency devaluations in the region, leaving its banking 
systems with a lower net worth and higher levels of bad debt. The countries concerned had pursued an 
agenda of deregulation and financial liberalisation. Bail-outs by the IMF imposed conditions that 
undermined the economic sovereignty of governments. The threat of the global financial system 
manifested itself in China through a payments crisis suffered by China’s ‘red chips’ and ITICs  in 
Guangdong which had borrowed heavily from international commercial banks. This spread to other 
financial institutions and threatened the entire financial sector. Wang Qishan, the official entrusted by 
party leaders in Beijing with the responsibility to resolve the turmoil in Guangdong, balanced the 
potential economic instability created by closures and bankruptcies of financial institutions with the 
potential threat of future systemic risk. The bankruptcy of GITIC, in particular, served to reduce moral 
hazard and increase the accountability of China’s financial institutions.    
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The crisis defined a reform response which aimed to develop a more resilient banking system in the face 
of potential future external shocks. China’s officials implemented reform measures to reduce credit risk 
and develop a more robust system of regulation based on international standards to manage this risk. 
The state recapitalised China’s large banks to bring capital adequacy levels in line with the requirements 
of the Basel Accord. Officials studied the experience of other countries, including the Savings and Loan 
crisis in the U.S., to establish asset management companies for the large-scale purchase of NPLs from 
the large state-owned banks. The PBoC developed improved regulations for the recognition, 
investigation and reporting of NPLs. A new system of loan classification, based on international 
standards, was introduced which required officials to consider the quality and risks of all loans. Credit 
approval processes were standardised in large-state-owned banks, with loan assessment committees 
introduced at the branch level, providing a valuable check on the power of loan officers. Cases of large-
scale fraud at banks emerged as regulators and auditors began to address issues of operational risk.     
 
Officials made the decision to establish the CBRC in order to ensure the safety of China’s banking system. 
The creation of a new agency allowed China’s central policymakers to have a strong influence over its 
organisational culture. Liu Mingkang was selected to head the CBRC. Premier Wen and Liu maintained a 
close dialogue regarding the direction of the CBRC (Kuhn 2010, 270).  Liu had a reputation as a 
‘firefighter’ in the banking sector, having restored stability to two major banks caught up in corruption 
scandals. Under Liu, the CBRC successfully strengthened regulation and reformed the governance of 
state-owned banks, thereby reducing credit risk dramatically and allowing banks to build up a capital 
buffer to absorb future shocks. This was achieved through a regulatory philosophy of close, interactive 
regulation and supervision of banks along with the use of simple models and ratios to detect risk (Liu, 
Mingkang 2010a). CBRC successfully guided the large state-owned banks through shareholding reforms 
and listing. As a result, banks capacity to manage risk was enhanced by the implementation of a new 
two-tier corporate governance structure with independent non-executive directors that included a risk 
management committee, audit by international accounting firms, and a greater focus by Huijin and 
minority shareholders on commercial lending and profitability. Minority investors introduced prior to 
listing contributed valuable ideas and techniques for managing risk to China’s large state-owned banks. 
 
From 2008, the main focus for CBRC was to mitigate the new forms of financial risk which emerged as a 
result of the global financial crisis. To do so, the CBRC maintained its philosophy of close supervision and 
interaction with banking institutions. In areas of high credit risk, regulators enhanced supervision and 
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strengthened regulation, improved transparency, developed firewalls to prevent financial contagion and 
ensured that banks set aside adequate provisions for losses. Problems of moral hazard were addressed 
through the establishment of a deposit insurance scheme, creating the conditions for a forthcoming 
bankruptcy law for financial enterprises. 
  
The War of Ideas over Financial Regulation: 
 
China’s officials strived to adopt knowledge from the West in a manner which was suitable to China’s 
national conditions. China’s officials were faced with ideas about reform from self-interested Western-
educated bankers and government officials with a more sophisticated understanding of modern banking 
systems. China’s officials chose to adopt Western ideas selectively. Officials felt that the Western, 
neoliberal model had promoted a dangerous and insufficiently regulated global financial system which 
was vulnerable to financial crises. They rejected this neoliberal model in favour of a model which 
featured close supervision and regulation of the financial system. Liu Mingkang, for instance, was 
strongly opposed to Western-inspired trends of financial deregulation and innovation. The market was 
viewed as a ‘double-edged sword’ which had the potential to allocate resources more efficiently but 
from which financial instability and chaos could also emerge if not sufficiently regulated. In this respect, 
China’s officials were likely informed by theorists such as Minsky, who warned of the fundamental 
instability of markets.  
 
In acquiring ideas about financial regulation from the West, China’s officials were also wary of the 
economic self-interest of Western countries and their financial institutions. General Secretary Jiang 
Zemin pointed out that ‘developed Western countries have already made control of international 
finance a strategic measure for global control’ (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 454). The deregulation of the global 
financial services industry had given rise to the development of large financial conglomerates which had 
aggressively pursued cross border M&A deals across the developing world, with China viewed as the 
next major prize. Self-interested foreign financial institutions wished to gain control of China’s best 
financial assets, advocating financial deregulation, withdrawal of party governance from the sector, the 
break-up and privatisation of the large state-owned banks, and the introduction of foreign competition. 
This self-interest was advanced through an argument, supported by a neoliberal model, that Chinese 
officials needed to step aside and allow international financial conglomerates to take control of the 
financial sector in order to provide more efficient allocation of capital and market discipline. This 
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argument persisted beyond the 2008 financial crisis as demonstrated by Hank Paulson’s repeated claims 
that China needs to increase the pace of market reform and financial liberalisation (The Economic Times 
2008; Paulson 2015). 
 
The main purpose of engagement with the West was to adopt modern management practices, 
technology and international best practices in financial regulation to facilitate the development of a 
stable, well-regulated banking system which promoted economic development by serving the real 
economy. China’s officials established close dialogue with foreign regulators, bankers and international 
institutions from the beginning of reform and opening. After the establishment of the socialist market 
economy, China progressively adopted international standards of financial regulation, beginning with 
the 1988 Basel Capital Accord. The implementation of an international loan classification system 
followed consultation with PWC and other leading foreign advisers. The CBRC, which is guided by an 
International Advisory Council, has utilised Basel documents as the basis for domestic regulations on risk 
management. China’s banks and ATMs have depended on technology from Western corporations such 
as IBM, Hewlett Packard, Intel, and Microsoft (Nolan 2013, 115,118). Prior to listing, foreign firms were 
invited to act as minority investors in order to bring life to the new corporate governance structure and 
transfer knowledge of management practices and technological methods. International accounting firms 
regularly audit Chinese banks, a process which began as preparation for listing. After listing on the HKSE, 
China’s banks were exposed to an ‘international’ institutional setting with more rigorous laws and 
regulations.   
 
China’s officials have played a key role in defining the character of China’s banking system during this 
process of knowledge acquisition. Western technology and techniques were incorporated within a 
Chinese system. While there have undoubtedly been elements of convergence, China’s banking system 
has not converged substantially with any Western banking model. Throughout reform, important 
decisions made by officials have reflected China’s own reform priorities. While international firms were 
heavily involved in the restructuring of GDE and bankruptcy of GITIC, officials prioritised the stability of 
the financial system ahead of the interests of international creditors. China’s officials managed 
integration with WTO in the banking sector by introducing foreign competition to promote reform while 
limiting foreign control of China’s financial assets. The influence of the ideas of minority investors with 
respect to banking reform was restricted by strict ownership limits. Despite extensive consultation with 
international firms and examination of international case studies and reform proposals, Jiang Zemin 
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rejected the Western neoliberal discourse in favour of a shareholding reform which he described as ‘an 
important exploration of effective forms of public ownership’ (Du, Hua 杜华 2007, 458). Listing was part 
of a process of transformation of China’s financial enterprises which began at the start of reform and 
opening. China’s officials were wary of the risks of the U.S. model of corporate governance, which were 
laid bare during the 2008 financial crisis. To mitigate risk, China’s leaders integrated this system within 
the party’s own governance model and continued to refine systems of appointment and discipline of top 
officials while maintaining compensation levels far below levels seen in the West.  CBRC’s first head Liu 
Mingkang sought to apply principles of regulation that were abandoned by developed countries ‘during 
the frenzy [of] innovation and deregulation’ (Liu, Mingkang 2010a).   
 
Pragmatism: 
 
The pragmatic approach to reform advocated by Deng Xiaoping, for which he borrowed the Chinese 
idiom ‘seeking truth from facts’, was an important feature of institutional change in the banking sector. 
The overall goals of reform in the banking sector were clearly articulated, namely to liberate productive 
forces and modernise the economy, to aid in the transformation of SOEs and develop public 
infrastructure, to maintain financial stability and prevent financial chaos undermining the reform agenda.  
However policymakers did not have a fixed view for how to achieve these goals, or what the particular 
set of regulatory institutions needed to look like. The process of developing these institutions was highly 
exploratory and built on guiding documents such as the Commercial Bank Law and Central Bank Law. 
Even the most important regulations issued were provisional in nature, and comprehensive regulations 
were only issued after a series of trial regulations, a process which often took place over a number of 
years. The gradual incorporation of international standards aimed to ensure their suitability within 
China’s domestic regulatory framework. Officials were preoccupied with how best to regulate the 
socialist market economy and how to adapt party systems of governance as a regulatory system was 
established and banks became more commercially autonomous. Reform was often a reaction to 
observations or particular events which brought to light issues in the banking sector. The establishment 
of the socialist market economy was itself a response to a lack of financial stability and the need to 
empower banks to take on the responsibility of distributing capital to SOEs. The Asian financial crisis 
alerted officials to the dangers of premature integration into the global financial system and the 
systemic risk of NPLs. It defined a regulatory response which aimed to improve the credit culture and 
develop a more robust regulatory system. According to Wang Qishan, ‘the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
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helped us gain a deeper understanding of the need to establish principles for commercial credit in 
accordance with international practices’ (Qide Chen 1999). The creation of the CBRC was aimed to 
address weak bank supervision. It is argued that the decision taken under Wen Jiabao to establish a 
separate regulatory agency in 2003, the CBRC, was likely a pragmatic decision based on which 
institutional form was best suited to ensure the safety of the financial system. The incorporation of 
Western principles of corporate governance in China’s banks was a means to an end, with a view to 
improving asset quality by developing a new mechanism of governance. China made pragmatic efforts 
to mitigate the risks that emerged from the 2008 financial crisis. The rapidly implemented stimulus plan 
represented a major shift from long-term economic policy.  Series of regulations were issued to address 
areas of credit risk which emerged following the crisis such as the high level of local government debt or 
the opaque and under-regulated shadow banking sector.           
 
Part II: Research Contribution 
 
This thesis enables outsiders to better understand the reform path of China’s banking system since the 
establishment of the socialist market economy. It relies on primary sources which shed light on the 
thought processes of China’s officials with respect to reform of the banking system. The thesis’s 
characterisation of change in China’s banking sector as an institutional evolution is in contrast to the 
main body of literature, which evaluates its change according to the degree of implementation of free 
market policies. The thesis also makes a contribution to the research by making the argument of an 
institutional evolution over the particular timeframe of the research. It details the institutional change 
from the establishment of the socialist market economy, through the Asian financial crisis, shareholding 
reform and the reaction to the global financial crisis.   
 
This thesis uses original sources to shed light on banking reform in China over the research period in 
question. The views of Chinese officials on banking reform were obtained through ten semi-structured 
interviews with CBRC officials in CBRC headquarters in Beijing, primarily conducted in March and April 
2015. This perspective was further enhanced by interviews with a variety of past and present 
stakeholders in China’s banking system including current and former central bank employees, a member 
of the supervisory board of a centrally controlled financial enterprise, a former researcher at the 
Development Research Centre at the State Council, a partner at an international accounting and 
advisory firm, an economist at a foreign commercial bank, a former president of an occupation school 
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for the banking sector, and the former head of credit planning at a local commercial bank. Many of 
these interviews were conducted in Chinese. These original sources were supplemented by the use of 
Chinese language books and articles which have been rarely cited, if at all, in previous English language 
publications on China’s banking sector. ‘30 years of Reform and Opening in the Banking Industry’, edited 
by former head of CBRC and BoC Liu Mingkang, and ‘Jinrong Gongzuo Wenxian Xuanbian (1978-2005) 金
融工作文献选编 （一九七八——二 00五）’, a collation of speeches made by officials for the financial 
sector, are important examples.  
 
Institutional Evolution: 
 
This thesis contributes to the body of literature which views development in the context of an 
institutional evolution. Its conceptual framework relies on the work of Geoffrey Hodgson, who defines 
institutions as ‘systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions’ 
(Hodgson 2006, 18). Hodgson asserts that institutions are embedded in the country’s history, culture 
and politics. The implication is that historical patterns of political and economic organisation persist in 
institutions, making them path dependent and subject to an evolutionary process of development. This 
thesis has identified the main institutional features which explain the development of China’s banking 
system since the establishment of the socialist market economy. These account for the fundamental 
character of China’s banking system as it has gradually constructed institutions to regulate and govern 
the banking sector in the context of the market economy, while adopting technology and practices from 
developed countries.  
 
This approach can be contrasted with the orthodox view of reform, which attempts to use a single 
theoretical framework or universal laws and principles to analyse China’s banking system. The orthodox 
view utilises a single theoretical framework which is derived from neoliberalism and advocates for free 
markets and limited state intervention so as to maximise the efficiency of resource allocation through 
market forces. The principal work cited in this thesis which uses such a framework is Red Capitalism by 
Walter and Howie. In their characterisation of China’s banking system, Walter and Howie reject the 
premise that historical patterns of political and economic organisation are of importance, stating that 
‘China’s economy is no different from any other’ (Walter and Howie 2012, xvii). The orthodox view of 
reform is supported by the academic literature, institutions of global financial governance and by large 
international financial conglomerates and their governments. Its theoretical framework rejects the idea 
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of an active state to promote economic development and considers state intervention in the banking 
sector as detrimental to the efficient allocation of capital. The orthodox view of reform advocates for 
policies of financial deregulation and liberalisation. This thesis rejects the use of this theoretical 
framework to analyse the evolution of China’s banking system on the basis that it neglects historical 
patterns of political and economic organisation which have been central to the gradual, experimental 
reform which has occurred.   
 
Implications of China’s Reform Approach: 
 
China’s policymakers took a different path to that of other countries and this made all the difference to 
the outcome of China’s banking sector reforms. Officials chose to ‘grope for stones’ rather than the 
implement the ‘big bang’ approach to reform seen in many other developing countries. Global financial 
conglomerates have not succeeded in buying up China’s best financial assets and have only a small 
market share of the banking sector.  China has pursued its own model of reform which emphasises 
financial stability. Its regulatory philosophy allowed it to cope relatively well during the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis and 2008 global financial crisis. Given that the banking systems of China’s South East 
Asian neighbours were more advanced at the time, it is likely that if China had pursued policies of 
deregulation and an open capital account, its banking system would not have survived the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. At the least, managing the crisis may have required IMF intervention and the neoliberal 
policies attached to a bailout would have entailed a significant loss of economic sovereignty.  
 
The transformation of China’s banking sector could not have been achieved without the active, 
interventionist role of the state. The state was responsible for the gradual construction of institutions 
designed to closely supervise and regulate the market. Protectionist policies such as control over 
interest rates and the capital account have provided space for the stable transformation of China’s 
banks and facilitated regulatory development. This thesis has shown how the state played a 
fundamental role, determining the timing of reform based on national conditions and implementing 
reform in an ordered and balanced fashion. The state set the ultimate targets for banking reform, 
stressing that its banks should serve the real economy and ultimately the needs of society. In this way, 
the evolution of China’s banking system challenges basic ideas of market efficiency and efficient 
allocation of resources which do not take into account institutional control.  
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The state’s ability to drive constant improvement in the banking sector also separates it from other 
countries. They have turned what was an insolvent, poorly regulated banking system into one which is 
sustainably profitable, exceeds international standards of regulation and has a low rate of NPLs. China 
now has some of the largest banks in the world. As of 2015 the FT500, which provides an annual 
measure of the world’s largest companies, included 12 banks from China, more than any other country 
(“FT 500 2015” n.d.). China’s success can be attributed to a number of factors. China’s openness to 
external ideas and particularly its adoption of international best practices have been integral to raising 
regulatory and banking standards. Officials have been very open to ideas which would improve the 
banking sector’s ability to serve the real economy.  Throughout reform, central policymakers have been 
willing to release control of the banking system in order to promote its development. Competition from 
other financial institutions such as shareholding banks, city commercial banks and foreign banks has 
provided a continual stimulus for the reform and development of China’s large state-owned banks.  
 
China and the Future Governance of the Global Financial System: 
 
China’s increasing influence on institutions such as the G20, BCBS and the FSB will allow it to promote its 
own ideas on reform of the global financial system. The principal aim of reform for China will be to make 
the global financial system more stable. Its policymakers are very concerned about global financial 
stability, particularly given the high number of financial crises experienced in both the developing and 
developed worlds since the 1970s. After the recent global financial crisis, China has taken on a 
leadership role in the G20, which has become the de facto body responsible for policy discussions and 
initiatives for the reform of the global financial system. China also became an active member of both the 
FSB and BCBS after the crisis. It is likely that in the future China will continue to foster cooperation with 
other regulatory agencies and international institutions, and support the development of an 
international financial system with shared emphasis on close regulation and supervision. China will 
continue to raise concerns about the risks posed by financial systems in developed countries and the 
instability of cross border capital flows. China will strongly encourage developed countries to comply 
fully with the international banking standards set out in Basel III.  China will continue to advocate for 
greater representation of developing countries in global financial governance and seek reforms to 
international regulatory standards to ensure they are appropriate for the banking systems of these 
countries. China will seek to promote an international regulatory regime which puts the safety and 
soundness ahead of market efficiency or the interests of international financial conglomerates. It is also 
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argued that China will provide an opposing voice to developed countries such as the United States which 
have advocated for the deregulation or premature liberalisation of domestic financial systems. China will 
emphasise close regulation and supervision of domestic financial systems along with the pragmatic 
adoption of international standards according to each country’s national conditions. China’s leaders 
believe that achieving global financial stability is in the interests of all countries.  
 
Part III The Future of China’s Banking Sector: 
 
In the less than 25 years since the establishment of the socialist market economy, the banking sector 
has undergone a remarkable transformation. The scale of the banking sector has increased enormously. 
In 1992 the volume of credit extended by state-owned banks was recorded as RMB 350 billion (Chen, 
Yuan 1993). The total credit supply in 2009 reached 9.6 trillion RMB, over 27 times larger than in 1992 
(CBRC 2010, 44). Total assets in the banking sector have increased from RMB 27.6 trillion in 2003 to 
RMB 199.3 trillion in 2015, a per annum growth rate of approximately 18% (CBRC 2016). China has 
developed a regulatory system which has gradually become more robust and resilient to risk. China’s 
banking system was considered by external commentators to be technically insolvent in the 1990s (Liu, 
Mingkang 刘明康 2009a, 47). Today levels of asset quality and loan provisions exceed international 
standards. After the Asian financial crisis, Moody’s considered China’s NPL rate to be ‘much worse than 
even the most pessimistic of the official indications’, and was perhaps as much as 40-50% (Kynge 1998). 
The average NPL rate of the banking sector has decreased to just 1.9% as of 2015 (CBRC 2016, 196). 
China’s large state-owned banks have been transformed into unified, autonomous, commercial 
enterprises. Administrative influence over these banks has been refined so that there is less interference 
in commercial decisions. The introduction of modern corporate governance structures, minority 
investors and subjecting banks to an institutional setting with more rigorous regulations and enhanced 
transparency have all fundamentally improved bank governance. The landscape of China’s banking 
sector has changed also. While the large state-owned banks still dominate China’s banking sector, the 
share of banking assets of shareholding banks and local city commercial banks has risen substantially. 
 
Reform of the banking sector and the transformation of its banks will continue in the future. The 
General Secretary Xi Jinping’s vow that there would be ‘no stop in reform, no stop in opening up’ 
indicates that reform of the banking sector is set to continue according to the same philosophical 
principles. In the communique of the 3rd Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in 2013, the party 
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demonstrated its intent to commitment to further develop the socialist market economy, ‘to liberate 
and develop social productive forces’, to seek truth from facts and strive for ‘progress through stability’. 
‘Enhancing the people’s welfare’ remains the primary goal of economic development (CCP 2013).  
 
The 3rd plenum points to two broad areas of focus for the banking sector. The first area is the ‘perfection 
of modern market systems’ in order to ‘raise the efficiency and fairness of resource allocation’ (CCP 
2013). Perfecting systems of market regulation falls within the broader concept of perfecting modern 
market systems. CBRC and other government bodies will continue to implement new laws and 
regulations to mitigate areas of high risk such as local government debt or the shadow banking system. 
Recent reforms at CBRC have created an organisational structure which encourages a clear and 
consistent approach across different regulatory spaces. This trend of unification of systems and removal 
of regulatory arbitrage should continue, not only within CBRC but between CBRC and other regulatory 
agencies. This cooperation should extend beyond the inter-ministerial joint meeting system for financial 
regulation and coordination established by the State Council. China will also attempt to reduce moral 
hazard by establishing a harder budget constraint in the banking sector. Regulatory agencies such as the 
CBRC have already participated in the drafting of a bankruptcy law specific to financial enterprises (see 
for example CBRC 2012). The formal establishment of such a law, in conjunction with the recently 
established deposit insurance scheme, will provide the basis for the closure of troubled banks while 
protecting the interests of depositors and maintaining financial stability. The recent removal of the last 
remaining controls on interest rates should promote improvement in the pricing of risk and assessment 
of asset quality by banks. The healthy development of the shadow banking sector, with greater 
transparency and improved regulatory coverage, is vital to effective liberalisation of interest rates as it 
enables sectors of the economy which were marginalised by the banking system to have access to credit 
at a higher effective cost of financing.    
 
The second area of focus for the banking sector is the ‘transformation of government functions’ through 
structural reform (CCP 2013). While the Big Four have lost significant market share over the reform 
period, the banking sector remains dominated by banks which are majority owned and controlled by the 
central government. These are followed by banks controlled by local governments, while private banks 
remain at a very early stage of development. This means that reform of the large state-owned banks is 
integral to any future reform agenda. CBRC has taken an active approach in gradually developing 
mechanisms of corporate governance within the large state-owned banks and integrating them with the 
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party governance structure. The CBRC is steadily introducing more market-orientated appointments of 
senior management. However a high degree of administrative control is retained through the 
appointment of executive board members, which diminishes the accountability of the board to 
shareholders. The continuation of this high degree of administrative control subsequent to the listing 
process has maintained the existing bias of large banks towards government-supported sectors and 
undermines efforts to promote more market-orientated allocation of capital.   
 
While incremental improvements in governance have occurred, China’s policymakers are currently 
considering adjusting the governance structure to accelerate the adoption of market-orientated 
behaviour. This can be compared to the way that shareholding reform and listing provided a new 
institutional setting through which improvements in asset quality accelerated. State policymakers are 
advocating SOE reform which shifts administrative control from ‘managing SOEs’ to ‘managing state-
owned assets’ (Qingtai Chen 2014b). While it is unclear if such a policy will be implemented, it is a 
serious proposition which implies that the state would withdraw from direct ownership in the 
commanding heights of the economy. This policy is designed to liberate SOEs from government 
intervention while also liberating state-owned capital so that it can be used more effectively (Qingtai 
Chen 2014a). The state would focus on establishing investment funds to maximise the profits of state-
owned capital, a significant proportion of which could be held by social security and public welfare funds 
to benefit society. It is unclear how quickly reform would proceed in the banking sector. The state’s 
concern for economic stability has often caused reform in the banking sector to follow that of other 
state-owned sectors. However the banking sector already has a well-established investment fund in the 
form of Central Huijin Investments. In this respect Huijin compares favourably to SASAC, whose role of 
‘managing people, business and assets’ is the ‘hub of many current institutional conflicts’ (Qingtai Chen 
2014b). The mixed ownership reform plan recently announced for BoCom is considered to be a potential 
template for the first stages of governance reform in the large state-owned banks (Wildau 2015c). It 
explores concepts of employee shareholding plans and stock options. The intention of the state is for 
this new governance structure to accelerate market-orientated behaviour, foster creativity and 
innovation, and liberate productive forces (Qingtai Chen 2012). Policymakers will hope to improve the 
international competitiveness of Chinese banks. Governance reform will be a highly exploratory process 
which will require a further evolution of the role of party governance in enterprises. China’s officials will 
continue to grope for stones as they cross this new river.   
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